JPPI’s May Israeli Society Index looks at how the government is functioning, how confident Israelis are in the national leadership and in victory, and the reasons behind the prolongation of the war.
Additional Findings
- Most Israelis (55%) think the war will continue for another year or more – a rise compared to six months ago.
- Most of the public agrees that a total victory over Hamas is a worthy goal, but not a realistic one.
- 45% of Israelis believe that “total victory” is a politically motivated slogan.
- Half of Israelis think the war has been prolonged because the government has not made decisions quickly enough.
- 44% believe the war has been prolonged due to a lack of clear and realistic objectives that would have made ending the fighting possible.
- Half of Israelis think the war has been prolonged because the coalition has a political interest in its continuation.
- Two in five Israelis believe that international pressure has kept Israel from completing its objectives, causing the war to be prolonged.
- A quarter of Israelis think the Israeli legal system hinders the IDF and prevents it from carrying out its mission.
- 44% of the Israeli public agrees with the explanation that “the war has been prolonged because there is no clearly defined and realistic endgame.”
- There is broad public consensus that returning the hostages should be a central goal of the war, but disagreement over how to achieve it.
- A third think the way to return the hostages is by agreeing to Hamas’ demand to end the war.
- Most of the public thinks the government has not handled the economy or internal security situation well.
- There has been a further rise in Jewish Israelis’ confidence in the IDF senior command.
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Duration of the War
At the start of May, the IDF announced that it was planning to expand its military activity in Gaza. Accordingly, call-up orders were issued to tens of thousands of reservists. At the same time, the chief of staff ordered an immediate increase in draft notices to the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim), as the crisis surrounding Haredi conscription continues to threaten the stability of the governing coalition.
A year and a half into the war, JPPI’s Israeli Society Index shows that most Israelis (55% in total; 58% among Jewish Israelis) expect the war to continue for another year or more. A quarter of Israelis think the war will continue for a few more months, and 16% say they don’t know. Compared to views expressed last October, at the one-year mark of the war, Israelis now expect the war to last longer. In October, a third (31%) of the public expected the war to end within a few months, a fifth (18%) said it would continue for another year, and a tenth (11%) thought it would end within a few weeks. Seventeen percent estimated, in October, that the war would continue for more than a year, and 9% believed it would go on for another two years. That fact – that another six months have passed – has not shortened the estimated duration of the war but lengthened it.
Broken down by political orientation, the further left along the ideological spectrum, the longer the estimated duration of the war. On the right, 31% think the war will continue for “a few more months.” And the combined percentage of those who estimate the war’s duration as “a few more weeks, a few months, or a year” is 68%. Among centrists, the combined percentage (a few weeks/months or a year) is 54%; on the left, it is 43%
Government Performance in Wartime
This month, we repeated questions that had been posed at the war’s one-year mark about the government’s performance in three areas: internal security, the economy, and the treatment of evacuees from the north and the south.
Most Israelis rate the government’s handling of internal security as poor (“very poor” + “poor”), a fifth (18%) rate it as “reasonable,” an eighth (12%) rate it as good, and just 5% of Israelis think the government’s performance has been very good. Most in the left-wing (85%), left-center (81%), and centrist (64%) cohorts rate the government’s handling of Israeli internal security as “very poor.” Most in the right-center cohort rate it as reasonable (35%) or good (27%). Arab Israelis give the government the lowest marks on internal security. The incidence of violence within the Arab sector far outstrips that of the Jewish sector.
Most Israelis rate the government’s handling of the economy as poor (“very poor” + “poor”), a fifth (18%) rate it as reasonable, a tenth (10%) say it is good, and 8% believe it is very good. The Arab Israeli cohort has the highest share of respondents saying the government’s performance vis-à-vis the economy is very poor. In our October survey, 37% of Israelis rated the government’s handling of the economy as reasonable or better; this month, the figure is 36%.
Nearly half of Israelis (48%) think the government’s treatment of evacuees from the north and the south is poor (“very poor” + “poor”); 21% think it is reasonable, 14% say it is good, and 10% think it is very good. Relative to last October, the percentage of Israelis who rate the government’s treatment of evacuees as very poor has dropped. At the one-year mark of the war, 36% of Israelis felt this way; now, that figure is 29%.
In a breakdown by political orientation, most left-wing (91%), center-left (82%), and centrist (72%) respondents rate the government’s treatment of evacuees as poor (“very poor” + “poor”). On the other side of the political map, half of center-right respondents and most of right-wing respondents rate the government’s handling of evacuees as reasonable (35%) or good (25%). A fifth (21%) of the right-wing cohort thinks the government’s treatment of the evacuees is very good; the share in all other ideological cohorts is negligible.
The War’s Prolongation
This month, we reexamined the Israeli public’s views regarding the war’s prolongation by repeating questions posed at the war’s one-year mark.
A quarter (25%) of Israelis agree with the view that the war has been prolonged “because the missions are complex and take a long time to carry out.” A third (30%) “somewhat agree” with this explanation, while 43% disagree with it.
In an ideological breakdown, majorities in the left-wing (74%), left-center (64%), and centrist (55%) cohorts were found to disagree with the statement regarding the complexity of the missions. In the center-right cohort, 29% agree with this explanation, 33% somewhat agree, and 38% disagree. A similar breakdown was found in the right-wing cohort – 37% agree, 37% somewhat agree, and a quarter (25%) disagree. Compared to the survey we conducted at the one-year mark of the war, this month’s survey showed almost no change in the level of agreement with this explanation for the war’s prolongation.
Half (51%) of Israelis agree with the explanation that the war has been prolonged “because the government has not made good decisions quickly enough.” A quarter (27%) somewhat agree with this explanation, while a fifth (19%) disagree with it.
Broken down by political orientation, most in the left-wing (74%), left-center (73%), and centrist (69%) cohorts agree with the statement. In the right-center cohort, 46% agree with it, a third (34%) somewhat agree, and a fifth (18%) disagree. In the right-wing cohort, a third (30%) agree, 38% somewhat agree, and 31% disagree. Compared to the survey conducted in October, a year into the war, this month’s survey found a similar distribution in levels of agreement with this explanation for the war’s prolongation.
In a breakdown by voting pattern in the 2022 Knesset elections (among those who voted for the coalition parties): 45% of Mafdal-Religious Zionism voters, a third (30%) of United Torah Judaism voters, a quarter (23%) of Shas voters, and a fifth (19%) of Likud voters agree that the war has been prolonged because the government has not made good decisions quickly enough.
Two in five Israelis agree with the statement that the war has been prolonged “because international pressure has hindered Israel from completing its missions.” A quarter (25%) somewhat agree with this explanation, while 35% disagree with it. This question evinced a significant disparity between the responses of the Jewish and Arab populations. Most Arab Israelis (55%) disagree with the assertion that international pressure has hindered Israel from completing its missions, thereby prolonging the war, a fifth (19%) somewhat agree with it, and 16% agree with it. Among Jewish Israelis, the pattern is reversed: most in the right-wing and right-center cohorts agree with this explanation, while most in the left-wing and left-center cohorts do not. Half of centrist respondents also disagree with it.
In a breakdown by religious affiliation, most respondents in the non-religious traditionalist (Masorti), religious (Dati), and ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) cohorts agree with this assertion. Half (49%) of religious-traditionalist (Masorti) and a quarter (23%) of secular respondents also feel that international pressure has hindered Israel from completing its war mission. By contrast, half (50%) of the secular and a fifth of the Masorti cohorts disagree with this explanation.
Half of the Israeli public disagrees with the explanation that the war has been prolonged “because the Israeli legal system hinders the IDF and prevents it from carrying out its missions.” A quarter (28%) of Israelis agree with this explanation and another 14% somewhat agree with it. On this question as well, a disparity was found between the responses of Jewish and Arab Israelis. A third of Jewish respondents agree with this statement, while only an eighth of Arab respondents do.
Broken down by political orientation, most respondents in the left-wing, center-left, and centrist cohorts disagree with this explanation, while most of those in the right-wing cohort agree with it. Among right-center respondents, 45% disagree with this explanation, 34% somewhat agree, and 18% agree.
In a breakdown by voting pattern, most Mafdal-Religious Zionism (74%) and Likud (58%) voters believe that the war has been prolonged because the Israeli legal system hinders the IDF and prevents it from carrying out its missions. Half (50%) of United Torah Judaism voters and 46% of Shas voters agree with this explanation.
Nearly half of Israelis (44%) think the war has been prolonged “because the coalition has a political interest in prolonging it,” while 39% of Israelis disagree with this explanation, and an eighth (13%) somewhat agree with it. Most Arab Israelis (61%) agree with the statement, 16% somewhat agree, and 13% disagree. Among Jewish Israelis, 45% disagree with this explanation for why the war has been prolonged, 39% agree with it, and an eighth (12%) somewhat agree with it (overall, a small majority agree or somewhat agree with it).
Most (61%) Arab Israelis agree that the coalition has a political interest in prolonging the war: 16% somewhat agree with the statement, and 13% disagree with it. Among Jewish Israelis, 45% disagree with this explanation for why the war has been prolonged, 39% agree with it, and 12% somewhat agree with it (overall, a small majority agree or somewhat agree with it).
Broken down by political orientation, most respondents in the left-wing and center-left cohorts agree that the coalition has a political interest in prolonging the war, while half of center-right respondents and most of those in the right-wing cohort disagree with it. Among the right-center cohort, a fifth (21%) of the respondents also agree with it.
Half (52%) of the Israeli public disagrees with the explanation that the war has been prolonged “because protesters and pressure groups weaken the determination to win.” A quarter (28%) agree with this explanation, and a fifth (17%) somewhat agree with it. Among Jewish Israelis, 45% disagree with it, while 33% somewhat agree with it, and a fifth (17%) agree with it. Among Arab Israelis, two-thirds (61%) agree with this statement, 15% somewhat agree with it, and 15% disagree with it.
Among both Jews and Arabs, there has been a decline over the past six months in the percentage of respondents who disagree with this explanation.
Broken down by political orientation, most left-wing and center-left respondents, and half (46%) of centrist respondents, disagree with this contention. By contrast, most (63%) of those in the right-wing cohort agree with it. Most United Torah Judaism (60%), Religious Zionist Party (59%), and Likud (58%) voters in the 2022 elections agree that the war has been prolonged because protesters and pressure groups weaken the determination to win.
Forty-four percent of the Israeli public agrees with the explanation that the war has been prolonged “because the objectives are neither clearly defined nor realistic.” A fifth (22%) somewhat agree with this assertion, a third (31%) disagree with it. Among Arab Israelis, a higher percentage agrees with this explanation than among Jewish Israelis, while a lower percentage of Arab Israelis disagree with it. Compared to the October survey, the share of all Israelis, Jews, and Arabs who agree with the contention that the objectives are neither clearly defined nor realistic has risen from 57% to 66% over the past six months.
Broken down by political orientation and party affiliation, most left-wing and center-left respondents, as well as most Yesh Atid (75%), National Unity (75%), Yisrael Beiteinu (67%), and Labor (64%) voters, agree with this explanation. By contrast, most right-wing respondents and 43% of center-right respondents disagree with it.
Slightly more than half of the Israeli public (54%) disagrees with the explanation that the war has been prolonged “because the IDF senior command is not determined enough to achieve a quick victory.” A fifth of Israelis (19%) agree with this explanation, and another fifth (22%) somewhat agree with it. Compared to the October survey, a lower percentage of respondents, Jews and Arabs, agree with this contention at present.
Broken down by political orientation, majorities across cohorts, except for the right-wing group, disagree with the assertion that the war has been prolonged because the IDF senior command is not determined enough to achieve a quick victory. Among right-wing respondents, 38% agree with this view, another 35% somewhat agree with it, and a quarter (24%) disagree with it. In a breakdown by voting pattern in the 2022 elections, half (50%) of Mafdal-Religious Zionism voters, 38% of Shas voters, and a third (32%) of Likud voters agree that the war is being prolonged because the IDF senior command is not determined enough to achieve a quick victory.
The War and the Hostages
There is a broad consensus among Israelis that returning the hostages should be a central goal of the war. By contrast, a majority do not feel that Israel should capitulate to the Hamas demand for the war’s cessation as a condition for returning the hostages. That is, there is agreement on the goal, but disagreement over how to achieve it. Regarding the options offered in the survey, a third (32%) of the Israeli public (29% of Jews) said that the way to achieve the objective of returning the hostages is to comply with Hamas’ demand to end the war, a quarter (28%) believe the way to return the hostages is through a decisive victory over Hamas, and another quarter (25%) chose the option of “pressuring Hamas until it agrees to a reasonable deal.” Eight percent believe that returning the hostages is important, but should not be a central goal of the war, and 2% believe that returning the hostages is one of many issues in the security arena and not more important than any other.
A majority (54%) of the right-wing cohort thinks the hostages can be returned solely through a decisive victory over Hamas. In contrast, most left-wing respondents (center-left and left) and half of centrist respondents think that the way to achieve this goal is by complying with the Hamas demand for a ceasefire to end the war.
Most United Torah Judaism (55%), Shas (54%), Mafdal-Religious Zionism (52%), and nearly half of Likud voters (48%) believe that the hostages can be returned only through an unequivocal defeat of Hamas.
On the other side of the political map, most Yesh Atid (66%), National Unity (56%), and Labor (68%) voters believe that returning the hostages entails capitulating to the Hamas demand to end the war.
This month, after 18 months of war, we examined how the Israeli public views the government’s motives vis-à-vis the hostage issue. Half of the public ascribes the government’s handling of the fate of the hostages or coalition survival to self-interest. When respondents were offered options broken down individually, a quarter (28%) think the government is not prepared to reach a hostage deal due to coalition survival concerns. Another quarter (27%) believe the government is prepared to reach a hostage deal, provided no security price is paid, and a fifth (22%) think the government has lost interest in the hostages and abandoned them. A fifth (20%) believe the government is prepared to reach a hostage deal at a heavy price, but Hamas is uninterested in such a deal. A higher percentage of Arab Israelis think the government has lost interest in the hostages and abandoned them than Jewish Israelis.
Half of the right-wing cohort (51%) think the government is prepared to reach a hostage deal as long as no security price is paid. A fifth (21%) of the right-wing cohort think the government is prepared to reach a hostage deal at a heavy price, but Hamas is uninterested. In contrast, a majority of centrist and 46% left-wing respondents believe the government has lost interest in the hostages and abandoned them.
This month, we looked at how Israelis characterize their primary emotion a year and a half into the war through a question also posed at the one-year mark. A quarter (24%) say their dominant emotion is worry, 17% say it is despair, 16% say anger, 14% say sorrow, 13% say determination, and another 13% feel mainly optimistic. These responses are relatively similar to those obtained last October, when an identical question was asked. The main differences are a slightly lower share of those who say “worry” this time, while the percentage of those who feel despairing or angry is slightly higher.
In the left-wing and left-center cohorts, the dominant emotions are worry and despair (and anger is also predominant among left-wing respondents). On the other side of the political map, a third of right-wing respondents report mainly feeling optimistic (30%), a quarter (25%) report feeling mainly determined, and a fifth (19%) report feeling mainly worried. In a breakdown by religiosity, we see a similar pattern: while most secular respondents mainly feel despair (28%) and worry (27%), 43% of religious respondents mainly feel determined or optimistic.
Last February, we reworded our question on confidence in victory in the war from a future-oriented question – how confident respondents are that Israel will win the war – to a question about the present: “To what extent do you believe that Israel is winning and/or has won the war?” This rewording led to a significant deviation in respondent answers. We have continued to ask the question in this new wording since February, and the findings have remained consistent.
By contrast, a tenth (11%) of the Israeli public is “totally confident” that Israel is winning or has won the war. A quarter (24%) are “not at all confident” that Israel is winning or has won. No significant changes were found this past month among Jewish Israelis.
This month, we also used an additional question to explore the notion of victory. Prime Minister Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that he will not end the war until “total victory” over Hamas has been achieved. We sought to determine what the Israeli public thinks about this statement. A third (34%) of Israelis think “total victory” is an appropriate goal that can be achieved. Slightly less than half (45%) think it is a declarative political goal, and a fifth (19%) think it is an appropriate goal but doubt whether it can be achieved. Essentially, there is a majority that thinks it is an appropriate goal (53%) but also a majority that thinks it is unattainable (64%). Among Arab Israelis, a majority (62%) think that “total victory” is a declarative political goal.
Broken down by political orientation, most in the right-wing cohort (75%) think it is an appropriate goal that can be achieved, while most in the left-wing and center-left cohorts think that “total victory” is a declarative political goal.
In the question we ask regularly about confidence in the government, no major change was found this month. Half of Israelis (51%) report that their confidence in the government is “very low,” compared to a tenth (10%) who say it is “very high.” A fifth (17%) say their confidence is “somewhat low,” and another fifth (19%) say their confidence in the government is “somewhat high.”
Most Jewish Israelis (64%) report that their confidence in the government is low (“somewhat low” + “very low”), while a third (33%) say their confidence in the government is high (“very high” + “somewhat high”). These findings are similar to those obtained in recent months. Among Arab Israelis, 82% say their confidence in the government is low, while 14% say it is high. Broken down by political orientation, a majority in all cohorts, except for the right-wing cohort, say their confidence in the government is low. Among the right-wing group, two-thirds (67%) say their confidence in the government is high.
Half (53%) of Israelis say their confidence in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is very low, while a fifth (17%) say it is very high.
A majority of respondents in all ideological cohorts, except for the right-wing group, say their confidence in the prime minister is low (“somewhat low” + “very low”). Among the right-wing cohort, 72% say their confidence in Netanyahu is high. However, 20% of Likud voters and 43% of Religious Zionism voters (up from 31% last month) say their confidence in the prime minister is low.
This month, at a time of numerous developments in U.S.-Israel relations – such as the Houthis’ agreement in Yemen, Trump’s impending visit to the Gulf states, and the continuation of nuclear talks with Iran – we asked about Israelis’ confidence in Trump regarding the Iranian issue.
Half of the Israeli public (47%) say they have some confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” in dealing with Iran, a third (36%) say they have no confidence in him in this regard, and a tenth (8%) say they are very confident that the U.S. president will do the right thing in dealing with Iran. Compared to the identical question posed in January, there has been a significant decline in Jewish Israelis’ confidence that Trump will act appropriately on this issue.
In January, a quarter of Jewish Israelis said they were very confident that Trump would act appropriately in this arena, but at present, less than a tenth feel this way.
Most respondents in the left-wing and centrist cohorts say they have no confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” in dealing with Iran. By contrast, most respondents in the right-wing cohort say they have some confidence in him. A fifth (21%) of Religious Zionism voters also say they are confident that Trump will act appropriately on this issue. Among 2022 Likud voters, 18% say they have no confidence that Trump will “do the right thing” in dealing with Iran.
Confidence in Public Institutions
Last month, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir assumed his duties. At the end of April, the government announced the cancellation of the forced dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, after he announced he would leave his post in mid-June. This past month, fighting in Gaza was expanded.
Alongside these changes in the security establishment’s top brass, this month saw another rise in Jewish Israelis’ confidence in the IDF senior command. The share of Jewish respondents who said their confidence is “somewhat high” rose by 7% (after a 12% rise last month), and the share of those who said their confidence is “very low” dropped by 5% (after a 9% drop last month).
Three in five Jewish Israelis report that their confidence in the IDF senior command is “somewhat high,” a quarter say it is “somewhat low,” 8% say it is “very high,” and 7% say their confidence is “very low.”
Majorities across ideological cohorts said this month that their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (“somewhat high” + “very high”), similar to last month and in contrast to the previous half-year when most right-wing and center-right respondents said their confidence in the IDF senior command was low.
Half of all Israelis (50%) say their confidence in the Shin Bet senior echelon is low (“somewhat low” + “very low”), while 46% say their confidence is high (“somewhat high” + “very high”). The confidence of Jewish Israelis in the Shin Bet senior echelon is slightly higher than that of Arab Israelis.
Broken down by ideological orientation, most left-wing, center-left, and half (49%) of right-center respondents say their confidence in the Shin Bet senior echelon is high (“somewhat high” + “very high”). By contrast, most in the right-wing cohort say their confidence is low (“somewhat low” + “very low”).
Compared to the identical question posed in March, this month showed no significant change in the confidence of Jewish Israelis in the Shin Bet top brass. Among Arab Israelis, confidence slightly dropped this month, while Jewish Israelis’ confidence rose slightly.
This month, we repeated our annual question about how Jewish Israelis feel their “sense of Jewishness” – on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). The average sense of Jewishness for all Jewish Israelis is 9.05, slightly higher than the figure from this time last year. The average by religiosity stands at 8.29 for secular Jews and 9.98 for religious Jews. Compared to this time last year, there has been a slight rise in the average score among secular, traditional-religious (Masorti), and religious Jews in how Jewish they feel.
We also asked Israeli Arab respondents to what degree they feel “Israeli,” on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 (the maximum possible). A similar share of respondents – a fifth – rated their sense of Israeliness at the minimum or maximum levels. The overall average stands at 4.88.
The May Index of the JPPI was administered between May 4 and 6, 2025, among 722 respondents. Data was collected via the Madad panel (522 Jewish sector respondents, online survey) and Afkar Research (200 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). The data was weighted and analyzed by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the adult population of Israel. The Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov. Professor David Steinberg serves as the statistical consultant.