This August 2025 survey report addresses the war in Gaza, confidence in the nation’s leadership and in victory, attitudes toward Israel and Israelis, ultra-Orthodox conscription, Arab society, and a general morality index, including comparisons with other countries.
Additional Findings
- A third of Israelis believe reports of famine in Gaza are false; a quarter believe they are true.
- Most Israelis are troubled by the starvation reports – a third because they believe it is important that Israel not cause starvation; a fifth because they think it could hinder the continuation of the war.
- Slightly more than half of Israelis support the decision to transfer large-scale humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
- When asked to choose between returning the hostages without removing Hamas from power or continuing the war to achieve both goals, the majority preferred the first option.
- There has been a rise in the proportion of Israelis who feel that Israel is not winning the war.
- A majority of Jewish Israelis believe Hamas is responsible for the lack of a hostage deal; half of Arab Israelis believe the Israeli government is responsible.
- Most Israelis are concerned that Israel will become a pariah state in the West; on the political right, most are not concerned by this.
- Following reports of harassment against Israelis abroad, a fifth now say they are less likely to travel overseas.
- A majority of Jewish Israelis are pessimistic about the future of Diaspora Jewry.
- Half of Jewish Israelis believe that former Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman Yuli Edelstein was ousted to buy time before deciding on an ultra-Orthodox conscription/exemption law.
- A majority of Arab Israelis believe that Israel has no interest in reducing crime in the Arab sector.
- A significant gap exists between Jewish and Arab Israelis in defining what is morally acceptable regarding various issues.
- Most Israelis say abortion, the death penalty, and physician-assisted suicide are “morally acceptable.”
- In Israel, Jewish women are more likely than Jewish men to consider these acts (and same-sex relations) “morally acceptable.”
- Jewish men are more likely than Jewish women to say polygamy, speeding, the death penalty for murderers, animal testing, and gambling are morally acceptable.
- Most Israelis believe that global warming exists and is due to human industrial activity.
To download the PDF version, click here.
The War in Gaza
On the eve of writing this report, Israel’s security cabinet approved the occupation of the Gaza Strip, despite the objections of the opposition parties. The survey, conducted before the vote, examined what the Israeli public thinks should be done regarding Gaza when presented with two theoretical options:
Try to reach an agreement for the return of the hostages, even at the cost of leavingHamas in power.
Continue the war until the stated objectives are achieved (overthrowing Hamas rule and returning all the hostages).
It could well be that both of these options reflect unrealistic scenarios at this stage; however, the survey enables us to track Israeli preferences when faced with the two options, each carrying potentially heavy costs, but offering a possible achievement.
Among the general Israeli public, there is a preference for the option of returning the hostages and ending the war. This preference largely stems from the views of Arab respondents, who overwhelmingly (88%) support this option. Among Jewish respondents, opinion is evenly split: 45% prefer the release of hostages even without removing Hamas from power, while 46% would prefer continuing the war until that goal is achieved (alongside freeing all Hamas-held hostages).
Most who self-identify as left-wing (98%) or centrist (68%) support seeking an agreement to return the hostages, even if Hamas is not overthrown. By contrast, most self-identifying as right-wing (88%) say they support continuing the war if stopping it means Hamas remains in power. Compared to the same question posed two months ago, there is virtually no change in respondent positions.
Prior to the cabinet decision to take control of Gaza City, most public discussion concerning Gaza in recent weeks focused on reports of starvation in the Strip, the decision to deliver large-scale aid there, and international criticism of Israel due to the prevailing situation in the territory. In the media (especially foreign outlets), there were accounts and reports from various sources describing severe food shortages in parts of Gaza, and according to data from international organizations, the number of Gazans suffering from hunger has been rising. Israel’s position throughout this crisis has been that there is no real starvation in Gaza, and that these reports are the product of Hamas propaganda.
One-third of Israelis (33%) agree with Israel’s official position and believe the famine reports from Gaza are “completely false.” A quarter (27%) believe that the reports are very accurate, a fifth (19%) think they are somewhat accurate, and another fifth (17%) think they are somewhat false. Significant differences emerge between Jewish and Arab respondents: an overwhelming majority of Arab Israelis (87%) think the famine reports are accurate (very accurate + somewhat accurate), whereas a majority of Jewish Israelis (61%) believe the reports are inaccurate (completely false + somewhat false).
Broken down by political orientation, most respondents self-identifying as left-wing (including center-left) and centrist believe the famine reports from Gaza are accurate, while most of those self-identifying as right-wing think otherwise. Three in four right-wing respondents (74%) believe the famine reports are completely false. Among center-right respondents, 41% think they are completely false, and an additional 30% think the reports are somewhat false.
Despite the lack of trust among many Israelis in the famine reports, most are nevertheless troubled by them for various reasons. One-third of Israelis are troubled mainly because it is important to them that Israel not cause starvation among Gaza residents; this is the prevailing view among those on the left and center-left. About one-fifth (22%) are troubled by the reports mainly because they “could make it harder for Israel to continue the war,” a stance widely held among centrists. A quarter of Israelis (23%) are unconcerned by the reports, and chose the option “even if there is starvation in Gaza, it’s not Israel’s problem.” Another 17% are unconcerned by the reports because they do not believe there is such starvation in Gaza.
On this question as well, there are significant differences between the views of Jewish and Arab respondents – while an overwhelming majority of Arab Israelis (81%) are worried about the situation in Gaza because it is important to them that Israel not cause starvation there, only a quarter of Jews chose this option. Another quarter is worried by the reports due to their concern about the reports’ ramifications for Israel’s ability to conduct the war.
Broken down by voting pattern, 41% of Likud voters, a quarter of Religious Zionism voters, and a quarter of United Torah Judaism voters said they are not troubled by the reports because they do not believe starvation exists in Gaza. By contrast, half of Yesh Atid voters, a third of National Unity voters, and most Labor voters (in the 2022 elections) said they are troubled mainly because it is important to them that Israel not cause starvation in Gaza.
In light of the famine reports and international criticism, in recent weeks, Israel has allowed large quantities of humanitarian aid to be delivered to Gaza. Half of Israelis (53%) support this decision, a third (32%) oppose it, and 15% said they do not know what their position is on this issue. The figure attesting to majority support among Israelis for the aid delivery is largely due to the stance of Arab respondents, most of whom (87%) support the decision to deliver aid. In the Jewish sector, 44% support the transfer of aid in large quantities, while 39% oppose it.
As one moves along the ideological spectrum from left toward right, the proportion of those opposing the aid increases, and the proportion supporting it decreases. While most of those who self-identify as left-wing and centrist support the decision to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza, most of those in the right-wing cohort oppose it (among those who self-identify as center-right, 44% oppose the aid and 35% support it). It is worth noting that on this question there was a relatively high percentage of respondents who said they didn’t know, compared to most of the other questions in the survey.
Confidence in Victory and in the Nation’s Leadership
Compared to last month, JPPI’s August Israeli Society Index shows a rise in the proportion of Israelis who feel that Israel is not winning the war. This downward trend is evident among both Jews and Arabs. A possible explanation is the waning effect of the successful campaign against Iran, whose impact was significant in the run-up to the July survey. Reports of difficulty in reaching an agreement with Hamas, international criticism of Israel, and uncertainty regarding the next steps have likely contributed to this trend. In recent weeks, in the Arab sector there has been a noticeable increase in willingness to demonstrate against the war and to express critical views on social media, more so than in earlier stages of the fighting.
In the past month, there has been a decline in the Jewish public’s confidence in the government. At present, three in five Jewish Israelis say they do not trust the government, while two out of five say they do. Despite this downturn, the current state of confidence in the government is one of the highest recorded over the past year and a half (the peak was last month, immediately after the Iran campaign). As expected, Arab Israelis’ confidence in the government is significantly lower than that among Jewish Israelis: while 60% of Jews say their confidence in the government is low, 83% of Arabs say the same.
In recent weeks, renewed efforts were made to advance a deal to release the hostages and achieve a ceasefire in Gaza, but ultimately these efforts failed. The parties involved conducted negotiations mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the United States; however, it was reported that significant gaps between their positions remained.
Half of Israelis (47%) believe that Hamas bears primary responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement to return the hostages and implement a ceasefire. A quarter say the responsibility lies mainly with the Israeli government, and a fifth think the Israeli government and Hamas are equally responsible. Among Jews, a majority (58%) think Hamas bears most of the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations. By contrast, a majority of Arab Israelis (53%) think the Israeli government is responsible.
Broken down by ideological affiliation, significant gaps emerge in perceptions of responsibility for the failure of the talks: a majority of those in the right-wing and center-right cohorts believe Hamas bears the primary responsibility, while most of those who self-identify as left and center-left consider the Israeli government responsible for the failure, or think the responsibility is evenly divided between Israel and Hamas. Among those who self-identify as centrist, there was no clear consensus – one-third believe Hamas is mainly responsible for the failure, one-third believe the responsibility lies with Israel and Hamas equally, and a quarter think the Israeli government bears most of the responsibility. An overwhelming majority of coalition voters think the efforts failed primarily because of Hamas (United Torah Judaism, 95%; Likud, 89%; Religious Zionism, 88%; Shas, 86%).
Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis
In recent weeks, various commentators have expressed growing concern about the erosion of Israel’s international standing, and the danger that Israel will become a pariah state in the West. These remarks were made against the backdrop of increasing criticism in international institutions, governments, and Western public opinion polls regarding Israel’s Gaza policies.
Most Israeli Israelis are concerned (very concerned + somewhat concerned) about the possibility that Israel will become a pariah state in the West. Conversely, about one-third are not concerned about this possibility. Compared to June, there has been no significant change on this question.
Broken down by ideological affiliation, large majorities of those who self-identify as left-wing (88%), center-left (73%), and centrist (69%) are very concerned about the possibility that the West will shun Israel. By contrast, half of those self-identifying as right-wing are not at all concerned by such a possibility. A similar pattern emerges when broken down by religiosity – the further along the spectrum from secular to religious, the lower the percentage of those concerned about Israel becoming ostracized in the West.
In recent weeks, there have been reports of harassment against Israelis around the world in connection with the ongoing war. In light of these reports, two in five Israelis say they will be traveling abroad “as usual” but “with greater caution.” A fifth (21%) say the likelihood of their traveling abroad has decreased, a fifth say they will travel abroad as usual and behave as usual, and another fifth say they will not be traveling abroad in any case, so the security situation for Israelis overseas does not affect their plans at all. About a quarter in all religious cohorts say the likelihood of their traveling abroad has decreased (except for the ultra-Orthodox). The ultra-Orthodox group has the highest percentage (26%) of respondents who say they would behave as usual when traveling abroad, and also the highest percentage (32%) of those who say they do not travel abroad at all.
Following these questions, the survey examined the attitudes of Jewish Israelis regarding the future of Diaspora Jewry. Most Jewish Israelis are pessimistic (somewhat pessimistic + very pessimistic) about the future of Diaspora Jewry, while a third are optimistic (somewhat optimistic + very optimistic) about it. Broken down by ideological affiliation, a fifth of those identifying with the right or center report great pessimism about the future of Diaspora Jewry, while between a third and a half express moderate pessimism. In this context, it is worth noting that JPPI’s monthly survey of connected American Jews found that a significant proportion of US Jews expressed pessimism regarding “the future of American Jewry.” On a scale from -5 to 5, the average score in May 2025 was -0.4, meaning it leaned toward the pessimistic side.
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Conscription
A few weeks ago, the coalition ousted the chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuli Edelstein, amid intra-coalition discord over the Haredi draft. Edelstein had advanced a Haredi conscription bill that was rejected by the Haredi factions. Opposition to the bill and the coalition’s resulting destabilization (including the withdrawal of the Haredi parties) led to the appointment of MK Boaz Bismuth to replace Edelstein.
Nearly half of Jewish Israelis believe Edelstein was replaced so that the coalition could buy time before deciding what to do regarding a law regulating Haredi conscription/exemption. A quarter believe Edelstein was replaced so the coalition could advance a law leading to the conscription of fewer ultra-Orthodox men, and a fifth believe he was replaced so that the coalition could advance a law leading to the conscription of more ultra-Orthodox men.
Most of those self-identifying as left-wing, and half of those who self-identify as centrist or center-right, believe that Likud’s decision to replace Edelstein was meant to gain additional time for the coalition until a decision could be made on the Haredi issue. A quarter of those who identify with the right also share this view. A third of respondents think Edelstein was replaced so that the coalition could advance a law leading to the conscription of more ultra-Orthodox men.
Broken down by political party affiliation, a third of Likud voters, 46% of Religious Zionism voters, 29% of Shas voters, and 40% of United Torah Judaism voters think Edelstein was replaced to buy time until a decision could be made about Haredi conscription/exemption.
Half of Jewish Israelis say they trust Bismuth on the conscription/exemption law issue less than they trusted Edelstein, a quarter trust him more than they trusted Edelstein, and a tenth trust both of them equally. Broken down by ideological affiliation, a clear pattern emerges: a majority of those self-identifying as left-wing, center-left, and centrist, and half of those self-identifying as center-right, trusted Edelstein more than they trust Bismuth. Half of those in the right-wing cohort trust Bismuth more than Edelstein, an eighth trust both of them equally, and an eighth trust Edelstein more. About a quarter (23%) of those in the right-wing cohort were unable to answer the question, and this respondent group includes a particularly large share of Religious Zionism voters (40% of whom were unable to answer). Among the ultra-Orthodox, a large majority of those expressing an opinion trust Bismuth more (though this group also had a high percentage (35%) with no opinion).
Violence and Rights in Arab Israeli Society
There has been a dramatic rise in recent years in violence and crime rates in Israel’s Arab sector, reflected in an increasing number of murders, shootings, extortion incidents, and other criminal activities. This phenomenon has sparked widespread public concern due to its impact on the sense of personal security and on the Israeli social fabric.
A third of Arab Israelis believe that Israel “wants crime rates in the Arab sector to increase.” Another third believe that Israel “does not particularly want to reduce crime rates and therefore does not try.” An eighth of Arab Israelis think that Israel wants to reduce crime but does not make enough effort, and a tenth feel that Israel is trying to reduce crime but is not succeeding.
Among the Jewish public in Israel, the results are different. Only a small proportion of Jews believe that Israel has an interest in rising Arab-sector crime levels. However, about a third believe that Israel “doesn’t particularly want” to lower the sector’s crime rate. Only a fifth of Jews believe that Israel “tries” to reduce crime rates but fails.
Broken down by ideological affiliation, a majority self-identifying as left-wing (63%) and center-left (53%) feel that Israel doesn’t particularly want to reduce crime in Arab society, and therefore does not try. A quarter of those in the center-right cohort and 14% in the right-wing group share this view. Two in five of those who self-identify as right-wing believe that Israel is trying to reduce Arab-sector crime but is not succeeding.
Nearly half of Likud (47%) and Otzma Yehudit (45%) voters, and a third of Religious Zionism voters believe that Israel is trying to reduce crime rates but is failing. Conversely, 38% of Likud voters, 46% of Religious Zionism voters, and 36% of Otzma Yehudit voters think Israel wants to lower Arab-sector crime rates but is not making enough effort.
Among Arab Israelis, this month we also examined their views on the impact of their vote in the next elections. Two-thirds of Arab Israeli respondents said it’s important to vote so they can have influence. One-eighth said it’s important to vote even if they won’t secure influence. Fewer than one in ten said it doesn’t matter whether they vote or not, because they will not have any influence, and a negligible percentage said it’s better if they do not vote, to make it clear they aren’t participating in the political game. An eighth indicated that they didn’t know how to answer this question.
Israeli Morality
As part of this month’s survey, we for the first time examined Israelis’ moral attitudes on a range of issues. Respondents were asked to tag a list of topics and actions as “morally acceptable” or “morally wrong,” and were explicitly told that the question referred to their moral perception regardless of applicable Israeli law. The data reveals a significant gap in moral perception between Jewish and Arab Israelis on many issues. In general, the percentage of Jews who labeled actions as “morally acceptable” was much higher than the percentage of Arabs in almost every category. The only exception to this pattern concerned paying in cash without an invoice or receipt.
Comparing the attitudes of Jewish Israelis to those of Americans on similar issues examined recently in a Gallup poll, several similarities and differences emerge. Regarding same-sex relations, 51% of Israelis and 64% of Americans feel it is morally acceptable. Regarding married men and women having an affair, 11% of Israelis and 8% of Americans see it as morally acceptable. Regarding medical testing on animals, 45% of Israelis and 47% of Americans consider it morally acceptable.
Jewish Israelis (but not Arab Israelis) regard certain behaviors as morally acceptable at higher rates than do Americans. For example, abortion (65% versus 49%), the death penalty for murderers (64% versus 56%), and physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill (60% versus 53%). On the other hand, Americans are more inclined than Jewish Israelis to regard polygamy as morally acceptable (21% versus 10% of Jewish Israelis) and, especially, gambling: 63% of Americans consider it morally acceptable, compared to only about a third of Jewish Israelis.
A gender-based disaggregation of data among the Jewish Israeli public reveals significant differences in moral perceptions between women and men. Women are more likely than men to regard certain behaviors as morally acceptable, such as: abortion (78% of women versus 57% of men), same-sex relations (75% versus 52%), and physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill (70% versus 54%). Conversely, men are more likely than women to view the following as morally acceptable: polygamy (16% of men versus 2% of women), driving above the speed limit (23% versus 14%), the death penalty for murderers (69% versus 56%), medical testing on animals (64% versus 33%), and gambling (34% versus 23%). The only issues on which no major gender disparity among Jewish Israelis are: having an affair while married, and paying in cash without an invoice or receipt.
On questions relating to moral perception, as might be expected, significant gaps can be observed along the religiosity spectrum. Within Israel’s Jewish population, a large majority of secular and traditionalist respondents believe that same-sex relations are morally acceptable, compared to a minority among religious and Haredi respondents. A higher proportion of secular Jews believe that gambling is morally acceptable, while a lower share of them believe that medical testing on animals is. Significant gaps also exist regarding abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and other issues.
Global Warming
This summer’s heat waves in various parts of the world have renewed the debate regarding “global warming.” Experts and public figures worldwide have voiced concerns about its long-term effects on climate, the environment, and society, and are calling for immediate steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to prepare for the anticipated climate changes. Opposing them are other public figures and experts who argue that the phenomenon is not dangerous, or that humanity cannot realistically counter it at a cost the public can bear.
This month, we examined Israelis’ attitudes toward the issue. Half say that according to their understanding, global warming exists and is caused by human industrial activity. A third believe that global warming exists but are unsure of its true cause. A negligible percentage are unsure that global warming exists at all, or believe that it is “an invention of progressive scientists.”
Broken down by ideological affiliation, most of those self-identifying as left-wing or centrist, half of those who self-identify as center-right, and a third of those who self-identify as right-wing believe that global warming exists and is caused by human industrial activity. In the centrist and right-wing cohorts, two in five believe that global warming exists but are unsure of its true cause.
Data for JPPI’s August Israeli Society Index was collected between July 31 and August 4, 2025. The survey was administered to 791 Israeli respondents, Jews and Arabs. Data was collected through the Madad.com (591 Jewish sector respondents in an online survey) and Afkar Research (200 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). The data was weighted and analyzed according to voting patterns and religiosity to represent the adult population of Israel. The Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov. Professor David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.