US Jews on Trump’s Relations with Arab Countries, the Israel-Hamas War, and Optimism About the Future
Main Findings
- There has been a significant decline in the confidence American Jews have in President Trump on many issues related to Israel and to Jews.
- This drop in confidence is also evident among Jews who voted for him.
- There has been a significant decline in confidence that Trump “will do the right thing” regarding Iran and US-Israel relations.
- Two in five respondents say that Trump is handling US-Jewish relations less well than they had expected.
- A third of Trump-voters on the respondent panel concur.
- Half of the respondent panel: We have no confidence at all that Trump will act appropriately in the fight against antisemitism.
- Half of the respondent panel thinks the agreement between the US and the Houthis not to attack each other is good for the US but bad for Israel.
- Half of the respondent panel thinks the retraction of the US demand for Saudi normalization with Israel as a condition for advancing a civil nuclear program in Saudi Arabia will harm both the US and Israel.
- There has been an increase in the share of respondents who think the US does not support Israel enough.
- Two in five respondents oppose a “two-state solution,” a third see it as the only way to resolve the conflict.
- A quarter say they have been more involved in Jewish activity in recent months than in the past.
- There has been a decline in the respondent panel’s optimism about the future of Israel, American Jewry, and the US.
- Conservatives are significantly more optimistic than liberals regarding the future of Israel, American Jewry, and the US.
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A general note about the survey period: Data was collected between May 15 and 20. Major events during the period immediately preceding the survey: President Trump visited several Persian Gulf countries, signed economic agreements, and engaged in intensive diplomatic activity. An IDF soldier with American citizenship was released from Hamas captivity through American mediation. Subsequent to Trump’s announcement last month on the start of nuclear talks between the US and Iran about the nuclear issue, five rounds of talks between the two countries had been held by the time this report was written. The survey was conducted before the Washington, D.C. terror attack that took the lives of two Israeli embassy staffers.
The US and the Arab States
From March of this year until the beginning of this month, the US struck the Houthi regime in Yemen as part of a military campaign known as “Operation Rough Rider.” In early May, President Trump announced he was ending the campaign. In response to this statement, the Houthis said that quiet would be answered with quiet, but that the strikes on Israel would continue.
This month, we examined the Voice of the Jewish People panel’s views on the bilateral understanding reached between the US and the Houthis, which did not include Israel in the issue. Nearly half of respondents (44%) think that this understanding is good for the US but bad for Israel; a third (34%) believe it is bad for both Israel and the US, and 8% think it is good for both Israel and the US.
The centrist cohort had the highest share (42%) of respondents who think the agreement is bad for both Israel and the US. The liberal-leaning cohort had the highest share (50%) of respondents who think the understanding is good for the US, but bad for Israel.
In a breakdown by voting pattern, an eighth (12%) of Trump voters think the US-Houthi agreement is good for both Israel and the US. Nearly half of both Trump voters and Harris voters believe it is good for the US but bad for Israel. A third of them think it is bad for both Israel and the US.
Last month, it was reported that the US would no longer insist on the establishment of relations with Israel as a condition for the launch of a civil nuclear program in Saudi Arabia. Although no announcement such as this was made during Trump’s Middle East trip, a question about it was posed to the respondent panel.
Nearly half of the respondents (46%) think that dropping the Israel-related condition would be bad for Israel and the US; a third (34%) believe it would be good for the US but bad for Israel, and less than a tenth believe it would be good for both Israel and the US. Broken down by political orientation, about half of liberals and of the centrist cohort, and a third of conservatives think such an understanding would be bad for both Israel and the US. A third of liberals and of the centrist cohort think it would be good for the US, but bad for Israel, as do 37% of the “leaning conservative” and 28% of the “strong conservative” respondents. About a fifth of the “strong conservative” respondents and an eighth of the “leaning conservative” respondents think the new understanding between the US and Saudi Arabia is good for both Israel and the US.
In a breakdown by voting pattern, 14% of Trump voters think the modified understanding is good for both Israel and the US. A third (31%) believe the modified understanding is good for the US but bad for Israel, and another third think it is bad for both Israel and the US. Among Harris voters, half think the understanding is bad for both Israel and the US, a third (34%) believe it is good for the US but bad for Israel.
This month, as in previous months, we looked at how confident respondents are that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran. A majority of respondents (55%) say they have no confidence at all that Trump will do the right thing on this issue, a quarter (28%) say they have a little confidence, and 10% say they have a lot of confidence in the US president in this regard. Since Trump took office in January 2025, there has been a steady downturn in the share of respondents reporting a great deal of confidence in the president on the Iranian issue, and a rise in the share reporting no confidence in Trump in this arena. This trend exists across ideological cohorts, although the main shift within the conservative cohort is from “a lot of confidence” to “a little confidence.” The response distribution reveals that the further along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the more confident respondents are that the US president will do the right thing in dealing with Iran.
This downturn in confidence is also found among Trump voters. At the start of his term, most Trump voters (70%) reported a great deal of confidence that he would do the right thing in this sphere, but today only a third (30%) feel this way.
US-Israel Relations
This month, as in previous months, we assessed the respondent panel’s confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations. Half (53%) of the panel say they have no confidence that the US president will act appropriately regarding relations between the US and Israel. A quarter (28%) say they have a little confidence in Trump in this arena, while an eighth (12%) say they have a lot of confidence in Trump in this regard.
Over the past two months, there has been a significant decline in confidence that the US president will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries. In March, a quarter (27%) reported having a lot of confidence in Trump on this issue; this month 13% gave this response. There has also been a slight drop in the share of respondents who say they have no confidence in Trump on this issue. This downturn in confidence that Trump will act correctly in terms of US-Israel relations exists across ideological cohorts. Compared to last March, the strong conservative cohort has shown a 37% decline in confidence that the president will act appropriately regarding relations between the two countries. In the leaning conservative cohort, there was a 26% decline, and among centrists, the drop was 20%. This month, most liberals and 43% of centrists report having no confidence that Trump will do the right
ng regarding US-Israel relations. Half (48%) of strong conservative respondents (48%), 43% of leaning conservative respondents, and 39% in the centrist cohort report having a little confidence in Trump in this regard. A third (33%) of the leaning conservative cohort and 41% of the strong conservative cohort say they have a lot of confidence in the US president on this issue.
In a breakdown by voting pattern, nearly half (46%) of Trump voters say they have “a little” confidence that the president will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations, and a third (38%) say they have a great deal of confidence in this regard. By contrast, most Harris voters (78%) say they have no confidence that the US president will do the right thing in the arena of US-Israel relations. Here too, we can discern a decline in confidence that Trump will act appropriately in this regard. In the past two months, there has been a 35% drop in the share of Trump voters who say they have a lot of confidence in Trump on this issue.
Subsequent to this question, we looked at whether President Trump is meeting the respondent panel’s expectations with respect to his handling of US-Israel relations. Two in five respondents say that Trump is performing precisely as they expected. Two in five say that Trump is doing less well than they had expected, while a tenth (9%) say the US president is doing better than they had expected on this issue.
Broken down by political orientation, half of liberals, 37% of centrists, and three in ten conservatives think Trump is handling US-Israel relations less well than they had expected. Across ideological cohorts, 40% say the US president is doing precisely as they had expected regarding relations between the countries, while a fifth (17%) of strong conservatives say he is performing better than they had expected him to in this regard.
Three in ten Trump voters (29%) report that Trump is performing less well than they had expected in the US-Israel relations arena. Two in five say he is performing precisely as they expected he would, while a fifth (17%) think he is handling relations between the countries better than they had expected.
Fighting Antisemitism
After this month’s data had been collected, a terror attack took place in Washington in which two Israeli diplomats were murdered. Another serious incident believed to be antisemitic occurred last month – an arson attack on the home of Pennsylvania’s Jewish governor, Josh Shapiro. Half (52%) of the respondent panel this month say they have no confidence in Trump in the fight against the growing antisemitism in the United States. A quarter (24%) report having a little confidence in him, while another quarter (22%) say they have a lot of confidence that Trump will act appropriately in this regard. Whereas most conservative respondents (strong conservative + leaning conservative) report having a lot of confidence in Trump on this issue, most liberal respondents (strong liberal + leaning liberal) say they have no confidence in the US president in the fight against antisemitism.
Compared to previous months, there has been a drop in the share of Trump voters saying they have a lot of confidence that he will do the right thing in fighting antisemitism: this month saw the lowest percentage (63%) of such responses since he entered office. Among Harris voters, there has been a steady upturn in the share of respondents saying they have no confidence that Trump will do the right thing in fighting antisemitism.
Israel at War
Again, this month, we looked at how the respondent panel perceives US support for Israel. Compared to last month, there has been a drop in the share of respondents who think the US supports Israel enough, and a rise in the share who think the US does not support Israel enough. This trend was found across ideological cohorts. Thirty-four percent of respondents think that US support for Israel is at the right level (versus 47% last month), 41% think the US does not support Israel enough (versus 33% last month), and 15% believe the US supports Israel too much. Most ultra-Orthodox and half of Conservative (48%) and Modern Orthodox (45%) respondents think the US does not support Israel enough. At the same time, a third of Reform (31%) and Conservative (32%) respondents think US support for Israel is at the right level (last month half of these respondents, along with half of the Modern Orthodox cohort, felt this way).
The Two-State Solution
This month, we examined the respondent panel’s views regarding the “two-state solution” for Israel and the Palestinians. Two in five respondents oppose such an arrangement, a third (31%) view it as the only feasible solution to the conflict, and a fifth (22%) support this framework but think that now is not the time to talk about it. These responses are indicative of the Voice of the Jewish People panel’s relative hawkishness compared to American Jewry writ large. To compare: A March Pew Research Center survey found that 47% of American Jews think that “a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with each other” (in a Pew survey from 2021, the figure was 63%).
The Voice of the Jewish People survey has found that most conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative) and half of the centrist cohort oppose the two-state framework. By contrast, most strong liberals (67%) support it as the only feasible solution to the conflict.
Broken down by denominational affiliation, most ultra-Orthodox (85%) and Modern Orthodox (69%) respondents, a third (35%) of Conservatives, and a fifth (22%) of Reform panelists oppose the two-state solution. At the same time, a quarter of Reform (26%), a third of Conservative (32%), and an eighth of Modern Orthodox (13%) respondents support the framework but think that now is not the time to talk about it. Additionally, 44% of Reform, 27% of Conservative, and a tenth of the Modern Orthodox respondents support this idea as the only feasible solution to the conflict. In a breakdown by voting pattern, most Trump voters (85%) and 16% of Harris voters oppose the two-state framework. By contrast, half (48%) of Harris voters view it as the only feasible solution to the conflict, and a quarter of them support the framework but think that now is not the time to talk about it.
Social and Jewish Involvement
Most panel participants (59%) say that in recent months they have been involved in Jewish activity at about the same extent as in the past, while a quarter (26%) say that in recent months they have been more involved in such activity. Broken down by denominational affiliation, a majority across cohorts say their degree of involvement in Jewish activity in recent months has been the same as it had previously been. Thirty percent of Reform, 28% of Modern Orthodox, and 26% of Conservative respondents report that their Jewish activity level has not changed in recent months.
This month, we also assessed the degree of the respondent panel’s willingness to be Jewishly and socially involved. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 denoting a total lack of involvement and 10 denoting a very high degree of involvement, the weighted score for all respondents was 8.3 for Jewish involvement and 9 for the desire to be involved in Jewish activity. That is: the desire to take part in Jewish activity is slightly higher than actual involvement. A similar pattern, if on a smaller scale, was found with regard to social involvement. The weighted score for those involved in social activity is 6.2, with a score of 7.1 for the desire to be involved in such activity.
With regard to Jewish involvement, a breakdown by denominational affiliation reveals a clear trend: the further one moves along the religiosity spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the weighted score for both involvement and the desire to be involved.
Regarding social involvement, a trend can be seen along the ideological spectrum. When moving from the liberal to the conservative ends of the spectrum, the weighted score drops. Across all cohorts, the weighted score for the desire to be involved is higher than that of actual involvement.
Future the About Optimism
This month, we examined the respondent panel’s optimism concerning Israel’s future, the future of American Jewry, and the future of the United States. These questions were posed exactly one year ago, and again three months ago. Respondents were asked to rate their optimism or pessimism on a scale of -5 (very pessimistic) to 5 (very optimistic). Compared to a year ago, there has been a 0.6 decline in respondents’ optimism about the future of the State of Israel. This drop in optimism was found in all ideological cohorts except for the strong conservative one, where optimism on this issue rose. The further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the optimism regarding Israel’s future (this is also a familiar phenomenon in JPPI surveys showing optimism disparities in Israel between centrist/left-wing Jews and Jews in the right-wing cohorts). Additionally, the further one moves along the spectrum, the smaller the change in optimism levels compared to a year ago. The gap between the strong liberal and strong conservative ratings regarding Israel’s future is 4.3, the largest in the three categories assessed (Israel’s future, the future of American Jewry, the future of the US).
Compared to a year ago, there has been a 0.3 drop in the respondent panel’s optimism regarding the future of American Jewry. This decline is even sharper when we look at the change over the past three months – a drop of 0.5. That is, between May of last year and February of this year, there had actually been a rise in the respondent panel’s degree of optimism about the future of American Jewry, with the decline occurring over the past three months. In an ideological breakdown we find a decline in optimism among liberals (strong liberal + leaning liberal) and centrists; by contrast, there has been a rise in optimism among conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative).
The respondent panel’s optimism level regarding the future of the United States is now, at -0.6, the lowest of the three categories assessed. However, the change in this category is the smallest of the three – 0.1. This change was found solely among liberals (strong liberal + leaning liberal). Among centrists no change was found over the past year, while among conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative) there has been a rise in optimism.
Survey Data and its Implications
This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 696 Jewish Americans registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel. Generally, it can be said that the survey tends to reflect the views of “connected” US Jews – those with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or to Israel, and/or to Jewish identity. Our January 2025 report included an appendix that details the characteristics of JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel and the differences between it and the American Jewish cohorts surveyed by other organizations.
The table to the right provides data on the May 2025 survey participants.
