The Jewish People Policy Institue

The Nuclear Talks

At the beginning of April, President Trump announced that bilateral diplomatic talks with Iran had begun, aiming toward an agreement on Tehran’s nuclear program. Trump’s objective is to conclude the negotiations within two months.

JPPI’s April survey, as in several previous months, assessed the confidence of American Jews in Trump vis-à-vis Iran. Half (49%) of the respondent panel is not at all confident that the US president will do the right thing in dealing with Iran, a quarter (30%) said they have “a little” confidence in him on this matter, and another 15% said they have “a lot” of confidence that he will act appropriately regarding Iran. Most in the strong conservative cohort (58%) say they have a lot of confidence in President Trump on this issue, but a majority of liberal respondents (strong liberal + leaning liberal) have no confidence at all that he will do the right thing vis-à-vis Iran.

Since Trump took office in January, we can see a significant change in the confidence American Jews place in Trump to do the right thing in dealing with Iran. Three months ago, at the start of his term, a third (30%) of the respondent panel said they had a lot of confidence in the president on this issue, but today a much lower share – 15% – expresses this confidence. This downturn can also be seen in the share of respondents saying they have no confidence at all that Trump will act appropriately regarding Iran. In January, a third (31%) of the respondent panel had no confidence in Trump vis-à-vis Iran, but this month half (49%) did so. This trend can be seen across ideological cohorts. Broken down by voting pattern, we find a drop in the share of Trump voters with “a lot” of confidence in the president regarding Iran – in January, 70% of them gave this response, but this month, less than half (44%) did so.

Half (53%) of the respondent panel said that if talks with Tehran fail, they would support an American military offensive against Iran. A quarter (26%) said they would not support such an offensive, while a fifth (21%) said they didn’t know how to answer this question. Notably, these findings point to a considerable difference between the respondent panel’s views and those of the general American public – and, it would seem, those of American Jewry as a whole (although the question has not been posed directly in any recent survey of US Jewry).

Broken down by political ideology, we find that most conservative (strong conservative and leaning conservative) and centrist (70%) respondents would support a military offensive against Iran should the talks fail. Two in five respondents in the leaning liberal cohort, and one in five in the strong liberal cohort, share this view. Only the strong liberal cohort comprises a majority (58%) opposing a military strike against Iran should the talks fail. A similar pattern emerges when the data is broken down by denominational affiliation – the further along the religiosity spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage of respondents who would support a military offensive against Iran if the current negotiations do not result in an agreement. In a breakdown by voting pattern, most Trump voters (86%) and a third of Harris voters (33%) would support a military offensive on Iran should the talks fail. By contrast, two in five Harris voters would oppose such an offensive.

This month’s survey presented respondents with the following statements:

“Recent reports on the nuclear talks between the US and Iran indicate possible gaps between the American and Israeli positions on this issue. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has said that a nuclear deal with Iran could be effective only if it is ‘Libyan style: They go in, blow up the [nuclear] installations and dismantle all of the equipment, under American supervision and carried out by America.’”

“The US special Mideast envoy, Steven Witkoff, has hinted that the US aims to restrict Iran’s uranium enrichment, without completely dismantling its nuclear program. ‘Iran doesn’t need to enrich uranium beyond 3.67%,’ Witkoff said.”

We asked respondents which of the two statements was closest to their own view.

Most respondents (61%) said they endorse Netanyahu’s demand for complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. A quarter (23%) agree with the American view that restricting Iran’s uranium enrichment would suffice, and 16% said they didn’t know. A majority across all ideological cohorts, except the strong liberals, said they support Netanyahu’s demand for total dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. Half of the strong liberals (46%), as well as a quarter of the leaning liberal cohort (25%), think that limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment would be sufficient. The vast majority of Trump voters (88%) and 45% of Harris voters think Iran’s nuclear program should be completely dismantled. One in three Harris voters thinks limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment would be enough.

The Fight Against Antisemitism

This month, as in previous months, we assessed the confidence American Jews place in Trump to “do the right thing” in fighting antisemitism. Nearly half of the respondent panel (47%) said they have no confidence in Trump on this issue, a quarter (24%) said they have “a little” confidence in him, and slightly more than a quarter (28%) said they have “a lot” of confidence that Trump will act appropriately in fighting antisemitism. While most politically conservative respondents (strong conservative + leaning conservative) said they have a lot of confidence in Trump on this matter, most liberal respondents (strong liberal + leaning liberal) reported having no confidence at all in the US president in this arena.

Compared to previous months, the percentage of Trump voters with a lot of confidence that he will do the right thing regarding the fight against antisemitism has increased. At the time he took office, two-thirds (67%) had a lot of confidence that Trump would act appropriately in fighting antisemitism, at present three-quarters (74%) hold this view. An opposite trend is in play among Harris voters – at the start of Trump’s term two-thirds (65%) said they have no confidence that Trump would do the right thing in the fight against antisemitism, three-quarters of them (75%) feel this way now.

We compared the findings for this question to those of a similar, but not identical, question posed in a mid-April survey of American Jews conducted by the Maryland-based Jewish Electorate Institute (JEI). While JPPI’s April Voice of the Jewish People survey queried respondent confidence that Trump would “do the right thing” in fighting antisemitism, the JEI survey gauged respondent support or opposition “to the way Trump is handling” antisemitism. Overall, similar findings were obtained by both surveys, but there is a discrepancy in the percentage of JPPI respondents who reported having “a little” confidence that Trump would do the right thing in fighting antisemitism (24%), and JEI respondents who said they somewhat support/oppose the way Trump is handling the fight against antisemitism in the US (13%). Another point of divergence is the percentage of respondents who answered “don’t know” – an eighth (13%) of the JEI poll respondents, and only 1% of JPPI’s respondent panel.

Trump’s Harvard Policy

Last month, the Trump administration announced its intention to freeze federal funding of some universities, in response to claims of their unsatisfactory handling of antisemitism. Subsequent to the administration’s statement and with the freezing of funds, Trump published the following declaration: “The persistent disruption of learning that has taken hold on campuses in recent years is unacceptable. The harassment of Jewish students is intolerable. It’s time for the prestigious universities to take the problem seriously and commit to meaningful change if they wish to continue receiving taxpayer support.”

We looked at the respondent panel’s views on this statement and on the university funding freeze. Forty-five percent of respondents said that, in general, they agree with the statement and with the decision to freeze funding, while 26% said they agree with the statement, but do not agree with the funding freeze. Another 26% disagree with both the statement and the funding freeze. That is, a majority of all respondents (71%) agree with the Trump administration’s statement, while a minority of one-quarter (26%) oppose it. On the other hand, a majority (52%) oppose the funding freeze.

Broken down by political orientation major gaps between the cohorts emerge – while most strong liberals (59%) oppose both the statement and the funding freeze, the vast majority of conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative) and half of the centrist cohort (52%) agree with the administration’s statement and with the decision to halt funding. A breakdown by denominational affiliation shows a similar pattern – the further along the religious spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the percentage in both agreement with the statement and support for the funding freeze. An overwhelming majority of Trump voters (96%) also think the funding freeze is appropriate, while 42% of Harris voters oppose it.

The Trump administration has made federal funding for Harvard conditional on a number of measures. We asked respondents whether they support or oppose these demands. The first of Trump’s demands we examined was his insistence on changes to the university’s organizational structure. Nearly half of the respondent panel (47%) opposes this demand, 38% support it, and 16% don’t know. While most conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative) support Trump’s demand for change in the University’s administrative structure, most liberals (strong liberal + leaning liberal) oppose it. A breakdown by voting pattern also shows major differences between cohorts – most Trump voters (79%) endorse the demand, and most Harris voters (69%) oppose it.

Removal of “diversity” as an admissions criterion was another condition the Trump administration placed on Harvard to receive federal funding. Half (50%) of all respondents oppose this demand, while 41% support it. It also garnered the support of most conservatives and the opposition of most liberals on the respondent panel. Half of the panel’s centrists support the removal of diversity as a factor in admission to the prestigious institution, while 38% oppose this demand.

Not admitting foreign students who are hostile to “American values” is another Trump administration demand of Harvard. A majority (57%) of the respondent panel supports this demand, while a one-third minority (33%) opposes it. Most of the strong conservative (99%), leaning conservative (89%), and centrist (70%) cohorts, as well as half of the leaning liberal cohort (48%), support this demand. Only the strong liberal cohort comprised a majority (77%) opposing the demand.

Also demanded of Harvard as a condition for receiving federal funding is a prohibition on admitting foreign students who support antisemitism. Three-quarters (74%) of the respondent panel endorses this demand, while a fifth (18%) opposes it. An overwhelming majority of conservatives (strong conservative + leaning conservative), and most of the centrist (89%) and leaning liberal (72%) cohorts support the demand. Among strong liberals, 43% oppose the demand, and 41% support it.

Reforming programs and departments that “fuel antisemitic harassment” was also demanded by the Trump administration. Of all the demands we asked about, this one elicited the highest share of support (76%). Most of the leaning liberal (73%) and centrist (91%) cohorts, and all of the conservative group (strong conservative + leaning conservative) support this demand. Forty-three percent of the strong liberal cohort opposes the demand, while 41% support it.

Another Trump administration demand of Harvard is that the university implement new disciplinary policies against student protesters. Most of the respondent panel (63%) supports this demand, while a quarter (25%) opposes it. The further along the political spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who endorse the demand. Broken down by voting pattern, the vast majority of Trump voters (95%) support the demand, but no clear pattern was detected among Harris voters – 43% of them support the demand and 40% oppose it.

Terminating DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) policies was the last Trump administration demand we queried. American conservatives harshly criticize DEI policies, which they claim lead to reverse discrimination, the prioritization of some demographic groups over others, and the reinforcement of radical-progressive views. Jews criticize DEI programs for disregarding antisemitism, arguing that the programs lead to the exclusion of Jewish groups, especially since the start of the Gaza War.

Half of the respondent panel (47%) opposes this demand, while 43% support it. In a breakdown by political orientation, most conservatives (strong conservative and leaning conservative) and half of the centrist cohort support the demand, while most liberals (strong liberal and leaning liberal) oppose it. On this issue as well, we found an overlap between political and denominational orientations – most ultra-Orthodox (82%) and Orthodox (73%) respondents support the abrogation of DEI policies, while most Reform Jews (67%) oppose it. Most Trump voters (95%) support the administration’s demand, while most Harris voters (73%) oppose it.

Israel at War

This month, as every month, we looked at how the respondent panel perceives American support for Israel: 47% of respondents think the US supports Israel enough, a third (33%) think the US doesn’t support Israel enough, and 15% believe that the US supports Israel too much. Half of the Reform (50%), Conservative (49%), and Modern Orthodox (53%) cohorts think the US supports Israel enough. A quarter of Reform, 41% of Conservative and Modern Orthodox, and half (47%) of ultra-Orthodox respondents think the US doesn’t support Israel enough.

This month, as in previous months, we also looked at the respondent panel’s views regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza. A third of respondents (33%) think Israel is not being aggressive enough in Gaza, a quarter (28%) think Israel’s actions are at the right level, a fifth (21%) say Israel is being much too aggressive, and 14% think Israel’s response to the October 7 offensive is a little too aggressive. While most strong conservatives (65%) think Israel’s actions in Gaza are not aggressive enough, half of the strong liberals think Israel’s actions are much too aggressive. A denominational breakdown shows similar patterns: the further along the religiosity spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share who think Israel’s response in Gaza is not aggressive enough. Most (61%) Trump voters feel this way as well. Among Harris voters, a third (33%) think Israel’s actions in Gaza are much too aggressive, a fifth (21%) think Israel’s actions are a little too aggressive, a quarter (24%) say Israel’s response is at the right level, and another fifth (18%) think Israel is not aggressive enough.

Compared to last year, and with this past January’s survey, when we last posed this question, this month saw a relatively high share of strong liberals expressing the view that Israel’s actions in Gaza are not aggressive enough. This is the highest recorded percentage (14%) of strong liberals who think this since the parameter was first assessed in January 2024. Overall, however, the dominant view among strong liberals is that Israel is too aggressive; 51% of them hold this view.

Major Life Milestones

As in JPPI’s April Israeli Society Index survey and a recent Pew Research Center survey that looked at identity issues in many different countries, this month we also asked American Jews what they think the right ages are to achieve major life milestones. A comparison of the surveys shows that Israeli Jews think it’s best to start a family at a younger age than do American Jews.

Regarding retirement age: American Jews think the right age to retire is later than that preferred by Israeli Jews. An eighth (12%) of Israeli Jews think it’s best not to retire at all, compared with 3% of American Jews who hold this view. A fifth of those in both groups feel there is no preferred retirement age.

Survey Data and its Implications

A general note on the respondent panel: Following a comprehensive data analysis of JPPI’s panel participants – their demographic composition and worldviews – we have begun to include aggregate figures in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People surveys that reflect the position of the panel as an entirety. This signals the maturation of the panel, and the stabilization of the respondent pool in such a way that we can now represent them as a fixed group, where the trends observed among participants, in our view, take on a significance beyond their categorization into sub-groups according to denominational affiliation (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, etc.), or political orientation (liberal, centrist, conservative, etc.).

The American Jews whose views are queried and expressed in JPPI’s monthly Voice of the Jewish People surveys have a relatively strong connection to Jewish identity, and/or Jewish institutions, and/or Israel. Our interest in this group is precisely due to that characterization. On average, members of our respondent panel are more active in the Jewish community, more connected to Jewish institutions of various kinds, contribute more to Jewish causes, and identify more with Jewish struggles. In many ways, our respondent panel functions as the backbone of the broader American Jewish community. Our January 2025 report included a methodological appendix that details the characteristics of JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel, its demographic composition, and the differences between the Voice of the Jewish People survey and other surveys of American Jewry.