The July survey found that the divide between Israeli and American Jews over the Gaza war continues to grow.
Main findings:
- US Jews believe the attack on Iran has somewhat reduced the existential threat to Israel.
- US Jews are less convinced that Israel has “defeated” Iran than Jewish Israelis.
- A third of American Jews believe that Israel is winning or has won the broader war.
- Jewish confidence that Trump “will do the right thing” regarding Israel-US relations has increased.
- A quarter of US Jews have changed their opinion of Netanyahu for the worse; in Israel, a third have changed their opinion for the better.
- A large majority of respondents say Mamdani is a bad candidate for the mayor of New York City, and do not support him.
- Most say that Mamdani is “anti-Israel and antisemitic”; 20% say he is “anti-Israel but not antisemitic.”
- Overall, US Jews trust other people less than Israeli Jews do.
- American, Canadian, and British Jews trust Jews significantly more than non-Jews.
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The Iran Campaign
In June, Israel conducted a 12-day offensive against Iran, and the US joined forces with it for a one-off strike on several of Iran’s major nuclear facilities. The American strike increased the share of Jews who believe that Trump will “do the right thing” in dealing with Iran, and lowered the share with no confidence that he will. This increase, at various levels, is discernible across all ideological cohorts, except for the “strong liberal” group, where the increase is small. Confidence among Jewish Trump voters in his Iran policy rose to 66%, but there was no significant change among Jewish Harris voters to Trump’s benefit, though there was some erosion of negative sentiment. Many Jewish Harris voters who last month said they “have no confidence at all” that Trump will do the right thing in dealing with Iran switched to having “a little confidence” that Trump will do the right thing on Iran (the questionnaire gave three options: a great deal of confidence, a little confidence, and no confidence at all).
Like Israelis, and Jewish Israelis in particular, US Jews view the attack on Iran as a success that somewhat reduced the threat posed by Iran to Israel. However, American Jews perceive the threat reduction as less sharp, because the percentage who regarded Iran as an existential threat was slightly lower to begin with, and because the percentage of those who believe that Iran remains an existential threat is higher. For comparison purposes: JPPI’s Israeli Society Index from early July found that 93% of Jewish Israelis believed Iran to be an existential threat before the campaign, while just 63% said that Iran remains an existential threat after the campaign. By contrast, 86% of the US Voice of the Jewish People panel said Iran was an existential threat (to a great extent or some extent) before the campaign, with the percentage dropping to 73% after it. It should be noted that there was a two-week gap in data collection, during which time a number of conflicting reports addressed the Iran campaign’s success. The disparity between Israeli and American Jews may stem, in this case (the comparison of JPPI’s two July surveys), from the time gap between them and from the types of reporting that appeared during this interval.
Generally, US Jews are less convinced than Israeli Jews that Israel “won” the Iran campaign. Again, these differences could be due to a perception discrepancy, or to the time gap between the two surveys – JPPI’s Israeli Society Index survey was administered in early July, a relatively short time after the campaign, and the present survey was conducted in mid-July, after more time had passed and impressions could be formed based on additional reports on the damage done to Iran’s nuclear program, and to Israel. Only 12% of Israeli Jews rated their sense that Israel had won as low (1 + 2), while double that percentage of American respondents felt that way (25%). Among those who “feel” that Israel won, there is also a striking disparity between Israeli Jews, over a third of whom chose the highest rating in this regard (5), and American Jews, only 7% of whom gave the “5” rating.
Among US Jews, the sense of Israeli victory over Iran closely correlates to ideological orientation. About half of the strong liberal cohort said they do not feel that Israel won (48% rating 1 or 2), while among centrists and those on the right, a majority feel that Israel did win. This split is also apparent among Israeli Jews, although ideologically flipped: most Jewish Israelis are situated on the ideological spectrum from the center rightward, while most US Jews are situated from the center leftward, which of course affects the overall result.
The Gaza War
About a third of US Jews believe that Israel “is winning or has won” the war. This question refers to the broader war that began on October 7, 2023, and has proceeded on multiple fronts. More than half of Israeli Jews (54%) said they felt this way when surveyed in early July. It should be noted, however, that the July findings in Israel reflected something of a surge in the sense of victory concerning the broader war, perhaps as an aftereffect of the Iran campaign. We must wait for subsequent surveys to see whether these findings continue as is. Events pertaining to Gaza are dynamic, and in the two weeks between the surveys conducted in Israel and the US, difficult negotiations were underway to reach a hostage deal and ceasefire – in whose wake, perhaps, an end to the war might be achieved.
As one might expect, there are major perception gaps on the question of Israeli victory – both in the US and in Israel – that correlate with ideological orientation. Half of Jewish Trump voters gave ratings of 4 or 5, i.e., that Israel is winning or has won the war. By contrast, over half of Jewish Harris voters gave ratings of 1 or 2 – meaning that Israel is not winning or has not won the war (53%). Among conservative and right-wing US Jews, the degree of confidence in Israeli victory is also substantially lower than among Israeli Jews.
There was no significant difference this month over last month in the Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel’s views regarding Israel’s level of aggressiveness in the Gaza war, or on whether Israel is, in moral terms, prosecuting the war appropriately. Both questions on this issue – one pertaining to aggressiveness and the other to allegations that Israel is carrying out a “genocide” – yielded similar responses in June and July. Forty-four percent of strong liberals agree with the allegation that Israel is committing “genocide” in Gaza. The strong liberal cohort holds views on Israel’s prosecution of the war that diverge from the other groups.
As noted, no real change was found this month over last month in the assessment of Israel’s aggressiveness in the Gaza war. Nearly half of the respondent panel believes that Israel is “much too aggressive” or “a little too aggressive” in the war (45%); a third believes that Israel is not aggressive enough.
Overall, a majority in the two liberal respondent cohorts maintain that Israel is being too aggressive in the war – while a majority of conservatives, a smaller share of the survey sample, believe that Israel is not being aggressive enough. Seventy percent of Trump-voting Jews (who constitute a quarter to a third of all American Jews) believe that Israel is not aggressive enough in Gaza. Sixty-eight percent of Jews who voted for Harris, the majority of US Jews, think Israel is too aggressive.
Confidence in Netanyahu and Trump
The respondent panel’s confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding Israel-US relations rose this month over last month, perhaps in the wake of his decision to attack Iran and/or Prime Minister Netanyahu’s friendly visit to Washington at the beginning of July. A majority of the respondent panel (57%) has some confidence that Trump will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries. This majority also comprises a third of Harris voters (35%) who believe that Trump will act appropriately in this regard.
Further comparison of the Israeli and American July surveys shows a disparity between American and Israeli Jews who have a lot or a little confidence in Trump. A larger percentage of Israeli Jews have a lot of confidence in Trump, and about half have a little confidence. Among US Jews, express “a little” or no confidence in him. Overall, 67% of Jewish Israelis have confidence in Trump; the figure for American Jews is 57%.
In the wake of the Iran campaign and a discernible rise in Israelis’ confidence in the prime minister, we posed a direct question this month, in both the US and Israel, regarding public opinion toward Mr. Netanyahu. Similar majorities in both countries say their opinion of Netanyahu has not changed recently. However, a quarter of US Jews changed their view of Netanyahu for the worse, while a third of Israeli Jews changed their opinion of him for the better (somewhat for the better or very much for the better).
A mirror effect emerges when comparing the views of Jewish Trump and Harris voters. Among Trump voters, a third say they changed their opinion of Netanyahu for the better in recent weeks, while a third of Harris voters say they changed their view of him for the worse in recent weeks.
The New York City Mayoral Race
The mayoral elections in New York City – the “largest Jewish city in the world” – have captured the attention of the global Jewish community, primarily because issues are at play directly related to Israel and the Jews. Last month, Zohran Mamdani won the Democratic mayoral primary. Mamdani has a history of harsh statements about Israel and, implicitly, about Jews – at least according to many Jewish leaders. Among other things, Mamdani has not denounced the slogan “globalize the intifada,” which some perceive as a call for violence against Israelis or Israel supporters around the world, including the US (in mid-July, Mamdani committed to encouraging others to stop using the slogan).
This month’s Voice of the Jewish People survey posed two questions on Mamdani. One looks at how Jews feel about the possibility that he will become mayor. The following table shows both the aggregate views of all surveyed Jews and the views specifically expressed by New York respondents (33 in New York City, 144 in the state of New York), as well as an ideological breakdown. Unsurprisingly, Mamdani’s candidacy is viewed much more favorably by respondents in the strong-liberal cohort, and much less so by Jews further to the right. Even in the leaning liberal cohort, a majority do not support Mamdani’s candidacy. A Honan Strategy Group survey from May found that 20% of New York Jewish Democrats supported Mamdani’s candidacy, 31% supported the candidacy of Mario Cuomo. However, Cuomo lost the June primary to Mamdani and subsequently announced his intention to run as an independent in the November mayoral elections). JPPI’s July Voice of the Jewish People survey found that a quarter of Harris voters (24%) support Mamdani’s candidacy and would be happy to see him win. Another 15% are indifferent.
The second question on Mamdani sought to determine whether his views are or are not perceived by Jews as anti-Israel and/or antisemitic. Most of the respondent panel believes that Mamdani’s views are both anti-Israel and antisemitic. A fifth said his views are anti-Israel but not antisemitic, and a small minority thinks his views are neither anti-Israel nor antisemitic. A third of New York respondents think Mamdani is anti-Israel but not antisemitic. In the strong liberal cohort, a majority believe that he is not antisemitic; 49% of the leaning liberal cohort believe that Mamdani has expressed antisemitic views (12% say they don’t know). The Centrist and right-wing cohorts have clear majorities who think that Mamdani’s views are both anti-Israel and antisemitic; 98% of Trump voters feel this way. Among Harris voters – Jews tend to support Democrats – 40% think Mamdani has expressed views that are both anti-Israel and antisemitic; 31% believe his views are anti-Israel but not antisemitic.
Trust in People
In 1972, nearly half of Americans (46%) said that, in general, “most people” can be trusted, five decades later, the figure had dropped to 34% – from nearly half to about a third. In a Pew Research Center study published in May, Americans’ Trust in One Another, its authors wrote, “Social trust is rooted partly in personal experience. People learn to trust others based on how they themselves have been treated. But scarring events that reduce trust – like losing a job or experiencing discrimination – may happen to people in some groups more often than others, leading to differences in trust across society.” In the US, one can see a major trust gap based on income and education levels: those who earn less and those who are less educated trust people less.
Both of this month’s JPPI surveys assessed trust in other people among both Israelis and American Jews. Findings from both surveys were compared in the context of international indices of a similar nature. To conduct this comparison with a high degree of accuracy, we used a standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can or cannot be trusted?”
Forty-four percent of the American Jews on JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel answered yes, 27% said no, and 29% were unable to answer the question. This trust level is significantly lower than among Israeli Jews, but somewhat higher than for Americans in general.
As part of our expansion of the Voice of the Jewish People panel into additional countries, we also posed the trust question to panel participants in Canada and the UK. The findings from these countries should be treated with caution at this stage, as we are still in the process of consolidating the panel. Still, it is interesting to note that among Canadian Jews (a sample of about a hundred participants), the share of those who trust other people is low compared to all Canadians – 33%. British Jews’ trust level is quite close to that of other Britons – 40%.
The tendency of Jews to trust or not trust other people correlates somewhat with ideological orientation: trust in others drops as one moves from the liberal to the conservative end of the ideological spectrum. A majority of strong liberals say people can be trusted, as do a clear majority in both the leaning liberal and centrist cohorts. There is no such majority in the conservative cohorts. Note that the percentage of respondents who “don’t know” is higher for this question than for most of the questions in this survey, and double or more than the corresponding percentage of respondents in JPPI’s July Israeli Society Index survey.
As in our July Israeli Society Index survey of Jews and non-Jews, we looked at US Jews’ trust in specific groups besides the very general one of “other people”: trust in “most Americans,” in “most American Jews,” in “most Israelis,” and in “most Israeli Jews.”
The results show that US Jews place much greater trust in other Jews (including Israelis) than they do in people in general, including other Americans. Less than half said that most people or most Americans can be trusted, while seven in ten said that most Jews can be trusted – in the US or Israel (the disparity between trust in Israelis and trust in Jewish Israelis is very small, probably because most Israelis are Jews; the distinction thus has little significance, certainly not when viewed from a distance).
In all the Jewish communities we surveyed, the share of Jews who trust other Jews within their communities is much higher than the share of Jews who trust non-Jews. This finding is true of Israeli and American Jews, with similar findings obtained for our smaller samples of Canadian and British Jews.
To return to the US, it is interesting and perhaps surprising that trust levels broken down by ideological orientation remain stable even when trust in Jews is at issue. Even liberal Jews tend to place more trust in other Jews than do conservative Jews.
Trust levels broken down by ideological orientation are somewhat reversed when the question pertains to Israeli Jews. In this instance, the tendency of liberals – strong liberals in particular – is to place less trust in Israeli Jews, while the tendency of conservative Jews is to place more trust in Israeli Jews.
The trust US Jews place in Israeli Jews is slightly higher than the trust Israeli Jews place in other Israeli Jews (mainly because a higher share of Americans say they don’t know). In an almost identical manner, the trust placed by US Jews in Israelis in general is higher than the trust placed by Israeli Jews in Israelis in general.
Survey Data and Its Implications
This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 726 Jewish Americans registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People panel. Generally, it can be said that the survey tends to reflect the views of “connected” US Jews – those with a relatively strong connection to the Jewish community, and/or to Israel, and/or to Jewish identity. Our January 2025 report included an appendix that details the characteristics of JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel and the differences between it and American Jews surveyed by other organizations. This month’s survey also included 134 Canadian Jews and 58 British Jews (their responses are displayed separately). The general findings refer solely to the sample of US Jews.
The table on the right provides data on the July 2025 survey participants.
