A majority of the public believes Israel acted appropriately in accepting President Trump’s plan; a majority believes Hamas will continue to have a significant leadership role in Gaza, and that the calm will only last a few months.
Additional Findings:
- After the agreement and the end of the war, the sense of victory has hardly changed.
- A majority think Israel acted appropriately in accepting the Trump plan. Half think there was no alternative.
- A majority of Israelis view Trump as the most pro‑Israel president ever.
- Half of Israelis think Israel is acting in line with American positions to the proper extent.
- A majority of the Israeli public assumes Hamas will continue to have a significant role in governing Gaza.
- A majority of Israelis – especially those identifying with the political right – believes the lull will not last long.
- A majority support establishing a commission of inquiry to examine the failures revealed during the war.
- Among the center‑left, there is support for a state commission; on the right, for a broad‑consensus national commission.
- A majority of Arab Israelis and half of Jewish Israelis favor early national elections.
- There is no agreement on what to name the war.
- A majority oppose revoking voting rights from those who do not serve in the IDF.
- A majority oppose MK Bismuth’s proposed Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft law.
- A majority of Arab Israelis think most Jews are political extremists.
- Half of Jewish Israelis think most Arabs are political extremists.
JPPI’s November Israeli Society Index examines Israeli attitudes a few weeks after the war ended: the war’s conclusion, the durability of the signed agreement and attitudes toward the leaders who concluded it, and several other salient questions, such as the Haredi draft exemption controversy.
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Confidence in Victory
JPPI’s November 2025 Israeli Society Index survey, the first we have conducted since the agreement ending the Israel-Hamas war, which was the result of an American plan supported by Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and other countries. The agreement included the release of all Hamas-held hostages and hundreds of Palestinian security prisoners, cessation of hostilities and an Israeli withdrawal to agreed lines (Yellow Line) within the Strip, and the stepped-up entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. This report includes several questions regarding the end of the war and what Israelis think will happen in the coming weeks and months.
With the end of the war, the share of Israelis who “do not at all feel” that Israel has won decreased slightly, but there was no rise in the share reporting that they completely believe Israel won the war. Among Arab Israelis, there was a slight increase in the share who think Israel has won the war. Overall, fewer than half of Israelis rated their sense of victory as a 4 or 5 on a 1-to-5 scale. Slightly more than half of Jewish Israelis gave such a rating.
With the end of the war, the government proposed changing its official name from the “Swords of Iron war” to the “War of Revival.” There is no public consensus on the correct name for the war. Of the four names offered in this survey, two in five Israelis (42%) prefer the “October 7 War”; one‑sixth (16%) prefer the newly proposed name, the “War of Revival”; and one‑eighth (13%) prefer the “Swords of Iron war,” the original name given by the IDF. One‑eighth (12%) support a name we added to the list – the “Simchat Torah War”; 7% think none of the names listed fit; and 10% did not know how to answer. Among Jewish Israelis, a breakdown by ideological orientation shows majorities in the left, center-left, and center cohorts (85%, 80%, and 68% respectively) prefer the “October 7 War.”
Trust in Leadership
There was a slight rise this month in the trust that Jewish Israelis have in the government. At present, roughly three in five Jewish Israelis report having low trust in the government, while two in five report high trust – similar to the past few months, a period of relatively higher trust compared to the war’s earlier months. The trust Arab Israelis have in the government is consistently much lower than that of their Jewish counterparts: three‑quarters (72%) report low trust, while a quarter (23%) report high trust.
End of the War
The vast majority of the Israeli public (90%) thinks Israel acted appropriately in accepting President Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war. Fifty‑five percent think it had to do so because “there was no choice,” and 35% think it was right to accept it on its merits. One in twenty Israelis thinks Israel acted inappropriately in agreeing to the plan; another 5% do not know. Among Arab Israelis, there is a more positive view of the plan: nearly half (48%) think the plan is good, while a third (32%) of their Jewish counterparts do. In addition, the share of Arabs who think Israel acted appropriately because it had no choice (37%) is lower than the share of Jews who think so (59%).
According to the plan, Hamas rule in Gaza will come to an end, and the position of most Israelis in this regard has not changed. Nevertheless, most of the public does not think this objective will be fully realized. A third of Israelis (31%) think Hamas will have “a significant role” in governing Gaza, and another quarter (25%) think Hamas will continue to rule Gaza. By contrast, only a sixth (16%) think Hamas will have no role at all in Gaza’s governance, and a fifth (20%) think it will have a limited role in governing the Strip. Pessimism is higher among Jewish Israelis – 60% think Hamas will have a significant governing role or continue to rule Gaza. Among Arabs this share is much lower – about a third (36%). A fifth (21%) of Arabs answered, “don’t know.” A breakdown by ideological orientation shows there is greater optimism on the right (right + center-right) than in other groups.
We also examined whether the Israeli public thinks this is a durable end or a relatively short respite before renewed fighting. Thirty-two percent of Israelis think the calm will only last a few weeks, 20% believe it will last a few months, 19% think the calm will last one to two years, and 18% anticipate a prolonged calm of several years. Compared with Jewish respondents, Arab Israelis assessed a longer hiatus – 22% believe a long‑term calm is expected.
As in our examinations at one year, eighteen months, and two years into the war, this month we also examined Israelis’ predominant emotions upon the announcement of the war’s end. A third (32%) of Israelis are mainly worried; a quarter (27%) mainly optimistic; a tenth (10%) mainly angry; another tenth (9%) mainly determined; 8% despondent; and one in twenty mainly sad. Compared to previous rounds in which we examined Israelis’ emotions, this month saw a rise in optimists – stemming largely from a significant shift among Arabs (from 2% optimistic in October to 52% now).
With the war’s end, a very large majority (88%) of Israelis think a commission of inquiry is needed to examine the circumstances of its outbreak. However, there is no agreement on the nature or framework of such a commission: 46% support establishing a State Commission of Inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice; 42% prefer a National Commission of Inquiry with a broadly agreed-upon composition and no Supreme Court representation. Four percent think there is no need for an investigative body beyond the professional inquiries of the security agencies. Among Arab Israelis, support for a State Commission of Inquiry is higher (56%) than among their Jewish counterparts (44%).
Most of the Israeli public wants the next elections (currently scheduled for November 2026) moved up: 44% think they should be held within three months, and another 10% want them in within the next six months. By contrast, 40% prefer holding them on the original date (fall 2026). Among Arab Israelis, there is a sweeping preference for early elections – three in five say they should be held as soon as possible, and only a sixth (15%) think they should be held on the original date.
US-Israel Relations
President Donald Trump’s initiative led to the agreement with Hamas, so this month we again examined the public’s trust that Trump will “do the right thing” regarding US-Israel relations. Israelis’ trust in Trump increased this month. Three in four Israelis (74%) express some degree of trust in him (22% great trust and 52% some trust); a fifth (20%) say they do not trust him. Notably, even this month – when trust in Trump is higher than in previous months – a majority of the public prefers to describe their feeling as “some trust” rather than “great trust,” indicating a cautious approach. The further one moves along the ideological scale from left to right, the higher the trust that the US president will do the right thing regarding relations between the two countries.
During Trump’s visit to Israel last month, several official speakers again referred to him – as they had in the past – as Israel’s greatest friend ever.” The data shows that most Israelis (72%) tend to agree with this statement: 38% see it as “very accurate” and 34% as “somewhat accurate.” Conversely, a fifth (21%) think the statement is inaccurate to some degree, and 8% do not know. Among Jews, agreement was higher (76%) than among Arabs (56%).
In his Knesset address, President Trump said that there was “hatred toward Israel” in the Obama and Biden administrations. We examined whether Israelis agree with this statement. The data shows that the Israeli public is divided, with a considerable share tending to accept Trump’s claim: 39% of Israelis think the statement is generally accurate, and another 19% think it is accurate with respect to the Obama Administration only. Conversely, about a third (31%) think the claim is inaccurate. Among Jews, agreement is higher than among Arabs.
In the lead up to the ceasefire agreement and after it was signed, American involvement in discussions about Gaza’s future deepened, and in Israel there was some debate over whether Israel is an American “client state,” a claim the prime minister dismissed. JPPI’s November Israeli Society Index shows that almost half of Israelis (45%) think Israel is acting to the appropriate extent in alignment with American positions; a third (31%) think Israel is aligning a bit too much; and 15% feel Israel is aligning far too much.
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Conscription
In the past month, several party leaders have called for revoking the voting rights of those who do not enlist in the IDF. A proposal of this sort was raised in the Knesset but not adopted. According to this month’s survey, a majority of the public (59%) opposes the idea of revoking the voting rights of those who do not enlist, compared with a third (30%) who support it. A majority among both Jews (60%) and Arabs (53%) is opposed to such a measure.
Alongside opposition to revoking voting rights from draft‑eligible non‑conscripts, a majority of the Israeli public opposes MK Boaz Bismuth’s bill to regulate ultra‑Orthodox (Haredi) exemption/conscription into the IDF. Half of Israelis (48%) oppose the proposal because it will not lead to significant Haredi enlistment. Another 6% oppose it because they feel it exerts unfair pressure on the Haredi public. By contrast, about a quarter of the public (26%) supports the bill – most out of a belief that it is a reasonable compromise that will lead to some Haredi enlistment, and a small minority because they see it as a way to preserve coalition stability.
Political Extremism
In both groups – Jews and Arabs – there is a majority who think that most members of the other group are politically extreme: 56% of Jews think most Arabs are extreme, and 64% of Arabs think this about the Jewish public. Over the past year and a half, there has been a slight increase of Jews who think that many or most Arab Israelis are politically extreme.
Over the past year and a half, the perception among Jews that many or most Arabs in Israel are politically extremist has strengthened slightly. One third of Jews (33%) believe that some of the Arabs in Israel are politically extremist, while a quarter (26%) think this is true of many of them, and an additional third (30%) estimate that it applies to most Arabs. By contrast, about a tenth (8%) believe that this is true of only a very small minority. These figures are quite similar to those from February 2025.
Most Arabs in Israel view Jews as a group in which political extremism is broadly represented: 38% of respondents believe that many Jews are politically extremist, and a further quarter (26%) maintain that “most” of them are. In contrast, only a small minority of 8% think that extremism is confined to a few, and 16% think it characterizes some Jews. The proportion of “don’t know” responses (13%) is somewhat higher than in previous surveys.
November survey data was collected between October 30 and November 3. The survey was administered to 1,257 Israeli respondents. Data collection was conducted by themadad.com (552 Jewish sector respondents in an online survey), and Afkar Research (205 Arab sector respondents, about half online and half by phone). Data was analyzed and weighted according to voting patterns and religiosity to represent the views of Israel’s adult population. The JPPI Israeli Society Index is compiled by Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepkov. Research, production, and writing assistance was provided by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg serves as statistical consultant.