The Jewish People Policy Institue

Survey of American Jews on the Kirk Assassination, the New York Mayoral Elections, the War in Gaza, Foreign Relations, Antisemitism, and Optimism about the Future.

Key Findings

The Assassination of Charlie Kirk

Charlie Kirk was an American conservative political commentator and the founder of Turning Point USA, an organization that promotes conservative values among college students and the wider American public. He was assassinated during an appearance at Utah Valley University (UVU) in Orem, Utah. Soon after, his killer was apprehended. The murder sparked a broad debate about political polarization, public discourse, and the impact of hatred and violence on the political reality in the United States.

In the wake of Kirk’s assassination, we asked panel respondents whether they viewed Kirk as a friend or an adversary of Israel and American Jews. Two in five respondents identified Kirk as a friend of American Jews; nearly one-third (29%) saw him as an adversary; one-fifth (18%) regarded him as a neutral figure in relation to American Jews; and 16% said they did not know.

When broken down by ideological orientation (see table) and religiosity level, clear gaps emerge: 79% of ultra-Orthodox and 62% of Modern Orthodox respondents viewed Kirk as a friend of American Jews, while 41% of their Reform and 24% of Conservative counterparts saw him as an “adversary” of American Jews. By voting pattern, the differences are even starker: 86% of Trump voters considered Charlie Kirk a friend of American Jews, while only 12% of Harris voters thought so. Moreover, nearly half (47%) of Harris voters regarded Kirk as an adversary of American Jews.

Half (51%) of respondents believed Kirk was a “friend of Israel,” while 12% viewed him as an “adversary of Israel,” and 18% regarded him as a neutral figure. Here too, gaps appear among the ideological cohorts. Among the “strong liberal” group, only a fifth (21%) thought Kirk was a friend of Israel, compared with 85% of conservatives who held this view. A similar pattern is evident when broken down by religiosity level: while just over one-third (36%) of Reform respondents saw him as a friend of Israel, two-thirds of their Modern Orthodox (75%) and nearly four-fifths of their ultra-Orthodox (79%) co-panelists regarded him as such.

In the wake of Kirk’s assassination, various conspiracy theories spread, some of which linked the murder to Israel or to Jews (Prime Minister Netanyahu even responded to these assertions in a U.S. interview). Most respondents believe that some portion of the American public subscribes to such conspiracy theories, though it is not a large share. Nearly half of respondents (45%) think that “some” Americans believe conspiracy theories surrounding Kirk’s murder, while just one in seven (14%) believe that many Americans accept them, and only 2% think that most Americans believe them. About one-quarter (26%) estimate that “very few” Americans believe these theories. Liberals are slightly more inclined than conservatives to assume that many Americans believe the conspiracy theories around Kirk’s assassination.

The War in Gaza

In mid-August, Operation Gideon’s Chariots II began, with the objective of occupying Gaza City. So far, areas surrounding the city have been seized, and several targeted killings have been carried out. In recent weeks, preparations have been underway for conquering the city itself, alongside the launch of an air campaign that has expanded the scope of the operation. Many residents have evacuated Gaza City to assembly areas in the southern part of the Strip.

This month, we presented respondents with a deliberately simplified – and therefore problematic – binary question. The same question was posed to Israelis in parallel surveys. One option: Israel should end the war and secure the release of hostages, even if it means Hamas continues to rule Gaza. The other option: Israel should continue the war in order to remove Hamas from power, even if it means no hostage deal is reached. Despite the limitations of such a binary framing, we asked this question to clarify public preferences when faced with two alternatives, each representing a clear potential achievement (the removal of Hamas, or the release of hostages) alongside a clear cost (Hamas remaining in power, or the loss of hostages).

Among American Jews on the respondent panel, 43% believe Israel should aim to end the war and bring about the return of the hostages, even if Hamas remains in control of Gaza. By contrast, 42% think Israel should continue the war to oust Hamas, even if it means forfeiting a hostage deal. Fifteen percent of respondents were unable to answer. These responses are nearly identical to those of Israeli Jews in JPPI’s September Israeli Society Index.

Among American Jewish respondents, most self-identifying as conservative or centrist believe that given the current circumstances Israel should continue the war to deracinate Hamas, even at the cost of forfeiting a hostage deal. By contrast, most liberal respondents support ending the war and securing the hostages’ release, even if it means Hamas remains in control of Gaza.

A similar pattern appears when broken down religiosity level: a majority of ultra-Orthodox and Modern Orthodox respondents support continuing the war, while a majority of Reform respondents call for its end. In line with this ideological divide, most Trump voters (81%) favor continuing the war, while most Harris voters (61%) support ending it.

This month’s survey confirmed a continuing slow but steady rise in the share of respondents who believe that Israel’s response to the Hamas October 7 attack has been overly aggressive. In January, only 31% held this view, but the figure has now risen to 47%. At the same time, opinions at the opposite end of the spectrum have declined: at the beginning of 2025, two in five panel participants thought Israel’s response was not aggressive enough – today, just over a quarter (26%) still hold that view.

This month recorded the highest level (69%) since our measurements began in January 2024, among the strong liberal cohort (about 30% of survey respondents) who believe that Israel’s response to Hamas’s surprise attack has been “far too aggressive.” Compared with our measurement in January 2024, the share of strong liberals has doubled from 34% to 69%.

Last month, reports of famine in the Gaza Strip increased, with public debate focused on the decision to transfer extensive aid to the Strip alongside growing international criticism of Israel. International media published testimonies and reports from various sources about severe food shortages in different parts of Gaza, and according to international organizations, the number of Gazans suffering from hunger increased. Israel’s position throughout the crisis remained consistent: there is no real famine in Gaza, and such reports are the product of Hamas propaganda.

This month, we examined how panel members retrospectively assessed these reports. Nearly half (44%) believe they were greatly exaggerated, while one-quarter (26%) think they were somewhat exaggerated. One-fifth (21%) believe the reports were accurate, and 4% think they understated the severity of the situation. Most conservatives and those identifying as centrists believe the reports were very exaggerated, while most liberals think the reports were either accurate or somewhat exaggerated. By voting pattern, a large majority (86%) of Trump voters believe the reports were greatly exaggerated, compared with one-fifth (21%) of Harris voters. One-third (34%) of Harris voters think the reports were somewhat exaggerated, while another third (34%) regard them as accurate.

Antisemitism and Foreign Relations

Over the past month, Israel’s international standing has continued to erode, alongside a rise in antisemitism – a trend that concerns Jews around the world.

This month, we examined whether American Jews believe that global antisemitism is a product of Israeli policy. One-third of panel participants (31%) believe that the increase in antisemitism stems largely from Israeli policy, another third (34%) think it is somewhat related, and a further third (32%) believe there is no connection at all. According to JPPI’s September Israeli Society Index, the share of Israelis who think there is no link between Israeli policy and the rise in antisemitism is higher than among American Jews. Conversely, American Jews are more likely than Israeli Jews to see at least a partial connection. In other words, Jews in Israel are more inclined than Jews in the United States to reject the notion of a direct link between Israeli policy and the rise in antisemitism.

Ideologically, the more one moves along the spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who deny any connection between Israeli policy and the rise in global antisemitism. Only one in eight in the strong liberal cohort believes there is no connection, compared with nearly two-thirds (64%) of the strong conservative group. Conversely, the more one moves in the opposite ideological direction, the higher the share of respondents who believe antisemitism stems largely from Israeli policy: only one in ten strong conservatives holds this view, compared with half of the strong liberals.

By voting pattern, a majority (58%) of Trump voters believe there is no link between rising antisemitism and Israeli policy. One-quarter (26%) think the trend is somewhat related to how Israel acts, and one in eight see a direct connection. Among Harris voters, two in five believe Israeli policy has a strong impact on antisemitism, another two in five see a partial connection, while 15% believe the rise in antisemitism is not at all connected to Israeli policy.

Although most respondents believe there is a connection between Israeli policy and the rise of antisemitism, nearly half (45%) think it is not a reason to change Israel’s policies. About one-quarter (27%) argue that moderate adjustments are warranted, and one-fifth (21%) believe there should be significant changes. According to JPPI’s Israeli Society Index earlier this month, the share of Israeli Jews who believe there is no need for policy change is even higher – more than half (56%) hold this view. In other words, and as expected, American Jews are more inclined than Israeli Jews to assume that growing antisemitism necessitates changes in Israel’s policy.

Ideologically, most conservatives and centrists believe that Israel does not need to alter its policies. In contrast, among the strong liberal cohort, a majority supports substantial change. A similar pattern emerges when broken down by religiosity level: the further one moves from the liberal pole to the conservative pole, the greater the share of respondents who believe Israel’s policies should remain unchanged despite the rise in antisemitism.

Diplomatic Action Against Israel

Alongside the UN General Assembly and announcements by numerous countries recognizing a Palestinian state, we examined whether American Jews accept the claim voiced by some senior Israeli government officials that such a move is anti-Israel or antisemitic. Overall, a large majority of American Jewish respondents accept this claim in one form or another. Two in five believe such announcements are both anti-Israel and antisemitic. Twenty-nine percent think they are anti-Israel, while a fifth (22%) believe it is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic. A negligible share views them as solely antisemitic, and a similarly small share regard them as pro-Israel.

On this question, there is a conspicuous gap between the responses of Israeli Jews, as documented earlier this month in JPPI’s Israeli Society Index, and American Jews in the present survey. Nearly twice as many American Jews than their Israeli counterparts see recognition of a Palestinian state as neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic, or even pro-Israel (27% versus 15%).

From an ideological perspective, most conservative or centrist respondents believe that recognition of a Palestinian state is both anti-Israel and antisemitic. By contrast, half of the strong liberal respondents consider it neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic. A similar pattern emerges when broken down by religiosity level: the further one moves along the religious spectrum from liberal toward conservative, the greater the share who view recognition of a Palestinian state as both anti-Israel and antisemitic. Across all religious cohorts, a majority consider such recognition as anti-Israel, but there is no consensus as to whether it is also antisemitic.

This month, we also examined how panel respondents interpret calls in various countries to impose sanctions on Israel because of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and whether they see such calls as anti-Israel, antisemitic, or neutral. About half of the respondents (48%) view these calls as both anti-Israel and antisemitic, while nearly one-third (29%) see them as anti-Israel. Fifteen percent of respondents believe such calls are neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic.

The proportion of American Jews who view sanction calls as both anti-Israel and antisemitic (48%) is higher than the corresponding share among Israeli Jews (37%). However, American Jews are also more likely (15%) than Israeli Jews (8%) to regard such measures as neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic.

As with the previous question, the data here also point to a clear connection between ideological and religious identity and perceptions of calls to sanction Israel over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The more politically conservative, the greater the tendency to view such calls as both anti-Israel and antisemitic.

Another question in this month’s survey concerned countries that permit their academic institutions to boycott Israel. The data shows much stronger consensus among American Jews on this issue: 70% view such permission as both anti-Israel and antisemitic – a significantly higher proportion compared to Israeli Jews. In addition, 15% of respondents consider it to be anti-Israel, and only 6% believe it is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic.

On the question of academic boycotts, there is broad agreement across ideological camps, though the proportion of respondents choosing each response varies. The more conservative the ideological position, the higher the respondent share regarding academic boycotts as both antisemitic and anti-Israel. This share rises from 44% in the strong liberal cohort to 85% among those in the “leaning conservative” or “strong conservative” cohorts.

Attitudes Toward the United Nations

The UN General Assembly approved by a significant majority the “New York Declaration,” which expresses support for a two-state solution, alongside condemnation of Hamas and a series of accusations leveled against Israel. According to the declaration’s sponsors, it constitutes an action plan designed to chart an “irreversible path” toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. In light of this decision and following a series of UN actions and statements since October 7, we examined the views of Voice of the Jewish People panel participants regarding the UN this month.

A majority of respondents expressed negative views of the UN. Of these, 61% said their opinion was very negative, and 18% described it as somewhat negative. Only a fifth of respondents expressed a positive view (somewhat positive or very positive). Along the ideological spectrum, the more conservative the position, the higher the share of respondents with a very negative opinion of the UN. A quarter of the strong liberal cohort holds a very negative view of the international body, while an overwhelming 95% of strong conservatives share this view.

The New York Mayoral Elections

As in previous months, we again examined respondent views on the Democratic candidate for mayor of New York City, Zohran Mamdani. The New York elections are expected to preoccupy the largest Jewish community outside Israel between now and the November 4 elections. Unlike past New York City mayoral elections, the candidate’s stance toward Israel and Jews has been a frequent and widely reported discussion topic. Mamdani has spoken harshly against Israel in the past – and according to several Jewish leaders, some of his statements have bordered on antisemitism. At the same time, he has many Jewish supporters seeking to persuade the public to separate his critical stance on Israel from his attitude toward Jews and the New York City Jewish community.

As in the past two months, a majority of respondents (58%) believe that Mamdani is both anti-Israel and antisemitic. One-fifth believe he is anti-Israel but not antisemitic, while one in ten believe he is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic. Compared with the past two months, there has been no significant change in respondent perceptions of Mamdani.

Along the ideological spectrum, the more conservative the orientation, the higher the share of respondents who believe Mamdani is both anti-Israel and antisemitic. While a fifth of the strong liberal cohort hold this view, 92% of the strong conservative group do. The strong liberal cohort is the only one with a significant portion of respondents who believe Mamdani is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic – one-quarter take this view. Among liberals, a relatively high share of respondents said they did not know how to answer the question about Mamdani, compared with conservatives and centrists.

A similar pattern emerges when responses are broken down by religiosity level: the further along the scale from liberal to conservative, the higher the share who view the Democratic mayoral candidate as both anti-Israel and antisemitic. Across religious cohorts, at least half their respective respondents share this assessment. Broken down by voting pattern, an overwhelming majority of Trump voters (93%) and 37% of Harris voters regard Mamdani as both anti-Israel and antisemitic. One-third (32%) of Harris voters think he is anti-Israel but not antisemitic, an eighth say he is neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic, and a fifth say they do not know.

Trump or Harris

This month, coinciding with the release of former presidential candidate Kamala Harris’s book, 107 Days, we asked respondents for whom they would vote for US president, given the information available to them today.

Among Trump voters, the response was unequivocal: 98% said they would vote for him again. By contrast, among Jewish Harris voters, the picture regarding Jewish Harris voters was less clear – 77% said they would vote for her again today, while 16% indicated they would now choose another candidate.

Across the sample as a whole, and based on what respondents currently know, 35% said they would vote for Trump, 47% for Harris, 14% for another candidate, and 4% said they would abstain from voting.

Optimism for the New Year

On the eve of Rosh Hashana, we examined how American Jews evaluate the past year and how they approach the coming one. Some of the questions mirrored those asked earlier this month in JPPI’s Israeli Society Index.

American Jewish respondents enter the new year with a sense of pessimism regarding the United States, Israel, and the world.

Most respondents (66%) believe the US is on a path of decline and that this process will continue. By contrast, 11% believe the US is on a path of improvement with further progress ahead. One in ten think the state of the US is improving but do not expect the situation to get better, while another one in ten take the opposite view – that the US is in decline but is likely to improve.

Sharp ideological differences emerge: while an overwhelming majority of the strong liberal respondents (92%) believe the US is deteriorating and will continue to do so, only one-quarter (23%) of their strong conservative counterparts share this sentiment. Nearly half (45%) of the strong conservative cohort is optimistic – believing the US is already on a path of improvement with more progress to come. A similar pattern appears when broken down by voting pattern: 85% of Harris voters are pessimistic, compared with only one-quarter (27%) of Trump voters. More than one-third (36%) of Trump voters express hope that the progress they sense now will continue, one-fifth (22%) believe the US is indeed improving but fear the process may not last, and 9% think the US is currently in decline but will eventually improve.\

Sentiment regarding Israel’s future is mixed but also leans toward pessimism: two in five respondents (38%) believe Israel is on a path of decline and fear the situation will only worsen. By contrast, a fifth (19%) believe Israel is on a path of improvement with continued positive progress ahead, while another fifth (20%) shares that view but expresses concern about the future. Compared with Israeli Jews, nearly the same share of American Jews lands on the pessimistic side; however, the proportion of Israeli Jews who are optimistic about the country’s future is higher than among American Jews.

On Israel’s future, too, ideological divisions are significant: among the strong liberal cohort, an overwhelming majority (71%) believe Israel is in decline, and only 3% are optimistic. By contrast, among strong conservative respondents, half (51%) believe Israel is already improving and will continue to do so, with just 8% thinking the country is in decline. A similar trend appears in a breakdown by religiosity level: 50% of Reform respondents believe Israel is on a path of decline that will continue, compared with 43% of ultra-Orthodox and 33% of Orthodox respondents who express optimism about continued improvement.

When asked about their feelings regarding the state of the world, panel participants expressed greater pessimism than both Israeli Jews and Israelis overall. Seventy-one percent believe the world is on a path of decline and fear this process will continue. Nearly a fifth (17%) of American respondents think the world is deteriorating but expect it to improve, while an additional 3% believe the world is improving and will continue to do so.

The sense of pessimism among most American Jews regarding the state of the world cuts across political groups. Whether strong liberal (70%) or strong conservative (70%), the majority believe the world is on a trajectory of decline. Only a very small minority – between 2% and 5% in each cohort – believe the world is on a path of improvement that will continue.

A similar trend is evident by religiosity. Among Modern Orthodox Jews, the level of pessimism is especially high, with 82% saying the world is deteriorating. Among ultra-Orthodox respondents, despite a relatively high share of “don’t know” responses (14%), 71% still say the world is heading in a negative direction. Among Reform and Conservative respondents, the data is similar, with roughly 67–69% expressing a sense of decline.

Overall, the findings point to a broad consensus, cutting across religious streams and political orientations, of deep concern about the direction in which the world is heading.

In recent months, we have begun including Jewish respondents from Canada and the United Kingdom in the Voice of the Jewish People panel. The group from these countries is not yet large or diverse enough to allow us to present full results across all questions, but on issues concerning the state of their countries, Israel, and the world, we present their (unweighted) responses.

As in the US and Israel, the data shows a deep sense of pessimism regarding the state of the world. Seventy-one percent believe the world is on a path of decline and that the situation will only worsen. Similar levels of pessimism were recorded regarding the specific situations of the United States (66%), Canada (62%), and the United Kingdom (77%).

Canadian and British respondents were somewhat more positive about Israel’s situation. Only 38% believe Israel is deteriorating – a lower figure compared with respondents in Israel and the US. When ranking the four countries surveyed in terms of being on a path of improvement and likely to continue improving, Israel comes first with 19%, compared with 11% for the US, 7% for Canada, 4% for the UK, and just 3% for the world as a whole.

Survey Data and Implications

This report is an analysis of a survey conducted among 609 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index panel. In addition, 105 Canadian respondents and 52 from the United Kingdom participated (their responses were included in the analysis only as explicitly noted).

In general, it can be said that JPPI’s monthly Voice of the Jewish People Index surveys tend to reflect the views of “connected” American Jews – that is, those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, and/or to Israel, and/or to Jewish identity.

This table provides data on the September 2025 survey respondents.