Most respondents assume that when Trump takes office, US-Israel relations will improve.
Main Findings
- The main issue for Jewish Harris voters was “democracy”; the predominant issue for Jewish Trump voters was “foreign policy.”
- Most respondents assume that when Trump takes office, US-Israel relations will improve; even among Harris voters, less than a third feel that relations will worsen.
- A new record for the share of liberal Jews who feel that Israel’s military actions in Gaza are too aggressive – more than half hold this view.
- Most respondents feel that the Biden administration did not perform well in the struggle against antisemitism; only half of Jewish Harris voters think that President Biden did a good job in this sphere.
- Jewish Trump supporters believe that Trump will perform well with regard to fighting antisemitism; Jewish Harris supporters feel that he will not perform well.
- Nearly half of the respondent panel reports that when traveling abroad they conceal signs of their Jewishness.
- A large majority of the respondent panel closely followed reports of attacks on Israelis in Amsterdam.
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The US Elections
A general note on the survey period: Data was collected between November 14 and 20, a little more than a week after Donald Trump was elected the 47th president of the United States. The survey was conducted after the dismissal of Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, in a month when the fighting continued in Gaza and Lebanon, and a large number of rockets and missiles were fired at Israel, causing civilian deaths.
The US presidential race concluded with the election of Donald Trump. Although the race had appeared close, Trump won in all seven swing states, and the Republican Party achieved a majority in both houses of Congress. Trump is the second president in US history to serve two non-consecutive terms.
As expected, most Jews who self-identify as politically “conservative” voted for the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, while most Jews who self-identify as “liberal” voted for the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris. Half of “centrist” respondents voted for Harris; only a quarter of them voted for Trump. Actual vote shares for both candidates are quite similar to the figures obtained by polling during the months preceding the elections. Regarding both candidates, at the “moment of truth” the vote shares obtained for respondent panel members were slightly higher than indicated by the monthly surveys conducted prior to the elections. According to the weighted panel data, 66% of Jews voted for Harris while 25% voted for Trump.
This result is fairly similar to the figures obtained in some of the Election Day polls. In any case, all of the polls agree that Harris received a large majority of the Jewish vote, but they are divided about the exact split. Some polls (Fox News) reported 65% for Harris. Others (the mainstream media outlets) reported 79% for Harris.
Some polls looked at the Jewish vote by district or by state. One such poll, identified with Orthodox organizations, found that 40% of Jews in Pennsylvania swing districts voted for Trump. A study by the left-leaning organization J Street found that 25% of Pennsylvania Jews voted for Trump.
Voice of the Jewish People panel data broken down by religiosity level indicates that a majority of Modern Orthodox and ultra- Orthodox Jews, a quarter of Conservative Jews, and a fifth of Reform Jews voted for Trump. Most Reform and Conservative Jews, and a quarter of Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews, voted for Harris.
Similar differences were also found in other post-election surveys. A Jewish Electorate Institute poll found that the four top reasons given by Jewish Harris voters were: “threat to democracy”; Trump’s “unfitness” for office; Trump’s “fascist leanings”; and his stoking of “prejudice and bigotry” (in this poll, unlike JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People survey, respondents could select several reasons, not just a single “main” reason). Harris’s wider-ranging support for abortion rights was the fifth-most-cited reason why Jews voted for her. Sixty-three percent of Jewish Harris voters mentioned the abortion issue.
Jews who voted for Trump noted other reasons for their choice. First, like other American Trump voters, they cited his immigration policy (61%) and his economic policy (55%). These reasons were immediately followed by issues pertaining to Israel, Iran, and antisemitism. Fifty-three percent of Jewish voters said that Trump’s support for Israel was one of the most important considerations in voting for him.
Regarding the Incoming Administration
After Trump’s win, we asked panel participants whether they were confident that the president-elect would do a good job. Overall, we see that the further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher one’s confidence in Trump on all of the issues mentioned in the question. For conservatives, the two issues that elicited the highest degree of confidence were “immigration” and “relations with Israel.” A large majority of conservative respondents are confident that the president-elect will do a good job on all of the issues we asked about. For centrists and liberals, confidence that Trump would do a good job with respect to relations with Israel broke down as follows: 54% of centrist respondents, 16% of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and only 7% of strong liberals.
As expected, on this question we can easily spot disparities between Harris and Trump voters. Only an eighth of Harris voters are confident that Trump will do a good job on relations with Israel, and an even lower share are confident of his performance on all the other issues. The issue that elicited the lowest rating among Trump voters was democracy (72%).
After Trump’s win, we asked panel participants whether they were confident that the president-elect would do a good job. Overall, we see that the further one moves along the ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher one’s confidence in Trump on all of the issues mentioned in the question.
For conservatives, the two issues that elicited the highest degree of confidence were “immigration” and “relations with Israel.” A large majority of conservative respondents are confident that the president- elect will do a good job on all of the issues we asked about. For centrists and liberals, confidence that Trump would do a good job with respect to relations with Israel broke down as follows: 54% of centrist respondents, 16% of the “leaning liberal” cohort, and only 7% of strong liberals.
Immigration was one of the main issues during the election campaign. A majority of Reform and Conservative respondents, a third of the Modern Orthodox cohort, and a quarter of ultra-Orthodox do not expect Trump to perform well on immigration; most Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox respondents do have confidence in Trump on immigration, and nearly half of “unaffiliated” respondents do so.
Most modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox respondents, a third of Conservatives, and a fifth of Reform Jews on the panel believe that Trump will do a good job in the foreign relations arena. However, most Reform and Conservative, a third of Modern Orthodox, and slightly more than a quarter of ultra- Orthodox respondents are not confident in his performance in this regard. A breakdown by ideological orientation shows similar findings – the further one moves along the political spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher one’s confidence that Trump will do a good job on foreign relations.
Most politically conservative and centrist Jews are confident that Trump will have a positive effect on US-Israel relations.
A majority of liberals do not expect him to perform well in this sphere. Most Modern Orthodox and ultra- Orthodox respondents, half of the Conservative cohort and a quarter of Reform survey participants are confident that Trump will do a good job in US-Israel relations.
The question of the next president’s policies and actions regarding Israel was also posed in another way, leading us to conclude that most Conservative, Modern Orthodox, and ultra- Orthodox respondents feel that when Trump takes office, US-Israel relations will improve. Forty-one percent of Reform respondents also feel this way, but a quarter of them think that relations between the two countries will worsen. A large majority of Trump voters believe that the relationship will improve under Trump; a quarter of Harris voters also feel this way.
However, a fifth of Harris voters say that relations will remain as they currently are, and 30% say that US-Israel relations may worsen under Trump. Over half of the entire respondent panel thinks that US- Israel relations will improve under Trump, compared with 19% who say that they will worsen (13% believe they will remain the same).
Most conservative respondents are confident about Trump’s ability to fight antisemitism, while most liberal respondents are not. Those in the “centrist” cohort are evenly divided on this issue. A similar trend can be seen on the religiosity spectrum – the further one moves from the liberal toward the conservative (small c) streams, the stronger one’s confidence in Trump.
Biden’s Term in Office
With President Joe Biden’s term in office approaching its end, we looked at what respondents think about his performance in a variety of spheres. Overall, we see that those with liberal views have significantly higher levels of satisfaction with Biden’s performance than those with conservative views. For liberal respondents, the issues on which Biden elicited the highest degree of satisfaction were democracy, the economy, and security/defense. A majority of centrists also expressed high satisfaction with Biden’s performance regarding democracy and the economy. A fifth of those who “lean conservative” think Biden performed well on the issue of democracy, while an eighth think that he did well with regard to relations with Israel. A tenth of “strong conservatives” are satisfied with Biden’s performance with respect to democracy, while less than a tenth expressed satisfaction on all other issues.
Only a quarter (28%) of Harris voters believe Biden did a good job on immigration. Furthermore, only half of them think Biden did well in the struggle against antisemitism, and 59% are satisfied with Biden’s performance regarding relations with Israel. Trump voters gave similar answers to those of conservative respondents.
The results for the entire respondent panel, weighted by religiosity level, indicate that Biden “did a good job” in the spheres of democracy (69%) and the economy (61%); a smaller share feel this way about his performance in the foreign relations (46%) and defense (49%) arenas, and relations with Israel (43%). An even smaller percentage think Biden performed well in the struggle against antisemitism (33%) and with regard to immigration (14%).
This month, Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs published a study indicating that the amount of aid provided by the Biden administration to Israel was the highest in the history of relations between the two countries. This finding is not reflected in how JPPI survey respondents perceive Biden’s support for Israel. Most centrists (54%) and conservatives feel that the outgoing president did not do a good job in relations with Israel. Sixty percent of liberal respondents feel that Biden performed well in this area, while a quarter do not share this view.
When the findings are broken down by religiosity level, we see that a majority of Conservative, Modern Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox respondents believe that Biden’s performance in the struggle against antisemitism was unsatisfactory. Reform Jews are evenly divided over whether Biden handled rising antisemitism well.
Support for Israel
As noted, various studies indicate that American aid to Israel since the start of the war has amounted to over 20 billion dollars, a figure that supports the claim that Israel is the country that has received the largest amount of American assistance since World War II.
Despite these findings, the November Voice of the Jewish People survey shows a persistent gap between liberal respondents and those from all other cohorts in how they perceive the degree of US support for Israel. The dominant view among conservatives and centrists is that the US support for Israel is insufficient. By contrast, the “strong liberal” cohort shows a slow but steady rise in the share of those who think the US is overly supportive of Israel. This month, centrist respondents showed a decline in the percentage who believe that the US does not support Israel enough – the lowest share recorded for this group in the past six months.
This month, in a series of questions about support for Israel, we also looked at respondents’ attitudes regarding the president- elect’s and the vice- president-elect’s views on Israel. Most respondents showed no change since Trump’s election in their rating of his support for Israel. The only cohort for which a significant change of outlook is the “centrists”: the share of centrists who think that Trump is pro-Israel rose by 17% this month, reaching a high over the past several months. A majority of panel participants (54%) consider Trump to be pro-Israel.
We asked the same question about Trump’s vice president, J.D. Vance. Most conservatives see him as “pro-Israel,” while most liberals do not. A third of centrists view him as pro-Israel, and a third do not. In contrast to this question regarding Trump, a relatively high percentage among all groups do not know whether or not Vance is “pro-Israel.” A third of respondents in all groups chose the “don’t know” response (except for the conservatives, only 14% did so). Compared with an identical question posed in July, there has been a rise in the share of conservatives who see Vance as “pro-Israel.”
Israel at War
In a continuation of the trend of earlier months, the November Voice of the Jewish People survey showed a rise in the percentage of liberals and centrists who feel that Israel’s military activity in Gaza is too aggressive. This month, the share of respondents in the liberal cohorts (strong liberal and leaning liberal) who think so reached a new high.
The percentage of “strong liberals” who feel that Israel’s actions in Gaza are too aggressive is 79%, and 56% of those “leaning liberal.” This trend widens the perception gap between conservatives and liberals on this issue – the percentage of conservatives who think Israel is too aggressive has been very low since early 2024, while the percentage of liberals and centrists who feel this way has risen over time.
This month, the percentage of strong liberals who think that Israel’s response to the October 7th onslaught is “much too aggressive” reached a new high – half of this cohort now feel this way. A quarter of strong liberals think Israel’s response is “somewhat too aggressive.”
The fighting in Lebanon continued over the past month. The data shows a slow but steady upturn over recent months in the percentage of conservatives who feel that Israel is aggressive “to the right extent” in Lebanon, and a drop in the share of liberals who hold this view. At present, 40% of conservatives and 55% of centrists feel that Israel is aggressive to the right extent in Lebanon. In August, the percentage of conservatives who felt that Israel was not aggressive enough was 81%; now it is 57%. A third of “strong liberals” feel that Israel’s military actions in Lebanon are much too aggressive, while a third feel that they are not aggressive enough.
Antisemitism and Sense of Security
A notable antisemitic event took place in Europe this month: dozens of Israeli fans of the Maccabi Tel Aviv soccer team were violently attacked on the streets of Amsterdam by pro-Palestinian activists. Respondent panel participants report having been aware of the attacks at the beginning of the month, and to having closely followed the story (80% of those in all ideological categories and religious streams). The further one moves along the political spectrum from liberal to conservative, both in terms of ideology and in terms of religiosity, the higher the share of those who say that they closely followed the events. A negligible percentage said that they had not heard about the events in Amsterdam.
Jews’ sense of security when they travel around the world has been compromised since the start of the Israel-Hamas War. In this month’s survey, nearly half of respondents across all subgroups reported concealing their Jewishness when traveling outside of their areas of residence (sometimes or always).
A little over a third of respondents in all ideological groups said that they never hide their Jewishness. Major differences were found between liberals and conservatives on this question. In a breakdown by religiosity, we see that the further one moves toward the conservative end of the political spectrum, the higher the percentage of respondents who said they never conceal their Jewishness when they travel. This is an interesting finding given the fact that Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews exhibit many more external signs of Jewishness (head coverings and the like).
Survey Data and Its Implications
This report is an analysis of a survey administered to 564 American Jews registered for JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. The report does not provide a weighted representative sample of American Jewry as a whole, but the number of panel respondents who self-identify as belonging to various groups enables us to identify trends, views, and differences between Jews based on religious affiliation, emotional attachment to Israel, political orientation, attachment to Judaism, and more.
Roughly speaking, it can be said that this survey tends to reflect the attitudes of US Jews with some connection to the Jewish community, as indicated by a specific question in this regard (which includes data for anyone who stated a connection to some Jewish institution, such as a synagogue, community center, Jewish organization, etc.), as well as Jews with an attachment of some kind to Israel, as reflected in the data on visits to Israel, which are significantly more numerous than the average for all US Jews.
Data on survey participants (see table below): About half self-identify as liberal; the percentage of intermarried respondents is significantly lower than the average for US Jews generally; the share of Conservative respondents is higher than their share in the American Jewish population as a whole. The percentage of respondents unaffiliated with any religious stream is lower than for American Jewry in general.
