At a time when accurate historical context is critical, The New York Times has instead offered a revisionist account that erases Palestinian agency and distorts the realities of the conflict.
The brutal Hamas attack on southern Israel on October 7 made one thing unmistakably clear: the Palestinians have been active participants in their century-long struggle against Zionism and Israel. Yet, The New York Times presents a different narrative. In its February 6, 2024 magazine feature, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Long Shadow of 1948,” the overarching message is that Palestinians have been passive victims, devoid of agency, and bear no responsibility for the events that have shaped their history. This selective framing, compounded by factual inaccuracies and misleading interpretations, results in a profoundly distorted portrayal of the origins and course of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
I recently came across Benny Morris decripting the Times’ piece on the early history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—an exercise in selective memory that Morris, to his credit, exposed with characteristic rigor. Here, I want to engage with some of his key arguments while pushing the analysis even further into the realm of moral philosophy and journalistic malpractice.
The article is framed as a moderated “discussion” between six scholars—three Jewish and three Arab—led by Emily Bazelon, a staff writer at The New York Times. However, only one participant, Itamar Rabinovich (a former Israeli ambassador to Washington), has published works relevant to the conflict, including books on Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and the Lebanon War. The remaining five panelists have little direct expertise on the Arab-Israeli conflict or the 1948 war. The three Arab scholars—Nadim Bawalsa, an associate editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies; Leena Dallasheh, a historian focused on Nazareth; and Salim Tamari, a sociologist at Bir Zeit University—largely reiterate PLO (and in some cases, even Hamas) talking points, blurring the line between scholarship and propaganda.
The New York Times piece suggests that Palestinians were merely passive observers, as Zionists, Israel, and Western powers—particularly Britain—determined their fate.
This narrative is fundamentally flawed.
The Arab Rejection of Compromise and the Use of Violence
From the 1920s through the 1940s, the Palestinian Arab leadership repeatedly rejected political compromises and insisted on full control over all of Palestine, advocating for a state stretching “from the river to the sea.” Their opposition was not confined to rhetoric. Throughout this period, Palestinian Arabs engaged in violent uprisings against Jewish communities, often incited by religious and political figures.
In April 1920, May 1921, and August 1929, Arab mobs—spurred by inflammatory rhetoric—attacked Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Hebron, and Safed, carrying out a series of massacres. These attacks, which involved the killing of Jewish civilians, including women and children, resembled organized pogroms. The New York Times avoids this term, choosing instead to downplay them as mere “assaults.”
Bazelon’s article describes the 1920 Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem as a festival that “turned into a deadly riot” in which “five Jews and four Arabs [were] killed.” She fails to mention that an Arab mob launched the attack, chanting “Nashrab dam al-Yahud” (“We will drink the blood of the Jews”), and that British security forces had to intervene to restore order. The subsequent 1929 riots, incited by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, were even more devastating, with Jewish communities in Hebron and Safed brutally massacred. British officials condemned the violence as “acts of unspeakable savagery.”
Despite this well-documented history, The New York Times article implies that the violence simply “broke out” rather than being orchestrated by Arab leaders. One panelist, Derek Penslar of Harvard University, claims that Muslims were merely reacting to perceived Jewish intentions to seize the Temple Mount—a claim that aligns with Palestinian nationalist narratives but disregards historical records.
The 1936–1939 Arab Revolt and the Partition Plan
In the late 1930s, the British attempted to mediate between Jewish and Arab interests. The Peel Commission of 1937 proposed partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, awarding Jews only 17% of the land. While Jewish leaders, recognizing the urgency of creating a safe haven for European Jews, reluctantly accepted the idea of partition (though they hoped for a larger share), the Palestinian Arab leadership flatly rejected it. The New York Times attempts to equate Zionist and Arab reactions, creating the false impression that neither side endorsed compromise.
The 1948 War: “Broke Out” or Was Initiated?
The New York Times uses similar euphemistic language to describe the 1948 war, saying that it simply “broke out.” This obscures the reality: the war was initiated when Palestinian Arab militias and neighboring Arab states rejected the United Nations Partition Plan (Resolution 181) of November 29, 1947 and launched attacks on Jewish communities. Armed Arab groups began ambushing Jewish buses and shooting Jewish civilians in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem the very next day. By May 15, 1948, when Israel declared independence, five Arab armies invaded the nascent state.
Bazelon’s description of the war’s beginning contains multiple errors. She writes that Lebanon attacked Israel (it did not), that Jordan joined the invasion later (Jordan participated from the outset), and that the British had just begun their withdrawal on May 15 (they had already been leaving since December 1947).
Britain’s Role in the Conflict
Contrary to the New York Times portrayal of the British as unwavering Zionist supporters, British policies were far more ambivalent. While the 1917 Balfour Declaration expressed support for a Jewish homeland, British authorities often acted against Zionist interests. In 1939, Britain issued a White Paper that drastically limited Jewish immigration to Palestine—at a time when Jews were desperately fleeing the Holocaust. Throughout World War II, Britain actively blocked Jewish refugees from reaching Palestine, even as the Nazis systematically exterminated European Jewry.
During the 1948 war, Britain continued to support Arab forces, supplying arms and maintaining an anti-Jewish naval blockade. Yet panelist Salim Tamari falsely claims that Britain was “complicit in the Arab defeat.”
Palestinian Arab Support for Nazi Germany
One of the most glaring omissions in the New York Times discussion of World War II is the relationship between Palestinian Arab leaders and Nazi Germany. Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the most prominent Palestinian leader at the time, openly collaborated with Hitler. After aiding the pro-Nazi 1941 coup in Iraq, he fled to Berlin, where he worked as a Nazi propagandist and helped recruit Muslims for the SS.
While Bazelon and panelist Leena Dallasheh briefly acknowledge al-Husseini’s meeting with Hitler, they downplay its significance. Instead, they cite historian Gilbert Achcar, who argues that many Arabs opposed Nazism. While individual Arabs may have rejected fascism, Palestinian nationalist leaders openly supported the Axis powers, hoping for a German victory that would rid Palestine of Jews.
The 1947 Partition Plan: Why Did the Palestinians Reject It?
Bazelon finally asks a crucial question: Why did the Palestinians reject partition in 1947? Her panelists offer misleading explanations. Abigail Jacobson suggests that Palestinians opposed the plan because it allocated 55% of the land to Jews, despite Jews comprising only one-third of the population. However, she omits the fact that much of this land was the barren Negev Desert, and that Palestinian Arab leaders were unwilling to accept any Jewish sovereignty, no matter how limited. Tamari falsely claims that “half the Palestinian political class” supported partition—an assertion unsupported by historical evidence.
The Broader Impact of Historical Distortions
The New York Times has presented its readers with a deeply skewed version of history, omitting key facts and absolving Palestinian leaders of responsibility for past decisions that have shaped the conflict. Rather than acknowledging that the repeated rejection of partition and engagement in violence have prolonged Palestinian statelessness, the article shifts blame to Zionism, Britain, and external forces.
At a time when accurate historical context is critical, The New York Times has instead offered a revisionist account that erases Palestinian agency and distorts the realities of the conflict.