In the Shadow of Progressive Identity Politics: Young Jews in Universities and Other Settings Today

Introduction: Framing the Conversation

The 2024 Jewish World Dialogue, In the Shadow of Progressive Identity Politics: Young Jews in Universities and Other Settings, addressed the changing position of the Jewish people with respect to their participation as Jews in the social and political events in their host societies as well as in Israel and the Middle East. Anti-Israel, Pro-Palestinian activists have challenged the prevalent understanding among liberal Jews that they were part of the “progressive” camp and having endorsed liberal and progressive values could participate with other identity groups, such as LGBTQ+ or African-Americans in their quest for social justice.

Instead, progressive and “woke” groups cast Jews as part of the white privileged population, as prime examples of settler colonialism and generally as an integral part of the “oppressors” against the “oppressed.” Thus, on many campuses and in other locations Jews and especially “Zionist” Jews were foreclosed from joining with other groups in struggles for social justice. Some Jews on college campuses were harassed and intimidated, tarred as members and representatives of the oppressor class. Such intimidation and harassment were carried out simply on the basis of Jewish identity, without inquiry into the actual beliefs and positions of their targets. This intimidation and harassment also creeped into more personal and intimate spheres, impacting friendships and relationships and undermining the sense of safety among some young Jews.

Young Jews, who mostly seen themselves until recently as unproblematically liberal reacted with pain and sadness, but also with bewilderment. In America it is unusual for one’s own self-fashioned identity to be challenged, especially violently. In the Dialogue we explored some of the reactions that young (and older) Jews had to this development. They spoke about (and exemplified) several responses to this situation which will be described and analyzed in the course of this report. However, to fully appreciate these responses we would like to first describe in greater depth the traditional position of liberal American Jews and to a certain extent, of Jews in the modern world, and the self-understanding that accompanied it, that is, the pre-October 7 self-understanding.

The Jew as Pariah

Most non-Orthodox Diaspora Jews have traditionally self-identified as liberal. This was greatly facilitated by the fact that everywhere in the Diaspora the Jews constituted a religious and ethnic minority. The individualistic and universalistic premises of liberalism greatly facilitated the entrance and participation of Jews into their non-Jewish host societies. Yet, the identification with liberalism seemed for many Jews to go deeper and they connected it up with their Jewish being and Jewish identity. Hence in certain contexts, Jews, including rabbis, would refer to liberal values as “Jewish values.” They would also insist that because they are Jews, they are liberal, that their liberalism expresses their Jewishness and validates their authentic Jewish identity.

To a certain extent such claims are understandable. Jews wished to lend legitimacy to their social and political attitudes on more than just an instrumental basis (i.e., that they are a minority). Yet, their identification with liberalism goes beyond this and somehow resonates deeply with their Jewish identity and reflects the age-old socio-theological position of Jews as a pariah people.

This concept was first introduced by Max Weber, in his writings on the sociology of religion and was later elaborated upon (and taken in a certain direction) by the German-Jewish philosopher, Hannah Arendt. The concept of “pariah” originates in Indian civilization where it referred to the Dalit caste, the “untouchables” who suffered from very low social esteem and were removed from most areas of public life, especially, prestigious and leadership roles. They existed, as it were, on the margins of society. Max Weber compared the collective life of the Jews to the Indian “pariahs.” They too, in Christian (and Muslim) societies suffered from low esteem and were excluded from the major social, political and cultural arenas in their host societies.

In both the Indian and the Jewish case, according to Weber, “compensation” plays a major role. In the Indian case, if a Dalit caste member lives a ritually and ethically righteous life, s/he will be compensated by being reincarnated as a high caste individual in the next life. Similarly, the Jews thought of themselves as righteous – that is, that their religion and ethical values were the true ones, and that the gentiles who dominated the world, were in fact wicked and evil. They believed that in the future messianic age, the true nature of things would revealed and that they, the Jews, would become the dominant group and the wicked gentiles would be punished. Thus, the Jews would be compensated for their sufferings in this world.

In this context as in others, suffering is associated with righteousness, and by extension the very fact of suffering and persecution indicates righteousness and moral credit. (This association is of course, in parallel fashion, reflected in the attitude of the pro-Palestinian left, that because the Palestinians are oppressed, they too, must be morally pure and could not have carried out the atrocities of October 7, 2023, or were justified in doing so.)

The German-Jewish social philosopher Hannah Arendt developed this theme. Aware of the fact that following the French Revolution, the emancipation and integration of Jews into the European non-Jewish host societies was more formal than actual, and that Jews were not really accepted, Arendt delineated two typical Jewish responses – that of the “parvenue” and the “pariah.” The parvenue, using resources s/he possessed (mostly money, but could also be talent, intelligence etc.) endeavored to push him- or herself into territory where he was not wanted. The pariah, by contrast, accepted his or her marginalization and attempted to leverage it into a critical stance vis-à-vis established society. Referring to the work of Henrich Heine, Bernard Lazare, Franz Kafka, and Charlie Chaplin (who was not Jewish at all, being of Irish and Roma descent) she developed this prototype to great effect. Again, in Arendt’s conception, it was marginality and suffering that provided the legitimacy and authority of the critique of Heine’s “schlemihl,” Lazare’s “rebel,” Kafka’s K in The Castle, and Charlie Chaplin’s tramp character.

Writing in the 1940s, Arendt refers to the pariah tradition as a “hidden” tradition. Yet, in mid- 20th century America, after the Holocaust, the Jewish cultural and political critic became a recognizable figure in American literary, cultural and political life, and included such figures as Arthur Miller, Norman Mailer, Susan Sontag, and Noam Chomsky. These figures were normally associated with liberal and left-wing causes, such as civil rights. (Left wing Jewish lawyers defended the Scottsboro Boys in the 1930s). The association of Jews with social justice and liberal causes was even given religious expression with the development of Tikkun Olam programs in Reform and Conservative synagogues. Many of these programs prioritized a universalistic orientation rather than a Jewish particularist-ethnic one.

This orientation continued even though most American Jews have enjoyed considerable financial and professional success since the 1950s. As the anthropologist Karen Brodkin put it, the Jews along with other ethnic groups such as Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans “became white” leading to some measure of acceptance together with upward social mobility. To a certain extent this continuing identification with liberal causes, the Democratic Party and the American left can be explained by additional factors. It has been argued that Jews in the 1970s were preparing to vote Republican and abandon their traditional Democratic allegiance. However, it was at that time that the evangelicals became a Republican voting bloc scaring Jews away. Nevertheless, and despite these explanations, it was thought of as incongruent that the Jews did not vote in accordance with their supposed economic and class interests, giving rise to several popular one-liners such as that “Jews earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans.” Despite their success, Jews in the post-war period retained their moral credit as a persecuted minority that had recently experienced genocide. This credit was extended to Israel too, as a safe haven for this persecuted minority – and as an underdog.

This situation has gradually changed in the last 15-20 years and more radically after October 7, 2023. The successful upper middle-class Jews having become assimilated into the white “privileged” population lost their status as an ethnic minority. As such, they were reclassified as eternally guilty “oppressors.” However, the real change was effectuated by Israel. The Palestinians (aided by outside factors like Soviet propaganda and Qatari and Saudi money) worked assiduously on shaping a narrative that cast the Jews of Israel as illegitimate interlopers; as settler colonists whose aim was to displace the native Palestinian population and appropriate their land. Zionism became the exemplar of settler colonialism – the ideal type by which all other manifestations are measured – and a form of white Jewish supremacy. Thus, the Jews in a short space of time moved from being a minority who had historically experienced onerous persecution, even genocide, to an inherently evil and oppressive group.

This re-classification of the Jewish people and the State of Israel as “oppressors” was thrown into sharp relief by disruptive and aggressive anti-Israel/pro-Palestinian protests in the wake of October 7, 2023. On some campuses Jewish students were harassed and intimidated, in some instances while in classrooms or other learning frameworks. As the progressive left continued to develop a dichotomous, Manichean worldview, Israel and the Jews began to be identified as in the same camp as racists, misogynists, and homophobes that all right-thinking advocates of minority, women’s and gay rights ought to oppose. It was reported that individual Jews began to be excluded from initiatives advancing minority, women’s and gay rights.

This year’s Jewish World Dialogue addresses this shift. It asked mainly young Jews, most of whom were not Orthodox and liberal or progressive about how they understood such freighted terms as “Zionism” and “progressivism” – whether they saw them as contradictory or congruent? How they viewed Jewishness and Israel and whether they had personal ties to Israel or to Israelis. We also discussed with them the upheaval on campuses and whether their personal lives or educational and professional plans were affected. In the course of these discussions, participants also addressed the question of Israel education and how it should be shaped and conducted. They also examined the boundaries of the Jewish community, to what extent should it be a “big tent” and include dissenting voices on Israel. In general, in the conversations we conducted, we solicited personal experiences and views and sought to gain insight into what young Jews thought and experienced. Enough other agencies have conducted broad survey research on you Jews and Jews in universities.

We wished to utilize the relatively intimate breakout group framework to gain insight into the inner processes of identity and values change and development in the wake of the October 7 and the upheavals on campuses.

Participants in the 2024 Jewish World Dialogue

The 2024 Jewish World Dialogue involved 106 participants who took part in about 13 dialogue sessions or focus groups. Because much of the post-October 7 anti-Israel activity took place on university campuses and within universities, we attempted to maximize the participation of university aged participants. Thus, this year’s participants were somewhat younger than in previous years – 58% were under 35. We recognize, though, that older participants may have children or grandchildren in university, so we also include a number of them in the dialogue sessions. One third of the participants were at the time of the Dialogue university students and about half of them had close relatives who were either students, faculty or employees of universities.

Broken down by country, there were 74 participants from the United States, 17 from Europe (Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and 15 from Canada. Our findings should not be thought of as representative of the Diaspora Jewish community. They were probably more engaged with Israel and Jewish communal life than the Jewish population writ large. Sixty-five percent indicated that Israel is “very much” central to their Jewish identity. By contrast, 45% of the Pew Research Center’s sample of Jewish Americans said that “caring about Israel was an “essential” part of “what it means to be Jewish.” The more engaged characteristic of JPPI’s Dialogue participants particularly came to the fore in regard to the younger age cohorts. Among the Dialogue participants, 92% of the 18-25 age group said that Israel was “somewhat” or “very much” central to their Jewish identity (61% very much). In the Pew study, though, in the 18-29 group, 72% said that “caring about Israel” was “essential” or “important.” In the Dialogue’s 25-35 age cohort, 94% said it was “somewhat” or “very much” central (61% very much). In the Pew study, 79% of the 30-49 age cohort said that “caring about Israel” was “essential” or “important.”

In this year’s Dialogue, as opposed to some previous years, participants from Europe answered the questionnaire and participated in the discussion sessions in a manner very similar to the North American participants with few exceptions. One may conclude from that, that what (young) Jews are experiencing is a global and not local phenomenon, affecting Jewish communities in many locations.

There were, however, two participant groups who were a bit of an exception to the emphasis on Israel – the JStreet and the OneTable groups. Among JStreet participants, only one participant out of five said that Israel was “very much” central to its Jewish identity, though two participants said it was “somewhat” central. Similarly, in the OneTable group, 28% said it was “very much” central and 43% said it was “somewhat” central. At the same time, there were a few participants mainly affiliated with AIPAC and the Tikvah program who were Orthodox and/or right wing, and decidedly not in any way progressive.

In other words, the Dialogue participants gave us a fairly in-depth picture of what highly Israel-engaged and committed younger and some older Jews were feeling and thinking in this past year and a half. A further effort has to be made to gain purchase on what more typical, somewhat less Israel-engaged Jews have been thinking and feeling.

Between Progressivism and Zionism – Personal Identity and Values

The 2024 Jewish World Dialogue process took place over nearly the course of a year. It was not intended to replace or compete with the valuable surveys of Jewish students and faculty conducted by entities such as the Cohen Center at Brandeis University or the Jim Joseph Foundation. These surveys were mainly focused upon whether and how Jews experienced antisemitism, or harassment and intimidation, and their immediate responses, particularly among younger Jews on campuses. Our discussions, of course, related to these topics, but what we really sought to understand was how Jews, young and older, negotiated the challenges the campus upheavals and related phenomena posed to their personal identity – their understanding of the world and their place in it.

The Dialogues took place via Zoom, and participating groups were generally composed of between 3 and 15 participants. At the beginning of each session, participants completed a questionnaire that related to the discussion topic together with background information. The primary purpose of the questionnaire was to have a basis for comparison between the participants and the different participating groups. The discussion then proceeded in a semi-structured fashion through a protocol prepared by facilitators beforehand. The actual discussions took place in breakout groups of 3 to 5 participants. The more intimate framework of the breakout groups encouraged participants to speak more freely and personally about their identity and values.

The first cluster of issues related to the ideological collision between progressivism and Zionism inherent in the disruptive events that occurred, on campus and off, in the wake of October 7. In answering the question: “Are you familiar with progressive political ideology?” 54.7% said that they were “very much” familiar with it. Further, 40% indicated that they “somewhat” identified with it. We can best understand these data points as reflecting the fact that in academic and (upper) middle-class circles (non-Orthodox) Jews move in, progressivism can be characterized as the “default” political and moral position. At the same time, many of the participants were uncomfortably aware that their commitment to progressive ideology stood in contradiction to their Zionist orientation and commitment. This could explain why the plurality of respondents answered that they “somewhat” identified with progressivism.

In the breakout sessions, we asked what “progressivism” meant to them. Participants gave several definitions and meanings, including some that were very general: “social support and basic humanity. Everybody deserves a certain level of living and everyone is entitled to that. Healthcare, housing, food, etc.,” said one Baltimore participant. Another from Cleveland said: “… the public policy goal is to lessen discrimination and economic inequality.”  Others were more specific and mentioned things like race. In some of the answers, we began to see attempts to reconcile their progressive with their Zionist commitments. There were a few, quite sophisticated, responses that explicitly distanced themselves from contemporary progressivism and especially its illiberal tendency to restrict discussion and certain opinions deemed not to be politically “correct” or acceptable. For example, one participant drew a distinction between “progressive ideas” and “progressive politics.” He felt he could still support the former but needed to move away from the larger umbrella stance of “progressive politics” to be able to continue supporting Israel. Thus, while some participants identified “progressivism” with giving the “traditionally oppressed class more fairness and more opportunity to make up for past deprivations” and associated it with race, others stressed the shift that liberal or progressive ideology has undergone in recent years. One participant in Chicago spoke of a “shift to a far-left ideology that rejects certain groups outright and is less inclusive.” Another said that it had been hijacked to a level of radicalism and included “Marxist ideas that are antithetical to liberal, progressive values.” At the Cleveland session, one participant characterized progressivism as framing situations through an “oppressor/victim lens,” while another noted that Generation Z “seems to interpret progressivism” as being focused on this binary perspective rather than its original definition of enhancing lives through government resources.

Many participants attempted to tie progressivism to “Jewish values.” One participant expressed the view: “To be a Jew is to be progressive. We have given the world every progressive value that exists. I’m talking about values, not policies.” Other participants associated it with Tikkun Olam, explaining it as “ways to better the future.” In the discussions, the relationship between progressivism and Zionism (or support for Israel) was very complex. We asked in the questionnaire: Do you experience support for Israel and progressive ideas as congruent or contradictory? 34.9% answered “somewhat congruent” while 38.7% answered “somewhat contradictory.” Only a small percentage answered in definite terms (very congruent or very contradictory). We suggest that this tendency to provide “centrist” or moderate responses (“somewhat”), reflects the complexity participants felt regarding this issue. This complexity was also evident in the two most typical responses that emerged in the breakout sessions. The first claims Zionism, at least originally or in principle, as a progressive movement. The second admits that progressivism and Zionism or support for Israel, are increasingly antithetical.

A woman in Baltimore said: “I personally view Zionism as originally a progressive idea. In the sense that there would be homeland for the Jewish people, and there were socialist roots.” Other participants emphasized the Jewish right to national self-determination as the essence of Zionism, irrespective of the political or religious values beneath the term, “there was more room for nuance and gradations and specific types of Zionism beliefs in the past. But what is emerging is that all of those different Zionisms are moot points and you either support the Jewish right to self-determination or you don’t.” A participant in Palm Beach defined Zionism as “the right of Jewish people to self-determination. Simple and needs reinforcement.” Other participants linked this right of self-determination to the history of the Jews as a persecuted minority. According to one Canadian discussant, Jews were looked down upon for being “always oppressed, which is why Zionism is so important,” yet she went on to say that they are now viewed as bad for having become the oppressor. The questionnaire asked, “What do you think about Jews and their history? Are they an oppressor class or a persecuted minority? Eighty-two percent of respondents answered, “mainly a persecuted minority.” As one participant put it: “In a way, Zionism was an answer to the problems the Jews faced as a minority – the way things have evolved in mass media, Zionism is totally misunderstood.” Other participants also emphasized the basic right of self-determination but were careful to distinguish this from blanket support for the policies of the Israeli government: “Progressive Zionism, overriding support for Israel, doesn’t mean we agree with every political position or activity of the government.”

At the same time, many participants expressed an awareness of the opposition, in contemporary discourse between progressivism and support for Israel. One Chicago participant expressed it this way: “If you are very progressive you have labeled Zionism as an evil. Moving further apart progressivism and Zionism.” A participant from New York simply said: “Zionist has become a dirty word – now synonymous with Jew.” One university student expressed the situation in more elaborate terms:

Zionism was always framed as a progressive movement and now from my experiences on campus, reading online, progressivism has left Zionism and has wholeheartedly embraced a post-colonial and post-modern framework. Takes a black and white framework as painting people as oppressor or oppressed and Zionists are the oppressors.

Other participants also complained about the black and white, either/or binary character of the issue: “Feels like you are either with us or against us. Zionism has become one of those things. Not enough people engage with the nuance.” Another university student expressed herself in a similar vein: “Many preconceived notions and [it] becomes more polarizing. People listen less and less when you identify with that term.” Similarly, one individual wished Zionism and progressivism were more interconnected, but recognized how they’ve become direct adversaries instead, “when there is no nuance it feels like progressivism and Zionism are diametrically opposed but many young people, like ourselves, want to see progressivism and Zionism in relation with one another.” As a result, some participants felt that they had to reconsider their identity, as one man from Palm Beach put it: “I have to reckon with my own identity – as a progressive and as a Zionist.”

The limitations of the binary framework of oppressor/oppressed were highlighted in several sessions. In the AIPAC Leadership Program, participants argued that “progressives have begun to look at Israel as the ‘boogey man’” and that “progressive politics now hate Israel more than they like caring about issues that deserve progress.” One participant from the session held with former students from the ‘Tikvah association” reflected that she “used to feel connected to progressivism until I started to understand the oppressor-oppressed dialogue,” highlighting how this framework has alienated previously progressive-identifying Jews.

This sentiment was echoed by British participant who observed that “the semantics of oppressor-oppressed is very dominant in the UK, making Israel the oppressor, and hence blocking any real dialogue on the topic, since it’s clear who’s the bad guy.”

We asked participants about their identification with Zionism and with Israel, and whether Israel is central to their Jewish identity. We also inquired as to whether the events of October 7, 2023, changed anything regarding this. The questionnaire included a question: “Is Israel central to your Jewishness or your Jewish Identity? Among our Dialogue participants, 65.1% said that Israel was “very central” to their Jewish identity. About a quarter of the participants, though, said it was only “somewhat” central, and just 8.5% said it was not really or not at all central. In the breakout groups, discussants were able to expand on their relationship to Israel and a common theme seemed to emerge in the various sessions. Many participants spoke about the fact that as they were introduced to Israel at a very young age, they were given an overly ideal and rosy picture of it, which they said was not realistic. They said they were not introduced to the Arab-Israeli conflict at an early stage and were given almost no information concerning the Palestinians. Thus, when they got to university or other adult settings, they did not know how to respond to attacks on Israel related to the oppression and suffering of Palestinians. As one man from Palm Beach phrased it: “I was given a glowing and naïve picture of Israel. You sell young people short by not talking about the conflict. Need to talk about Gaza and West Bank. The leadership is afraid to [speak frankly about the Palestinians and the conflict] because of the fear of young Jews becoming anti-Israel.” Another participant contended that they were not taught complexity about Israel as they were other topics. They stressed that not allowing young people to receive a complex picture of Israel did them a disservice and made many more susceptible to accepting an anti-Israel narrative since they didn’t face these threats earlier and so didn’t have the knowledge or skills to digest much less refute attacks they encountered when entering college settings.

A few participants expressed a view that may have been under-represented in our participant pool. This view did not accord any centrality to Israel. As one young woman asserted: “Israel is not an important part of my Jewish identity. It plays no part in my Jewish identity.”

In sum, Jews, especially young Jews, are becoming increasingly aware that their personal identity holds two components that seem to pose a dilemma and cause them a certain amount of bewilderment or perplexity. From their remarks in the breakout sessions, many seem to be trying out various strategies to resolve this conflictive predicament and (re)build a personal identity they perceive as consistent and rational.

However, the events of October 7 and the ensuing Israel-Hamas war have had effects that go beyond the inner thoughts and feelings of Jews; they have also affected personal relations and how Jews function within institutions.

Relations with Others

Some of the participants concretized their discussion of progressivism by referring to specific groups and individuals with which they had participated in working and/or advocating for progressive causes. One New York participant described this shift in simple, if general, terms: “Feels like the world turned on us. The “model minority” Jews can’t be oppressed compared to other identity communities.”

Even though the Jews have had a collective image of their history as a “persecuted minority,” some, especially if they are progressive, do not view the Jewish people in this light but rather as privileged oppressors themselves. Some participants, in Canada and the United States, complained that minority groups they had worked with in order to advance their rights, did not express any interest in what they were going through in the wake of October 7 and the start of the Israel-Hamas war. One New York participant described her relations with progressives in this way: “It’s been difficult for me over the last year when it feels like you have to choose one or the other. Moving away from progressives and going a bit more toward the right on Israel. I need to point out what it means to be pro-Israel in this world.” Another participant indicated that his political milieu is shifting: “Moving more right when it comes to Israel. I’ve never identified with Republican policies but find myself reading publications that I might not have read in the past because they have a more neutral or pro-Israel stance.”

October 7 and the anti-Israel demonstrations that followed have also affected more personal, even intimate spheres. Many participants, especially the students among them, reported having lost friendships. One University of Southern California student said that he had lost all his friends. Our questionnaire included a question about this: “Has the current state of affairs affected your relations with non-Jewish friends, colleagues, or partners?” Forty-seven percent responded that they had become more estranged from them as a result of these events. (Forty-four percent reported that it had not affected their relations with partners, friends, or colleagues.) Although some participants expressed a closer, more tight-knit connection with others within the Jewish community, they have simultaneously felt that their non-Jewish friends and/or roommates have not understood or supported them in the way they had hoped: “Any friendships, outside of the Jewish community, are harder to navigate. Intersectionality doesn’t allow for Jewish inclusion.” Some participants described a situation in which their non-Jewish partners had endorsed the pro-Palestinian cause. They said that such a situation was a strain on their relationship and that they (the participant and their partner) tended to avoid the topic altogether.

Experience of Institutions

We also queried participants about their experiences in regard to demonstrations and other protest activities concerning Israel and Palestine over the past year or two. We wanted to know how they felt in their universities and other institutional settings, especially their sense of comfort and safety. Eighty-four percent said they had experienced anti-Israel demonstrations occasionally or frequently. Sixty-seven percent also said they “very much opposed” these demonstrations. Further, just over 78% said that they had experienced harassment, intimidation, or assault at least once because of their Jewishness or their support for Israel.

In the discussion groups, though, many expressed a more complex and nuanced attitude toward the demonstrations. A few participants approved of the student activism: “It is amazing that students are coming together to use their voice,” said one participant, although he also thought that they (the protesters) did not have the slightest understanding of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Another participant said that he was both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel, and he complained that such a complex approach had no place at the demonstrations. Many participants said they strongly believe in Israel’s right to exist and the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and a state, and they were very disturbed by calls at the demonstrations and in on-campus graffiti for the destruction of Israel.

At the same time, they are adamant that affirming Israel’s right to exist does not mean endorsing or identifying with the policies of the current Israeli government. One Baltimorean man said it is actually a basic necessity to be able to do this, exclaiming, “One needs to be able to be pro-Israel and anti-Israeli governmental policy.” A Torontonian doubled down on this point, highlighting his view that there is a need for “separating the state, from the prime minister, from the government.” He argued that the vast majority of Jews identify and share a connection with the State of Israel, yet it is still “healthy to disagree with government policies.” They suggested that it is common, comfortable, and even important to express criticism of some Israeli policies, even while still endorsing the country as a whole.

The questionnaire also asked, “Do you believe these [campus] demonstrations are antisemitic?” Sixty-six percent responded that they [the demonstrations] were “totally” or “mostly” antisemitic. Nevertheless, there is some indication that antisemitism is in the eye of the beholder. We found that there is a very significant correlation between Israel being central to one’s Jewish identity and believing that the pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel demonstrations are mostly or totally antisemitic. In other words, the more central Israel is to one’s Jewish identity, the more one will tend to view the demonstrations as antisemitic (Pearson correlation 0.570; correlation significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed.) That is, those for whom Israel is very central to their identity believed that the demonstrations were “mostly” or “totally” antisemitic, while those for whom Israel was less central tended to experience the demonstrations as only “marginally” or “partially” antisemitic. This ambiguity was also expressed in the discussion groups. While some participants talked about the antisemitic character of the “vitriol” they experienced at or near the demonstrations and described how even being close to one felt “violent and scary” – others were not so sure. As one participant from Palm Beach said: “Our definition of what is antisemitic can be problematic. When you have a less nuanced understanding of Israel, anytime you are presented with information that is contrary to how you feel, it may sound antisemitic.” Those who weren’t as confident that the pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel protests were really antisemitic often blamed the “press [which] has made this worse.”

The sample of our Dialogue participants was very small (n = 106), and it would be rash to base any dispositive conclusions on it. Yet, these could help understand the tendency of some, especially young Jews, to seek parameters of Jewish identity that are not connected to Israel. That is, they may be sensing that the strong connection between Israel and Jewishness is problematic and causes them to feel like targets of antisemitism. A not insignificant view is that not only does Israel’s behavior increase the anti-Israel sentiment of its detractors, but it also (because my sense of Jewish identity is tied to Israel) causes me to experience that sentiment as directed against me, and makes me uncomfortable, and, therefore, perhaps I should seek a form of Jewish identity that is less Israel-centric.

How Did Our Participants Respond to these Events?

The questionnaire asked: “Which of the following statements best describes how you have reacted to the current state of affairs?” The most frequent response (42.5%) was “I have made my Jewish identity and Israel connection very visible”; 36.8% chose “I do not hide my Jewishness, but I don’t flaunt it either.” In the breakout sessions, people in New York and other places admitted to being more circumspect and self-censoring their Jewish identity and affiliations, revealing it to only certain people and in certain situations. In either case, they were more conscious and reflective of the how and what they wanted to be explicitly showing when it came to their Jewish identity: “I think about whether my [Jewish] star, or my Moishe House swag, is visible and marks me as Jewish. I think about how I’m presenting in the world and whether there will be backlash?” Among the Swiss participants, two admitted to hiding their Jewish identity signifiers. In some sessions, such as Palm Beach, participants said that they had no first-hand experience of antisemitism (though they read and heard about it in other locations), because they live in protected communities – in gated communities or Jewish neighborhoods.

In terms of feeling safe, nearly 28% of Dialogue participants said that they felt somewhat or totally safe on campus; 17% said that they felt somewhat unsafe or under threat. However, in the breakout sessions people talked about feeling unsafe in general. Several participants remarked that they had never thought they would feel unsafe in America, and now, to their surprise, that has become a real possibility. Some said that it had directly impacted what symbols they show and things they wear, “Since Oct. 7 I am very aware of censoring myself and how I am being perceived. I feel less safe being Jewish now than in my previous 31 years.”

The sense of betrayal we mentioned earlier, was also felt and even amplified on the institutional level. In response to the question, “Would you say that university officials have been helpful in creating a positive atmosphere on campus?” 43% responded that they were very unhelpful.

What Is to Be Done?

When we asked if there is a problem of antisemitism, what is to be done, we received a variety of sensible suggestions. Some participants argued that there must be a bi-partisan approach to fighting antisemitism, expressing concerns about its current political divisiveness: “Both parties have weaponized antisemitism. It’s not clear they care about antisemitism but use it to attack political opponents.” They hoped to begin to “see both parties support Jews and Israel.” Others claimed that allyship is important, as the Jewish community cannot fight hate and antisemitism alone. One participant insisted that the Israeli government not take part in this struggle, that it should be spearheaded by individual local communities instead. A few themes repeated themselves in this particular discussion. When we asked about whether there should be any boundaries to the Jewish community and whether all groups should be considered part of the community, the prevailing tendency was to be inclusive and include groups who were critical of the Israeli government’s policies, and even those who opposed Israel’s existence, at least in its current form. However, most participants drew a line at Jewish Voice for Peace, on the grounds that it is not an authentic Jewish organization but rather controlled by Palestinians and populated largely by non-Jews. The consensus was that dissenting voices on Israel should be included and recognized, but a line must be drawn when some voices or organizations are not authentically Jewish.

The basic inclusive character of most of the responses parallels what was indicated earlier about the need for Israel education that includes learning about the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Though Israel is very central to the Jewish identity of most participants, they do not expect an ideal Israel that is immune to criticism. They want to relate to an actual Israel, warts and all, and they are also willing to listen to criticism of Israel and Israeli government policy, as long as it is done in good faith, by Jews, and in connection with their Jewish identity and Jewish values.

Conclusion

Over the past year and a half, the self-understanding and self-identity of Jews has been, – in certain quarters and certain situations, – seriously challenged. Historically, thinking of themselves as a persecuted minority possessing moral legitimacy and virtue, they now find themselves identified as “privileged oppressors” who must be opposed by all people of good will. In other words, the Jews of the Diaspora experienced a form of “misrecognition.” Such experience challenges the notion that one can control her own life and fate and undermine self and world trust. (“Recognition,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

This experience dovetails with the fact that the Jewish community in America may be in flux, experiencing what anthropologists call “liminality” – the state of being “betwixt and between” different states or statuses. For the first time in their lives, many Jewish Americans are experiencing uncertainty about their safety and are having their self-understanding challenged. This is changing how they think about certain important life matters – Israel, who their friends and allies are, and even, for some, their intimate relations. In Europe and South Africa such changes have also had important effects on Jewish life – pushing some Jews to leave the Jewish community and causing others to become more inward looking and insular. Will this be the fate of the broad (and brilliant) North American Jewish community? Only time will tell, but it certainly bears watching.

Endnotes

1. Max Weber, Economy and Society, (Los Angeles and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968), Vol. 1.
2. Hannah Arendt, “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition”, in The Jew as Pariah (New York: Grove Press, 1978).
3. Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What that Says About Race in America, Rutgers U. Press, 1998.
4. This change entailed a revision of Jewish history, including a diminution of the role of Jews in the civil rights movement. The most striking example of which is the erasure of R. Abraham Joshua Heschel marching with Dr. Martin Luther King in Selma Alabama in the film Selma. See Mijal Biton, “Why I am no a Jew of Color”, Sapir Journal, March 9, 2025. https://sapirjournal.org/diversity/2025/03/why-i-am-not-a-jew-of-color/.
5. Pew Center, Jewish Americans in 2020. pewresearch.org