Identity

MASORTIM AND MASORTIYUT IN ISRAEL

WORLDVIEWS, DISCOURSE, AND CULTURAL TRENDS

Gabriel Abensour

MASORTIM AND MASORTIYUT IN ISRAEL

1 CBS, Social Survey 2020.
2 CBS, Social Survey 2020.
3 Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs and Noah Slepkov, #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution. Modi’in 2018, p. 226.
4 Tamar Hermann, Gilad Be’ery, Ella Heller, Hanan Cohen, Yuval Lebel, Hanan Mozes, and Kalman Neuman, The National-Religious Sector in Israel, 2014, Jerusalem 2014, pp. 23-24.
5 Dialogue Institute survey for the Reform movement, 2017.
6 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, #IsraeliJudaism, pp. 226-227. In a recent survey, Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov also showed that when there are more than four categories (secular, Masorti, Dati, Haredi), many Masortim choose the “secular-somewhat-Masorti” and “liberal Dati” categories. See Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs and Noah Slepkov, “Masorti Jews in Israel: Views on Issues of Religion and State, 2021,” findings from a theMadad.com survey for Israel Hofsheet.
7 CBS, Social Survey 2018.
8 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, #IsraeliJudaism, p. 29.
9 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, 2009, Avichai Survey.” It should be noted here that all of the data from Data Israel that appear in this study are courtesy of the Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Center. Data segmentation from the Pew 2016 survey paints a similar picture: 71% of Masortim identify ethnically as Mizrahim or Sephardim. See: Pew Research Center, “Israel’s Religiously Divided Society,” 2016.
10 Rosner and Fuchs, #IsraeliJudaism, p. 242.
11 Ibid.
12 Ariel Finkelstein, National Religious Society in Data, Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah, 2021, p. 74.
13 Poriya Gal Gatz, Leaving Religion Behind, Tel Aviv 2011, pp. 190-192.
14 CBS data from 2019, processed by the Masorti Association.
15 CBS, Social Survey 2018.
16 Hermann et al., National-Religious Sector, pp. 23-24.
17 Processed data from The Israel National Election Studies’ survey “Election Study 20-19-2021,” March 23, 2021. [In English]
18 Momi Dahan, “An Electoral Gap in the Knesset Elections Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim,” Second Version, September 2022.
19 EC 11280/02 Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. MK Tibi and MK Bishara, 56(4) PD 1, 22.
20 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “A Limited Partnership: Jews and Arabs, 2019.”
21 Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, Follow-Up Survey, Public Opinion on the Relationship Between Israel and the Diaspora, April 2022, p. 17.
22 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel,” Avi Chai survey, 2009. [A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009]
23 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index 2017.”
24 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, Survey on Incitement and the Boundaries of Free Speech – 25 Years since the Rabin Assassination, 2020.”
25 Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, 2016.
26 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2018.”
27 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2021.”
28 Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, 2016. [In English]
29 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2016.”
30 Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, 2016. [In English]
31 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Reform Survey, March 2020.”
32 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Peace Index – January 2018.”
33 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Peace Index – July 2016.”
34 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2011.”
35 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2011.”
36 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Smooha surveys, University of Haifa, 2019.”
37 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Smooha surveys, University of Haifa, 2019.”
38 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Bezeq survey, Attitudes Toward the Other, 2018.”
39 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Smooha surveys, University of Haifa, 2019.” During the period when the Nation State Law was subject to debate, 40% of Masortim supported adding to it a statement of equality for all citizens: Public Opinion Questionnaire on Issues Cutting Across the Political System, 2019.
40 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Smooha surveys, University of Haifa, 2019.”
41 Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs and Noah Slepkov, “Pluralism Index 2022,” Jewish People Policy Institute, 2022.
42 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2017.”
43 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Smooha surveys, University of Haifa, 2019.”
44 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2017.”
45 See: Meir Buzaglo, “The Masorti and Halacha: A Phenomenology,” in: M. Orfali and E. Hazan (eds.), Progress and Tradition: Creativity, Leadership and Acculturation Processes among the Jews of North Africa, Ramat Gan, 2005, pp. 187-204; Ophir Toubul, Kol HaTor, Traditional Sephardic Zionism, Rishon LeZion 2021, p. 13.
46 Yaacov Yadgar, Masortim in Israel, Jerusalem 2010, pp. 313-352.
47 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2017.”
48 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “The Israeli Democracy Index, 2021.”
49 Dan Feferman, Rising Streams: Reform and Conservative Judaism in Israel, the Jewish People Policy Institute, Jerusalem 2018, p. 64.
50 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, The Jewish Voice, May 2019.”
51 Ibid.
52 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Reform Survey, March 2020.”
53 Rosner, Fuchs, and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 6.
54 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Reform Survey, March 2020.”
55 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 6.
56 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, Public Opinion on Issues that Span the Political System, 2019; Bezeq Religion and State survey, August 2019.
57 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 6.
58 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 6.
59 Dialogue Institute survey for the Reform movement, 2017.
60 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, Reform Survey, March 2020.”
61 Dialogue Institute survey for the Reform movement, 2017.
62 Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, 2016. [In English]
63 Dialogue Institute survey for the Reform movement, 2017.
64 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Reform Survey, March 2020.”
65 Dialogue Institute survey for the Reform movement, 2017.
66 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel,” Avi Chai survey, 2009. It should be noted that a fair number of Masortim indeed choose shared schools when the option exists in their areas of residence. Also, Israel’s mixed religious-secular schools aspire to serve the Masorti population and to rise above the religious/secular dichotomy. See: Elyashiv Reichner, Living Here Together: The Story of Israel’s Inclusive Educational Frameworks and Shared Communities, Rishon LeZion 2016, pp. 42-45.
67 Rosner, Fuchs, and Slepkov, op. cit., Ref. 41.
68 Editorial, “51% of Secular Jews: No to Ultra-Orthodox Neighbors,” Ynet Jewish World, 20.07.2009.
69 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, the Israeli Democracy Index, 2010.”
70 Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, Follow-Up Survey, Public Opinion on the Relationship Between Israel and the Diaspora, April 2022, p. 19.
71 Ibid, p. 31.
72 Ibid, p. 25.
73 Ibid, p. 38.
74 Ibid, p. 39.
75 See Yonatan Gottlieb, “The Believers’ Camp,” Arutz Sheva, 27.12.2021.
76 This study is not concerned with the political views of Masortim, but the data show that there is no one single Masorti vote and that the Masortim – like most Israelis – vote all across the political spectrum, with a tendency toward the right-wing and center parties. The only parties that get almost no Masorti votes are the Arab parties, United Torah Judaism, and Meretz. See: Pew Research Center, Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, 2016; Shmuel Rosner, Camil Fuchs and Noah Slepkov, #IsraeliJudaism: Portrait of a Cultural Revolution, Modi’in 2018, pp. 241-242. The present study does not ignore the Haredi politicians who make rhetorical use of the “Haredi-Masorti” alliance to defame the rival camp and depict it as anti-Jewish. See: Kobi Arieli, “In the Pocket of Its Voters,” Israel Hayom, 05.04.2022.
77 See: Sagi Elbaz, “Even the Masortim Support the Secular Approach,” Haaretz, 23.09.2019. Recently, Israel Hofsheet, an organization that promotes freedom from religious coercion in Israel, commissioned a special survey to examine the views of the Masorti public, with the clear aim of demonstrating that, on this issue, there is more common ground between the Masortim and the secular than between the Masortim and the religious. See: Chen Artzi Sror, “Solutions, not Principles,” Yedioth Ahronoth, Shabbat Supplement, 16.12.2021.
78 See Rabbi Shai Piron’s book The Third Israel: Between Mamlachtiyut and Masortiyut, Rishon LeZion 2021.
79 The thinkers and intellectuals who speak on behalf of the Masortim tend to base themselves on an expansive definition of Masortiyut, in order to claim that the Masortim constitute at least a third of the Israeli Jewish population, while disregarding the data that indicate intra-Masorti heterogeneity. A striking example of this is Ophir Toubul’s introduction to Kol HaTor, where he argues that Masortim constitute 40% of Israeli Jewry, but also that Masortim are almost always Sephardic and demand no changes to Halacha. These two claims certainly do represent a segment of the Israeli Masorti public, but by no means do they represent all of it. Ophir Toubul, Kol HaTor, Traditional Sephardic Zionism, Rishon LeZion 2021, pp. 12-13.
80 M. Shokeid, “Cultural Ethnicity in Israel: The Case of the Middle Eastern Jews’ Religiosity,” AJS Review 9/2 (Fall 1984), pp. 247-271. [In English]
81 Meir Buzaglo, A Language for the Faithful, Jerusalem 2008; Micah Goodman, Philosophic Roots of the Secular-Religious Divide [English title in original; later translated as: The Wondering Jew : Israel and the Search for Jewish Identity], Hevel Modi’in 2019; Yafa Benaya, “The Masorti Way: the Option of a Pan-Israeli Judaism,” Al Da’at HaKahal, Shalom Hartman Institute, 21.11.2019; Piron, op. cit. Ref. 78.
82 Nissim Leon, “Not Just Nostalgia and Folklore: Masortiyut as a Way of Life,” Makor Rishon, 17.10.2021.
83 Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 76.
84 This is Charles Taylor’s main argument in A Secular Age, Cambridge 2007. See also Guy Ben-Porat’s discussion of the distinction between secularization and secularism in the Israeli context: Guy Ben-Porat, In Practice: The Secularization of the Israeli Public Realm, Haifa 2016; Yaacov Yadgar, Beyond Secularization: Masortiyut and the Criticism of Secularism in Israel, Jerusalem 2012, pp. 16-37.
85 Yehouda Shenhav-Shahrabani, “Invitation to a Post-Secular Framework for Investigating Israeli Society,” in Secularization and Secularism: Interdisciplinary Studies, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 2015, p. 162.
86 Guy Ben-Porat, In Practice: The Secularization of the Israeli Public Realm, Haifa 2016. See also the more recent data in Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 76.
87 See also Lahav’s sociological study on secular believers: Hagar Lahav, Women, Secularism, and Belief, Jerusalem 2021.
88 Eliezer Schweid, “The ‘Post-Secular’ Era,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 01.11.2000.
89 See Yadgar, op. cit. Ref. 84, pp. 62-65.
90 Eliezer Schweid, Orthodoxy and Religious Humanism: Major Trends in Twentieth Century Jewish Religious Thought, Eastern Europe and Palestine, Jerusalem, 1977.
91 Yehouda Shenhav-Shahrabani, “Invitation to a Post-Secular Framework for Investigating Israeli Society,” in Secularization and Secularism: Interdisciplinary Studies, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 2015, pp. 139-169.
92 Yadgar, op. cit. Ref. 84, pp. 62-65. See also: Yadgar, op. cit., Ref. 46, Jerusalem 2010.
93 Compare with Ben-David’s findings on hybrid identities in the Jewish renewal sphere: Regev Ben-David, “’This Isn’t an Encounter Between Religious and Secular’: Hybrid Jewish Identities in a Heterogeneous Population: A Test Case from the Field of Jewish Renewal in Israel,” Thesis, Bar-Ilan University 2016.
94 See the important studies by Leon and Yadgar: Yaacov Yadgar and Charles Liebman, “Beyond the Religious-Secular Dichotomy: Israel’s Masortim,” in: Uri Cohen, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Avi Bareli, and Ephraim Yaar (eds.), Israel and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Moshe Lisk, Sde Boker 2006; Nissim Leon, “Mizrahi Masortiyut as an Echo of Jewish Existence in the Islamic World,” Akdamot 23 (August-September 2009), pp. 129-146; Nissim Leon, “Mizrahi Secularity (Soft Traditionalism) from a Post-Orthodox Perspective, Pe’amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry, 122-123 (2009), pp. 89-113; Yadgar, op. cit. Ref. 84; Yaacov Yadgar, op. cit. Ref. 46.
95 See: Guy Ben Porat, “A State of Holiness: Rethinking Israeli Secularism”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 25/2 (2000), pp. 223-24; Yair Sheleg, The Jewish Renaissance in Israeli Society, Jerusalem 2010, pp. 162-174; Guy Ben-Porat, In Practice: The Secularization of the Israeli Public Realm, Haifa 2016. See also the more recent data in Rosner, Fuchs and Slepkov, op. cit. Ref. 76.
96 On the rise of secular Jewish renewal in Israel, see: Naama Azulai and Rachel Werczberger, “Jewish Renewal in Israeli Secular Space: From Passing Phenomenon to New Social Movement,” Politika 18 (2008), pp. 141-172; Naama Azulai, “’Hebrews We Are and Our Hearts Will We Worship’: the Jewish Renewal Movement in Israeli Secular Society,” doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bar-Ilan University (2010); Gad Ofaz, Second and Third Generation Kibbutz Members in Search of Jewish Identity, Jerusalem 2016; Yoav Zinati-Lavi, “Jewish Renewal in Israel: Judaism’s Reformulation as a Modern-Cultural Approach to Identity,” Thesis, School of Public Policy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2019).
97 On the process by which the Jewish renewal movement became institutionalized, see Azulai and Werczberger, Ibid, pp. 157-158.
98 For the full list of Panim member organizations, see: http://www.panim.org.il/organizations
99 For the full list of Rashut HaRabim member organizations, see: https://rashut-harabim.org/our-organizations/
100 It should be noted that the label “Masorti” has already been affixed to secular Jewish renewal by its critics. For example, in a critical article on the illusion of a secular return to tradition, Assaf Sharon used “neo-Masortim” as a derogatory term for secular people engaged with tradition. See Assaf Sharon, “The Illusion of the Return to Tradition,” Hazman Hazeh, February 2019. In addition, some actors in the secular Jewish renewal field have proposed the term hilonim-morashtim (“heritage secularists”) to describe those secular Jews who have a positive attitude toward Jewish tradition. See: Regev Ben-David, “Speaking of Jewish Secularism” Hashiloach 16 (October 2019), pp. 178-194. Ben-David confirmed for me in a conversation that he indeed views the word moreshet (“heritage”) as a synonym for masoret (“tradition”), but that since the latter term has already been appropriated by Mizrahi Masortiyut it is preferable not to use it.
101 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge 2007, pp. 2010-2011, 281-283. [In English]
102 Buzaglo, op. cit. Ref. 81, p. 57.
103 Yafa Benaya, “The Masorti Way: the Option of a Pan-Israeli Judaism,” Al Da’at HaKahal, Shalom Hartman Institute, 21.11.2019
104 Eliezer Schweid, Judaism and Human Rights, Tel Aviv 5741 [1981], pp. 236-237. Cited in Regev Ben-David, “Aharei Mot: Eliezer Schweid as an Israeli Rabbi,” Shalom Hartman Institute, 19.01.2022.
105 Beeri Zimmerman, “Avinu Malkenu,” In Avi Sagi & Nahem Ilan (eds.), Jewish Culture in the Eye of the Storm: A Jubilee Book in Honor of Yosef Ahituv, Tel-Aviv 2002, p. 762.
106 Ido Fechter, Diversity in Judaism, Jerusalem 2021.
107 Goodman, op. cit. Ref. 81, p. 180.
108 Data segmentation from the Israel Democracy Institute’s Data Israel website, “Religious Behavior in Israel, 2009, Avichai Survey.”
109 Buzaglo, op. cit. Ref. 81, pp. 34-35.
110 Muki Tsur, Doing It the Hard Way, Tel Aviv 1976.
111 Ido Fechter, Diversity in Judaism, Jerusalem 2021
112 Franz Rosenzweig, “Letter to Yosef Prager (24.7.1925), in: Franz Rosenzweig: A Selection of Letters and Diary Fragments, Jerusalem 1987, pp. 350-351.
113 Buzaglo, op. cit. Ref. 81, p. 37.
114 Tsur, op. cit. Ref 109; Gad Ofaz, Second and Third Generation Kibbutz Members in Search of Jewish Identity, Jerusalem 2016, pp. 146-149.
115 See Muki Tsur, “Tradition and the Halutzim,” in: Mountain/Field/Home: Writings from the Slope, Bnei Brak 2018. See also: Gad Ofaz, Second and Third Generation Kibbutz Members in Search of Jewish Identity, Jerusalem 2016, p. 143; Azulai and Werczberger, op. cit. Ref. 96, p. 149.
116 Ariel Picard, Seeing the Voices: Tradition, Creativity and Interpretive Freedom, Tel Aviv 2016, p. 287.
117 Goodman, op. cit. Ref. 81, p. 178.
118 Buzaglo, op. cit. Ref. 81, p. 57.
119 A striking example of this is the book Kol HaTor, published in 2021 and edited by Ophir Toubul (op. cit. Ref. 79).
120 See: Tsur, op. cit. Ref. 114. See also: Gad Ofaz, Second and Third Generation Kibbutz Members in Search of Jewish Identity, Jerusalem 2016, p. 143; Azulai and Werczberger, op. cit. Ref. 96, p. 149; Moti Zeira, Rural Collective Settlement and Jewish Culture in Eretz Israel During the 1920s, Jerusalem 2002.
121 Piron, op. cit. Ref. 78.
122  Amichai Danino, “Between the Fifth Tribe and A Unifying Mamlachtiyut: Masortiyut at a Crossroads,” De’ot 97 (August 2021); Inbar Harush Gity, “Masortiyut as a Response to the Core Issues of Israeli Society: From the “Inclusion” to the “Together” Approach,” De’ot 97 (August 2021).
123 Leon, op. cit. Ref. 82.
124 Meir Buzaglo, “Masortiyut – Opportunity for a New Disagreement,” in: Dov Elboim (ed.), Megilat Ha’Atzmaut – the Declaration of Independence with an Israeli Talmudic Commentary: Sources, Research, Literature and Midrash, Rishon LeZion 2019, p. 122. Here we should note that in his book A Language for the Faithful, Buzaglo refers to Masortiyut as a modern phenomenon and even differentiates between the new Masorti and the premodern Masorti. However, in his later writings the premodern and modern are blurred, and there is open criticism of the other Jewish approaches. See: Meir Buzaglo, In Honor of the Torah, Jerusalem 2022.
125 See Toubul, op. cit. Ref. 79.
126 Nissim Leon, “Mizrahi Masortiyut as an Echo of Jewish Existence in the Islamic World,” Akdamot 23 (August-September 2009), pp. 129-146; Nissim Leon, “Mizrahi Secularity (Soft Traditionalism) from a Post-Orthodox Perspective, Pe’amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry, 122-123 (2009), pp. 89-113. See also: Yafa Benaya, “The Masorti Way: the Option of a Pan-Israeli Judaism,” Al Da’at HaKahal, Shalom Hartman Institute, 21.11.2019.
127 Ruth Calderon, “Vav HaChibur,” in: Dov Elboim (ed.), Megilat Ha’Atzmaut – the Declaration of Independence with an Israeli Talmudic Commentary: Sources, Research, Literature and Midrash, Rishon LeZion 2019, p. 100.
128 Ibid, p. 101.
129 R. Brubaker, “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives in Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24/4 (2001), pp. 531–548.
130 Ya’ar Ephraim, “Continuity and Change in Israeli Society: The Test of the Melting Pot,” in: Herzog, Hanna Herzog, Tal Kohavi, and Shimshon Zelniker (eds.), Generations, Locations, Identities, Tel Aviv 2000, pp. 72-104; Moshe Lisk, Mass Immigration in the Fifties: Failure of the Melting Pot Policy, Jerusalem 1999; Sammy Smooha, “Class, Ethnic, and National Rifts in Israeli Democracy,” in: Ram, Uri (ed.), Israeli Society, Tel Aviv 1993. On Israel’s melting pot policy, see: Michal Zweig, “The Melting Pot: Theory and Practice,” Israelis 1 (2017), pp. 19-56.
131 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights, clarendon Press, 1995; W. Kymlicka, “Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship,” Philosophy 76.298 (2001); A. Gutmann & C. Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994. [Preceding items in Hebrew; following items in English:] On multiculturalism in Israel see: Yossi Yona and Yehouda Shenhav, “The Multicultural Situation,” Theory and Criticism 17 (2000), pp. 163-188; Yossi Yona, In Virtue of Difference: The Multicultural Project in Israel, Tel Aviv 2005.
132 Daniel Gutwein, “Identity Versus Class: Multiculturalism as a Neoliberal Ideology,” Theory and Criticism 19, Fall 2001, pp. 241-258; Daniel Gutwein, “Negation of the Exile, Melting Pot, and Multiculturalism: Between Ideology and Ethos,” in: Nir Michaeli (ed.), Political Education: An Anthology, Tel Aviv 2014, pp. 210-233.
133 S. Holt & Z. Machnyikova, “Culture for Shared Societies.” In M. Fitzduff (ed.), Public Policies in Shared Societies: A Comparative Approach, London 2013, pp. 167–214; S. Killelea, “Shared societies and Peace: The Ends and Means of Development,” Development, 57(1) (2014), pp. 64–70; R. Kuttner & E. Eiran, “Shared Society: Concept, Implementation and the Road Ahead.” Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 39(2) (2021), pp. 81–95; C. McCartney, “The Evolution of The Shared Societies Concept: The Theoretical Concept’s Application in Practice.” Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 39(2) (2021). [All items in English]
134 Club de Madrid. (2011). The Economics ofd Shared Societies, no. 2 of the shared societies project document series. http://www.clubmadrid.org/the-economic-benefits-of-shared-societies/ [In English]
135 R. Kuttner & E. Eiran, “Shared Society: Concept, implementation and the road ahead.” Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 39(2) (2021), p. 82. [In English]
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