Most Israelis believe that when the current military operation in Gaza concludes, Hamas will still be in power.
Main Findings
- Half of Israelis believe that Israel will continue its control over part of the Gaza Strip for at least a few months after the military operation ends; a third think that Israel will administer the entire Strip for a few years at minimum.
- Most Israelis do not think Jewish settlements will be established in Gaza after the war.
- Most Israelis believe that the large majority of Gazans will continue living in the Strip.
- Half of Jewish Israelis believe Israel is making adequate efforts to prevent harm to Gazans.
- A large percentage of Otzma Yehudit, Shas, Religious Zionism, and United Torah Judaism supporters, as well as a quarter of Likud supporters, say it’s not important that Israel avoid harming uninvolved Gazans.
- Most Israelis are concerned that Israel will become a pariah state in the West.
- A third of Israelis think the main motivation behind the appointment of David Zini as Shin Bet chief is the desire for political gain; a third think the reason is Zini’s suitability for the post.
- Most Israelis, across ideological cohorts, are concerned about the current state of Israeli social cohesion.
- There has been a decline in the willingness to compromise for the sake of Israeli social cohesion, especially concerning relations between the executive and judicial branches of government.
- Most Israelis believe that when the current military operation in Gaza concludes, Hamas will still be in power.
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The War in Gaza
In recent weeks, Israel has been carrying out ground operations in Gaza, aiming to achieve its war objectives Πthe toppling of Hamas rule in Gaza and the return of the hostages. This month, we posed a number of questions aimed at understanding what Israelis envision for the day after the war ends.
in Gaza: a third (30%) of Israelis think the Hamas regime will be toppled, a third (30%) think Hamas rule will continue under another name, a quarter (27%) expect Hamas will continue to rule as Hamas, and 13% of Israelis do not know or do not agree with any of the response options.
most Israelis (57%) believe that when military operations end Hamas will still rule Gaza, whether under its present name or another name. Among Arab Israelis, 40% think Hamas rule will continue, a quarter (27%) believe it will continue under another name, and 15% believe that the Hamas regime will be toppled altogether. Among Jewish Israelis, a smaller majority (53%) believe that Hamas will remain in power after the current ground operations, either as Hamas or under another name. As expected, the further along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the higher the share of respondents who think Hamas will remain in power, and the lower the percentage of respondents who believe the Hamas regime will fall and no longer exist. A majority of coalition voters believe the Hamas regime will be vanquished and no longer exist after the cessation of military operations.
A quarter of Israelis (25%) believe that Israel will continue to control part of the Gaza Strip for several years (12%) think Israel will continue to control all of Gaza for several years. That is, half of Israelis (47%) believe that Israel will retain control part of the Gaza Strip for at least a few months after ground operations have concluded; a third (33%) believe Israel will control the entire Strip for at least a few years.
The further along the ideological spectrum from left to right, the higher the share of respondents who believe that Israel will continue to control all of Gaza for an indefinite period – a third of the “right-wing” cohort feels this way. The same pattern holds in a breakdown by religiosity, as one moves along the spectrum from secular to ultra-Orthodox (Haredi).
A large disparity was found when the results were broken down by party affiliation: while most Likud, Shas, Religious Zionism, and Otzma Yehudit supporters believe that Israel will continue to control the entire Gaza Strip for a few years or an indefinite period, most National Unity, Yesh Atid, Yisrael Beiteinu, and The Democrats supporters think Israel will continue to control part of Gaza for a few months or years.
Most (59%) Israelis believe that once military operations in Gaza end, a large majority of its residents will remain in the Strip, while a small number will leave for other countries. A quarter (23%) of Israelis think that within two to three years, more than a quarter of Gazans will have left for other countries, and 14% expect that, within this time range, most Arab Gazans will have departed for other countries.
A majority across ideological cohorts, except the right-wing group, think that most Gazans will remain in the Strip once military operations conclude, and that a small number will emigrate to other countries. Four in ten right-wing respondents think that more than a quarter of Gazans will leave for other countries within two to three years. Three in ten respondents on the political right think that, within that timeframe, most Gazans will leave for other countries, while another three in ten believe that the vast majority of Gazans will remain in the Strip, with a small number emigrating to other countries.
Most Israelis (63%) believe that Israel will not establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip after ground operations end; 16% do believe that Israel will establish such settlements, in places close to the Israeli border, within two to three years, and 12% think Israel will establish Jewish settlements inside Gaza, including deep within the Strip, during this timeframe. That is: 28% of Israelis believe Jewish settlements will be established in the Gaza Strip. Arab Israelis tend to think that settlements will be established in Gaza more strongly than their Jewish counterparts. Broken down by ideological orientation, a majority was found across cohorts (except for the right-wing group, where nearly half feel this way) who think Israel will not establish Jewish settlements within the Gaza Strip.
Fighting and Criticism
Critical voices in Israel and abroad have grown louder as the current ground operation in Gaza has proceeded, with protests mounted and punitive measures taken. This month, we looked at the Israeli public opinion regarding Israel’s combat conduct, which has drawn criticism, and the potential ramifications of that criticism.
A large majority of Jewish Israelis (72%) feel that Israel takes all possible or sufficient care to avoid harming uninvolved civilians in Gaza. A fifth (21%) think Israel isn’t careful enough to avoid harming Gazan civilians not involved in the fighting, while 7% think Israel is simply unconcerned about harming uninvolved civilians. A significant disparity was found between the responses of Jewish and Arab Israelis. Two-thirds of Arab Israelis (66%) think that Israel, in the course of its Gaza operations, does not sufficiently avoid or does not at all avoid harming uninvolved civilians. An eighth of non-Jewish respondents (13%) maintain that Israel sufficiently avoids harming uninvolved civilians, and 9% believe that Israel takes all possible measures to avoid harming uninvolved Gaza civilians (the share giving this response is particularly high among Druze respondents).
Broken down by ideological orientation, most left-wing (56%) and center-left (54%) respondents think Israel does not sufficiently avoid harming uninvolved Gaza civilians. By contrast, most centrist (55%), center-right (71%), and right-wing (59%) respondents think Israel exercises sufficient care in this regard. The further along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the higher the share of respondents who believe that Israel is unconcerned about harming civilians not involved in the fighting.
The question of how much of an effort Israel makes to avoid harming uninvolved civilians differs, of course, from the question of how carefully it should avoid harming uninvolved civilians. The very use of the expression “takes sufficient care to avoid harming” actually entails a further question: What constitutes “sufficient” effort to avoid harming civilians in wartime? A question probing this yielded the following findings: a third (33%) of Jewish Israelis say it is very important that Israel, when operating in Gaza, avoid harming uninvolved civilians. A quarter (27%) say it is “somewhat” important that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians (thus, overall, a 60% majority considers such avoidance important), a fifth (21%) say it is “not especially important” to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians, and another fifth (18%) say it is “not at all important” to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians.
On this question, as well, there is a significant gap between Jewish and Arab respondents. Most Arab Israelis (72%) say it is very important that Israel, when operating in Gaza, avoid harming uninvolved civilians. Among Jewish respondents, there are substantial differences between different ideological cohorts.
Most left-wing (88%) and center-left (63%) respondents say it is very important to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians. In the centrist cohort, a third (35%) gave this response, while another 43% said it is “somewhat” important to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians. A third (32%) of right-wing and center-right respondents said it is “not especially” important to them, while 38% of right-wing respondents said it is “not at all important” to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians in the course of military operations in Gaza.
In a breakdown according to voting patterns, a significant share (over a third) of coalition-party supporters said it is not at all important to them that Israel avoid harming uninvolved civilians in the course of its operations in Gaza.
Last month, criticism of Israel’s military operation in Gaza intensified in countries around the world, especially in Europe. Certain countries have halted some of their trade with Israel, while others have threatened sanctions. In recent weeks, some have warned that Israel could become a pariah state in the West.
In response to a question about this issue, most Israelis (64%) expressed concern (very concerned + somewhat concerned) about the possibility of Israel becoming a pariah state. By contrast, a third (36%) are not concerned (not at all concerned + somewhat unconcerned) about this possibility. The share of Arab Israelis concerned about Israel’s potential pariah status is higher than among Jewish Israelis.
Most of those in the left-wing (88%), center-left (74%), and centrist (53%) cohorts report being very concerned about the possibility of Israel becoming a pariah state in the West. Among center-right respondents, three in ten are “very concerned,” while one in three is “somewhat concerned” – which still makes for a majority who express concern. By contrast, half (51%) of right-wing respondents say they are “not at all concerned” by such a situation, while a fifth (18%) say they are “somewhat unconcerned.”
Confidence in the Leadership and in Victory
An eighth (12%) of Israelis are “totally confident” that Israel is winning or has won the war; a quarter (24%) are “not at all confident” in this. No major changes were found in Jewish Israelis’ assessments regarding the country’s victory in the war since last month’s Israeli Society Index. Broken down by ideological orientation, a quarter (23%) of right-wing respondents say they are totally confident in Israel’s victory, while most left-wing respondents (56%) report being not at all confident in Israel’s victory in the war (last month, 46% of them gave this response). There was no consensus in any of the ideological cohorts as to whether Israel has won/is winning the war. The further along the religiosity spectrum from liberal to conservative, the higher the share of respondents who think Israel is winning/has won the war.
Most Israelis (63%) report that their level of confidence in the defense minister, Israel Katz, is low (very low + somewhat low), while a third (33%) say their confidence in him is high (very high + somewhat high). Two out of five Jewish Israelis (43%) say their confidence in the defense minister is very low, while 14% say it is very high. Most Arab Israelis (55%) report that their confidence in the defense minister is very low, while another quarter (25%) say it is somewhat low.
A majority across ideological cohorts, except the right-wing group, say their confidence in the defense minister is low (very low + somewhat low), while most right-wing respondents (68%) say their confidence in him is high. One in five Likud voters (2022 elections) low confidence in the defense minister; one in four Religious Zionism voters say this as well.
There has been a slight drop since the April Index in the share of Israelis, Jews and Arabs, who report very low confidence in the defense minister. In the same period, there has also been a slight decline in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who say their confidence in the minister is very high.
This month, the upward trend of confidence in the IDF senior command has continued among Jewish Israelis. This trend stems, among other things, from changes in the IDF’s upper echelon, and was already underway when the current chief of the general staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, assumed his duties. Most Jewish Israelis (54%) say their confidence in the IDF senior command is “somewhat high,” an eighth (12%) say their confidence in the senior command is “very high,” a quarter (24%) say their confidence in the IDF senior command is “somewhat low,” and another 8% say their confidence is “very low.”
A majority across ideological cohorts reported this month that their confidence in the IDF senior command is high (somewhat high + very high). This is similar to the findings of the past two months, but different from the earlier months of the past half-year, when most respondents on the ideological right (right-wing + center-right) said their confidence in the IDF senior command was low (somewhat low + very low).
Haredi Conscription
The issue of Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) IDF conscription reached a boiling point in recent weeks, with the Haredi parties issuing an ultimatum and threatening to topple the government if a law is not passed exempting yeshiva students from IDF service.
Most non-Haredi Israelis say they would only agree to a new draft/exemption law if it leads to the conscription of half or more of young Haredi men into the IDF. A third of respondents said that only a law leading to the conscription of all ultra-Orthodox men, apart from exceptional circumstances, would be acceptable to them.
Only a small percentage of non-Haredi Israelis support the full exemption of young Haredi men that existed in the past. Among coalition voters, most Likud supporters (71%) favor drafting Haredi men not engaged in Torah study, and this is also true of most Shas voters. Half of Religious Zionism voters support the conscription of most or all Haredi men. A large majority of those who self-identify as right-wing support the draft for all those who are not actively studying in yeshivas. Most (60%) center-right Israelis support the IDF conscription of most or all Haredi men.
Among secular Israelis, a large majority support drafting most ultra-Orthodox men. The other sectors are about equally divided between those who demand the draft for most, and those who support the conscription of those not in yeshiva.
Appointment of a Shin Bet Chief
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed Maj. Gen. David Zini to head the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) in contravention of Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara’s directive. A third (35%) of Israelis feel that the main reason behind Zini’s appointment is that Netanyahu views him as the most professionally suitable person for the post. Another third (33%) believe that the main reason for the appointment is Netanyahu’s desire to reap political benefit from the appointment of an officer well-liked by the right. A fifth feel that Netanyahu’s desire to clash with the judiciary is the primary factor behind Zini’s appointment. On this issue, there is a significant gap between Jewish and Arab responses. While two in five Jewish Israelis think that Netanyahu sees Zini as the most professionally suitable person for the post, only 10% of Arab Israelis think so. Additionally, while a third of Jewish Israelis believe that the primary motive behind the appointment is Netanyahu’s political gain among the Israeli right, half of Arab Israelis feel this way. Among right-wing respondents, including a substantial proportion of coalition supporters, a majority (77%) think the main reason for Zini’s appointment is his professional suitability.
The attorney-general determined that the prime minister has a conflict of interest that prohibits him from appointing a new a Shin Bet chief. Nearly half of Israelis (46%) feel that the main factor behind the attorney general’s opinion is her professional legal assessment. A third (36%) think the main factor behind her opinion is a desire to clash with the prime minister and his government, and 11% believe that the main reason behind the opinion is the attorney general’s desire to strengthen the power of the institution of the Israeli Attorney General’s Office.
11% believe that the main reason behind the opinion is the attorney general’s desire to strengthen the power of the institution of the Israeli Attorney General’s Office.
Most left-wing (96%), center-left (86%), and centrist (67%) respondents feel that the main factor behind the attorney general’s opinion is her professional legal assessment that this is the legal situation. By contrast, half (49%) of center-right respondents and most of those in the right-wing cohort (69%) think the the main reason behind the opinion is Baharav-Miara’s desire to lock horns with the prime minister and his government.
Broken down by voting intention in the next election cycle, most supporters of The Democrats (96%), Yesh Atid (93%), Yisrael Beiteinu (74%), National Unity (62%), and half of those who support Naftali Bennett’s newly-minted party (46%) believe that the main factor behind Baharav-Miara’s opinion is her professional legal assessment of the situation.
This past month, Israel’s High Court ruled that the government’s decision to dismiss the Shin Bet chief was “unprecedented in the history of the state,” “procedurally flawed,” “made in violation of the conflict-of-interest rules,” and without a “factual basis.” In response, the prime minister said that the ruling “explicitly violates the law, undermines democracy, and harms national security.” Two in five Israelis believe that the High Court’s reasoning and its ruling are correct. By contrast, a third (36%) of Israelis think the Court erred in its ruling, and that the prime minister was justified in his objections. Ten percent of Israelis believe that the Court’s reasoning was correct, but that it would have been better to refrain from issuing a ruling (given that the former Shin Bet chief, Ronen Bar, had already resigned). This question elicited a major gap between the views of Jewish and Arab respondents. While 44% of Jewish Israelis think the High Court erred in its ruling and that the prime minister was justified in his objections, only 6% of Arab Israelis share this view. Further, while most Arab Israelis (56%) think the Court was correct in its reasoning and its ruling, a third (36%) of Jewish Israelis feel this way.
Broken down by ideological orientation, most left-wing and centrist respondents feel that the High Court’s reasoning and its ruling were correct. By contrast, most right-wing respondents, and half of those in the center-right cohort, think the High Court’s ruling was wrong, and that the prime minister was justified in his objections. In a breakdown by religiosity, the secular is the only cohort with a majority who feel that the Court was correct in both its reasoning and its ruling. In all other religious cohorts, half or more responded that they believe the Court was wrong in ruling and that the prime minister’s contentions were correct.
Foreign Relations
This month, as in previous months, we looked at the confidence of Israelis that President Trump will “do the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations. There is a steady downward trend in the share of those who say they are “very confident” in the US president, and a steady upturn in the share of those who say they are “not at all confident” in Trump on this issue. In January, at the start of Trump’s current term, a third of Israelis said they were “very confident” that he would act appropriately regarding relations between the countries, but this month, only an eighth (12%) of the respondents expressed this view. Moreover, while a fifth of Israelis said at the start of Trump’s current term that they were not at all confident he would do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations, this month the share doubled, with 38% giving this response.
Broken down by ideological orientation, three-quarters of left-wing cohort (75%) and half (52%) of center-left respondents reported being not at all confident that Trump will do the right thing regarding US-Israel relations. Among centrist (52%), center-right (54%), and right-wing (57%) respondents, a majority said they have some degree of confidence in the US president on this issue.
This month, we examined whether reports of growing antisemitism around the world have affected Israelis’ plans to travel abroad over the past year. Half of Israelis (49%) say they had no plans to travel abroad.
Another third (34%) reported that they had made plans and had not changed them, a tenth (9%) had altered their plans somewhat due to reports of growing antisemitism, and 5% had changed their plans significantly.
The right-wing cohort represented the highest share (9%) of Israelis who significantly changed their plans due to reports of growing antisemitism. This cohort also had the highest percentage (61%) of respondents who had no plans to travel abroad over the past year and so had no plans to change. The left-wing cohort had the highest share of respondents (49%) who made travel plans and did not change them.
Compared to last year, when we posed this question to Jewish Israelis only, there has been a rise in the percentage of those who had plans to travel abroad and did not change them due to reports of rising antisemitism. Last year, the share of Jews who gave this response was 27%; this year, it was 38%. At the same time, we see a decline in the share of respondents who changed their travel plans in the past year, whether slightly or significantly.
Israeli Cohesion
Most Israelis (79%) are concerned about the state of social cohesion in Israel; four in five Jewish Israelis are concerned about it. Among Arab Israelis, the share is slightly lower, with three-quarters expressing concern about Israeli social cohesion. Across all ideological cohorts, a majority express concern about the state of social cohesion in Israel; the further along the ideological spectrum from right to left, the higher the percentage expressing such concern.
Compared to June of last year, the responses of Jewish Israelis have remained nearly identical, while those of Arab Israelis have shown a slight increase in the share of those “very concerned” and a slight drop in the share of those “somewhat concerned” about the state of social cohesion in Israel.
In a supplemental question related to social cohesion, we asked respondents “which tension,” from a list of tensions, affects social cohesion more than others. We found a significant gap between the responses of Jewish Israelis, who feel that the “right–left” tension is most central, and the responses of Arab Israelis, who think the “Jewish–Arab” tension is the primary one affecting social.
Broken down by religiosity, a majority in all cohorts think the right-left tension is paramount. Between 20 and 25% of respondents across cohorts think the religious-secular tension has the greatest impact on social cohesion (this was the dominant response in the Haredi cohort).
Compared to a year ago, there has been a rise in the share of Israelis who the right-left tension is greatest, and a decline in the percentage of Israelis who think the religious-secular tension most impacts social cohesion in Israel.
Israeli Society
This month, we again examined how important it is to Israelis that Israeli policy be as they wish it to be. With 0 denoting “not at all important” and 10 denoting “very important,” the mean response to the question, “How important is it to you that Israeli policy be as you want it to be?” was 7.49. That is, most Israelis say it is important to them that Israeli policy be as they wish. This average is nearly identical to that obtained last year for this question. The average for Jews (7.7) is higher than for Arabs (6.5).
Broken down by ideological orientation, the average for those in the cohorts at both extremes of the political spectrum is higher than the average for those at the center. Both the left- and right-wing ideological cohorts ascribe greater importance to the notion that the State of Israel should be as they want it to be than do respondents in the center-left, centrist, and center-right cohorts. The ideological cohorts at the extremes hardened their positions (meaning that it is even more important to them that Israel be as they want it to be) in the last year, and the centrist cohorts softened their positions slightly. A similar pattern is also evident in a breakdown according to political party affiliation.
When respondents were asked about the importance they attach to Israeli social cohesion, the average was 7.83, a slight decline from a year ago, when the average was 8.05. This downward trend in the degree of importance Israelis ascribe to social cohesion was found among both Jews and Arabs this year. Overall, the Jewish average on this question is higher than the Arab average – Jewish Israelis ascribe greater value to social cohesion than do Arab Israelis.
Broken down by ideological orientation, the average for the right-wing and center-right cohorts dropped over the past year. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the degree of importance attached to unity by the center-left cohort.
We also posed several questions this month about the compromises respondents are willing to make in order to strengthen Israeli cohesion. The respondents were asked to rate their views on a scale ranging from maximal social cohesion (with less representation of their own views) to maximal representation of the policy line they support (at the price of less social cohesion).
In the last year, there has been a shift among Israelis in the aspirational balance between the desire for social cohesion and the wish that Israeli policy align with one’s personal views. The desire that national policy align with one’s personal views increased, even at the cost of Israeli social cohesion. This shift was found among both Jewish and Arab Israelis.
The further one moves from the political extreme cohorts (the right-wing cohort– Israel’s largest, and the left-wing cohort – Israel’s smallest) toward the center (center-right, centrist, center-left), the greater the desire for cohesion, and the greater the willingness to compromise on their views for this purpose. Broken down by religiosity, however, no such pattern was found: the ultra-Orthodox cohort (-0.69) showed the strongest desire for Israeli policy to be aligned with their values, even at the expense of social cohesion, while the religious cohort (Datiim) (0.53) displayed the strongest desire for cohesion, even at the price of compromise on policy consistent with their values.
After looking at the question of policy/cohesion balance from a theoretical angle, we proceeded to consider it in relation to several specific issues. That is, we looked at how important Israeli policy on a specific topic would be to respondents based on their ideology, compared with the possibility of policy that is less aligned with their personal views but conducive to greater social solidarity. A question on Israel-Palestinian relations, registered a decline from a year ago in Israelis’ willingness to compromise on the fulfillment of their aspirations for the sake of social cohesion. This decline was found among both Jews and Arabs.
On this question, as with the previous one, the further we move toward the center of the ideological map, the greater the desire for unity, even at the cost of compromise on policy/ideology. The right-wing cohort indicated the strongest desire to see their preferred policy implemented, even at the expense of social cohesion (-2.3), i.e., this cohort was least prepared to compromise on policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue for the sake of social cohesion. The left-wing cohort followed (-1.4), also showing a low willingness to compromise on their views for the sake of cohesion. The centrist cohort showed movement this year in the direction of cohesion at the expense of bringing their views to bear on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
We also assessed Israelis’ desire to see their views realized versus their willingness to compromise on policy for the sake of social cohesion on the issue of “coalition-judiciary relations,” a major topic on the public agenda. Jewish Israelis showed a clear preference for the implementation of their views on this issue at the expense of social cohesion (average, -1.3). By contrast, Arab Israelis showed a greater willingness to compromise on their views for the sake of cohesion in this regard (0.2).
For this issue as well, the same pattern emerges, the further one moves toward the center of the ideological map, the greater the desire for unity and the weaker the insistence that state policy align with one’s personal views. The left-wing cohort showed, on the issue of coalition-judiciary relations, the lowest degree of willingness to compromise on views for the sake of cohesion (-2.7), followed by the right-wing cohort (-1.8), for whom the pendulum also swung toward policy alignment with personal views, at the expense of social cohesion. In contrast to the two previous questions, for which the averages of respondents in the centrist, center-right, and center-left cohorts testified to an openness to compromise for the sake of social cohesion, on this question the average for all cohorts indicated a low willingness to compromise for the sake of cohesion. That is, across all ideological cohorts, the wish that state policy align more closely with one’s personal views outweighs the desire for social cohesion.
Political Affiliation
A third of Israelis (30%) report choosing their affiliation with the right-wing, left-wing, or centrist camps based on whether they agree with the camp’s views on the Israel-Palestinian issue. A fifth (20%) say they chose the camp whose “cultural vision” resembles their own. Another fifth (18%) say they chose their political affiliation based on the camp with which they agree on economic and social issues. A tenth (9%) report that they affiliate with a given camp because it is “their camp” and they will not leave it.
Broken down by ideological orientation, for the right-wing cohorts, the main consideration in choosing their political affiliation is the camp’s position on the Israel-Palestinian issue. For the centrist cohort, the two main considerations are the camp’s position on economic and social issues (30%) and the degree to which the camp’s cultural vision for Israel aligns with the respondents’ own (29%). For the left-wing cohort as well, cultural vision is the primary consideration for many when choosing how to affiliate politically.
Broken down by voting pattern (2022 elections), the main consideration for Likud (46%) and Religious Zionism (51%) voters is the party’s position on the Israel-Palestinian issue. For Shas (25%) and United Torah Judaism (33%) voters, the main consideration is the camp’s religious vision for the State of Israel. Yesh Atid (34%) and Yisrael Beiteinu (34%) voters chose their political affiliation chiefly according to which camp’s cultural vision for Israel most resembles their own, while National Unity voters (31%) chose their affiliation primarily based on agreement on economic and social issues.
The findings for this question showed no significant change from a year ago.
Data for JPPI’s June Israeli Society Index was collected between May 25 and June 5, 2025 (Arab sector: May 29–June 3; Jewish sector: June 3–5). The questionnaire was administered to 746 respondents. Data was collected via theMadad.com (546 Jewish sector respondents, online survey) and Afkar Research (200 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). The data was weighted and analyzed by voting pattern and religiosity to represent the adult population of Israel. The Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov. Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.