According to this month’s index, nearly half of Israelis interpret the results as a message that the current government should not remain in office.
Additional Findings
- Nearly half of Israelis interpret the result as a message that the current government should not remain in office. Among Jewish Israelis, four in ten believe a majority of the Jewish public supports the government.
- For Jewish Israelis, the next government’s most urgent challenges are security and the judicial system; for Arab Israelis, crime and the cost of living. Voters in the two blocs share almost no common priority.
- The average Israeli rules out four of the 11 parties as coalition partners; about one in ten respondents rule out enough parties to leave no possible 61-seat coalition.
- The most widely shared condition for coalition participation is acceptance of the principle that Israel is a “Jewish and democratic state.” Next are two principles promoted by change-bloc parties: a state commission of inquiry into October 7 and broad Haredi military service.
- Four in ten Israelis feel Israel is winning or has won the war, a slight increase from October. Among Jewish Israelis, the sense of victory over Iran has fallen to four in ten.
- Among Jewish Israelis, those who feel Israel is winning or has won are more than twice as likely to be optimistic as those who do not (79% versus 36%), and only 7% would consider emigrating.
- Half give Israel’s achievements against Iran and Hamas the same rating; those who distinguish between the fronts tend to rate the outcome against Hamas more highly.
- More than half of Israelis are optimistic about the country’s future, up from a year ago, mainly because optimism has risen among Arab Israelis. One-quarter would emigrate if they could, unchanged from previous surveys.
- India and Germany are perceived as friendly to Israel; France and the United Kingdom are not. Jewish and Arab Israelis have sharply contrasting views of France and the United Kingdom; Arab Israelis are roughly six times as likely as Jewish Israelis to see China and Russia as friendly.
Throughout the report, ideological and religiosity breakdowns refer to Jewish respondents. Bloc breakdowns are based on voting in the 2026 elections.
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Election Results
Elections for the 26th Knesset were held in late October 2026. According to the published results, Likud is the largest party (27 seats), followed by Yashar, led by Gadi Eisenkot (21); Beyachad, led by Naftali Bennett (12); the Joint List (11); the Democrats (8); Ra’am (8); Yisrael Beytenu (7); Otzma Yehudit (7); United Torah Judaism (7); Shas (6); and Religious Zionism (6). The outgoing coalition parties won 53 seats in total, the change-bloc parties 48, and the Arab parties 19 – a historic high, driven by a rise of more than 20 percentage points in turnout in Arab localities compared with 2022. No bloc can reach a majority on its own without breaking party leaders’ pre-election commitments.
The survey was conducted a few days after the results were published (November 1–3). Six in ten Israelis (59%) said they had decided whom to vote for “several months ago,” one-fifth “in the last few weeks,” one-eighth “in the last few days” before the election, and 8% on Election Day itself. Late-deciding voters were concentrated in the center: Beyachad voters were the most hesitant – only 45% decided months in advance, while one-fifth (21%) decided in the final days. By contrast, 78% of voters for the Democrats and 72% of Likud voters said they had decided well in advance.
Satisfaction with the Result
Nearly two-thirds of Israelis (62%) are dissatisfied with the election results, while one-third (33%) are satisfied. But the overall figure masks sharply different views among Jewish and Arab Israelis. Seven in ten Jewish Israelis (73%) are dissatisfied – 44% “not very satisfied” and 29% “not at all satisfied” – while virtually none (2%) are “very satisfied.” Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (75%) are satisfied, including 37% who are “very satisfied.” The Arab parties reached a record high, while the outgoing coalition lost its majority. Among Jewish Israelis, dissatisfaction cuts across ideological camps, though for different reasons. On the right, whose bloc failed to secure a majority, one-quarter (28%) are satisfied. In the center, four in ten are “not at all satisfied.” On the left, represented in the Knesset by the Democrats’ eight seats, three in ten (29%) are satisfied – presumably because the outgoing coalition lost its majority. By party, Shas and United Torah Judaism voters are the most satisfied (39% and 33%, respectively, are “fairly satisfied”). Otzma Yehudit voters are the least satisfied (83% dissatisfied), followed by Yisrael Beytenu (80%) and Beyachad (77%). Three-quarters of Likud voters (76%) are dissatisfied.
Three in four respondents (75%) believe that “these elections were fateful and will have a major impact on the state of the country – for better or worse,” while one-fifth (19%) believe that “in practice, life in Israel for people like me will not change very much.” Among Jewish Israelis, the sense that the elections were fateful rises as one moves leftward across the ideological spectrum: nearly all on the left (92%) say so, compared with seven in ten (73%) on the right. Among Arab Israelis, two-thirds (64%) say the elections were fateful, while three in ten believe their lives will not change. In October, before the elections, four in ten Israelis called them “especially important” and another four in ten “important” – a different question, but a similar picture.
What Government Now?
No bloc has a Knesset majority that would allow it to form a government while keeping its pre-election commitments. What do voters want now? Four in ten Israelis (36%) want “a change-bloc government together with the Arab parties,” one-quarter (23%) “a Likud–Yashar unity government with additional parties,” one-sixth (17%) “a Netanyahu-bloc government with a party from the change bloc,” and one in seven (14%) another election soon. A change-bloc government with the Haredi parties – another option under active public discussion – draws just 3% support. Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (76%) want the change bloc with the Arab parties. Among Jewish Israelis, preferences are more evenly divided: 27% favor unity, 26% the change bloc with the Arab parties, 20% the Netanyahu bloc with a change-bloc party, and 17% another election.
As expected, each ideological camp wants a different government. The right is divided between a Netanyahu government with a change-bloc party (38%) and another election (29%); one-quarter (26%) favor unity. The center-right is the only camp in which unity is the preferred option (41%). Half of those in the center (50%), six in ten in the center-left, and three-quarters on the left (77%) want the change bloc with the Arab parties. Another election appeals almost exclusively to the right – especially Haredim (40%). The breakdown by vote is sharper. Likud voters prefer a Netanyahu-led government with a change-bloc party (45%) or another election (33%); only one-fifth (21%) favor unity with Yashar. Yashar voters divide between the change bloc with the Arab parties (52%) and unity with Likud (27%); among Beyachad voters, the figures are 49% and 38%. Yisrael Beytenu voters are the only group in the change bloc among whom unity leads (41%), while one-fifth (21%) accept none of the options. In other words, the unity government favored by one-quarter of the public is not the preferred option of a majority of voters in either of the two parties that would have to form it.
The preferences in this survey are consistent with what we measured before the elections. In October, one-quarter (27%) wanted “a government after the elections that includes both Likud and the largest party in the change bloc,” while six in ten (60%) did not. In July, using different wording, one-quarter of Israelis (27%) chose “the change bloc including Arab parties” as their preferred coalition. Today, with that option now concrete and few alternatives apparent, four in ten choose it.
How Israelis Interpret the Result
Nearly half of Israelis (46%) say that “the election results make clear that the people do not want the current government to remain in office.” One-quarter (24%) believe that “the people prefer the current government to any other government,” and another quarter (26%) accept neither statement. Jewish Israelis are divided: 38% choose “the people do not want,” 28% “the people prefer,” and 30% neither. Among Arab Israelis, three-quarters (76%) choose the first interpretation. When the question distinguishes between “a majority of the Israeli public” and “a majority of the Jewish public,” the picture reverses among Jewish Israelis: four in ten (39%) say the result reflects “support by a majority of the Jewish public for the Netanyahu government,” while one-third (34%) choose “opposition by a majority of the Israeli public.” Among Israelis overall, the order is reversed: 41% choose opposition and 34% support. Both statements are arithmetically true: the outgoing coalition’s 53 seats represent a majority among Jewish voters but a minority among all voters. The choice between them is therefore ideological and political. On the right, two-thirds (68%) choose “support by the Jewish public”; on the left and center-left, three-quarters or more choose “opposition by the Israeli public”; and in the center-right, roughly one-third choose each statement and one-third accept neither.
“Neither” and “Don’t know” are not shown in the table.
“Neither” and “Don’t know” are not shown in the table.
The Urgent Challenges
We asked respondents to select up to two major challenges the next government should address before other issues, regardless of who heads it. Among Israelis overall, security – Iran, Gaza, and the north – leads (36%). Four issues follow at roughly similar levels: the judicial system and relations among branches of government (27%), the cost of living (26%), Haredi military service and equality in sharing the burden (19%), and crime and public security (19%). But the average masks sharply different agendas. Among Jewish Israelis, the leading issues are security (43%), the judicial system (34%), and Haredi military service (23%); only 8% select crime. Among Arab Israelis, crime and public security (65%) and the cost of living (62%) dominate; all other issues are at 10% or below. Security, the top Jewish priority, is selected by just 7% of Arab Israelis.
Even with the qualifier “regardless of who heads it,” bloc differences remain stark. Voters in the two Jewish blocs have entirely different priorities. Among outgoing-coalition voters, security (66%) and the judicial system (56%) stand out; almost no one selects drawing lessons from October 7 or Haredi military service (2% and 5%). Among change-bloc voters, Haredi military service leads (39%), followed by drawing lessons from October 7 (34%) and polarization (27%); only one in seven (14%) selects the judicial system. Security is the only issue receiving substantial support in both blocs, though even here the gap is wide: 66% versus 20%. Among Haredim, the judicial system ranks first (51%), followed by security (48%); 14% select Haredi military service.
*Each respondent selected up to two issues.
Asked which issue was “most important to you in deciding how to vote,” respondents give a similar picture in more personal terms. Among Israelis overall, the leading issues are security (19%), the judicial system (13%), responsibility for October 7 (11%), crime (11%), “the personal question: Netanyahu – yes or no” (10%), and the cost of living (10%). Among Jewish Israelis, the cost of living – often the leading answer when surveys ask about “the most important problem” – determined the vote of only 6%. Among Arab Israelis, at least in retrospect, crime was decisive for half (52%) and the cost of living for one-quarter (25%). On the right, four in ten voted mainly on security and one-quarter on the judicial system; in the center and center-left, responsibility for October 7 led. On the left – a relatively small group – it was Netanyahu.
Who Will Address the Most Important Issues?
Cross-tabulating responses to the urgent-challenge and preferred-government questions shows that those who selected security want a Netanyahu-led government with a change-bloc party (34%), a unity government (29%), or another election (24%); only 7% want the change bloc with the Arab parties. A large majority (62%) of those who selected drawing lessons from October 7 want a change-bloc coalition with the Arab parties. Those who selected Haredi military service divide between unity (40%) and the change bloc with the Arab parties (36%); only 4% would accept a change-bloc government with the Haredi parties. Those who selected the judicial system are the group most likely to support another election (34%): respondents who want judicial reform to continue prefer another election to a government that includes a change-bloc party.
Each row shows the distribution of preferred governments among respondents who selected that challenge; a respondent may appear in two rows.
Coalition Options
We asked respondents to imagine that they could determine the makeup of the next coalition. From the 11 parties elected to the Knesset, they selected all those they wanted in the coalition and all those they did not want included under any circumstances (“even if that means another election”). The three parties most often wanted in the coalition are all in the change bloc: Yashar (65%), Beyachad (63%), and Yisrael Beytenu (59%). They are followed by Likud (50%), Religious Zionism (44%), and the Democrats (42%). The parties most often ruled out are the Joint List (62%), Otzma Yehudit (50%), and Ra’am (45%). The Democrats are ruled out by 37%, Religious Zionism by 35%, and Likud and each Haredi party by about one-third. The three centrist change-bloc parties are rarely ruled out (9%–13%).
Among Jewish Israelis, the two Arab parties are ruled out most often (Joint List 76%, Ra’am 56%), followed by the Democrats (46%) and Otzma Yehudit (44%). Among Arab Israelis, Otzma Yehudit (77%), Likud (68%), and Religious Zionism (57%) are ruled out most often; only one-fifth rule out the Haredi parties, and just 5%–17% rule out the three centrist parties and the Democrats. The main difference between the two Jewish blocs is whom they exclude: outgoing-coalition voters almost unanimously rule out the two Arab parties and the Democrats, while almost none rule out the Haredi parties. Change-bloc voters rule out Otzma Yehudit (85%), the Joint List (57%), and each Haredi party and Religious Zionism (54%–59%); nearly half (45%) also rule out Likud.
The exclusions are not symmetrical. Likud voters rule out Yashar (22%) and Beyachad (27%) at relatively modest rates; half of Yashar voters rule out Likud (53%), as do three in ten Beyachad voters (30%). A unity government is therefore a larger problem for Yashar voters than for Likud voters. Change-bloc electorates also differ in their exclusions. Yisrael Beytenu voters rule out Ra’am (47%) almost as often as Likud (39%), and rule out the two Haredi parties (61%–68%) more often than Likud. Beyachad voters rule out Shas (71%) and United Torah Judaism (67%). Voters for all right-wing parties rule out the Democrats (83%–100%) almost as often as the Arab parties.
Is There a Majority Coalition Most Israelis Do Not Rule Out?
These exclusions allow us to calculate, for each respondent, which coalitions of 61 seats or more could be formed without any party they ruled out. The average Israeli excludes about four parties (3.6; Jewish Israelis 3.7, Arab Israelis 2.9). About one in ten respondents (9%) are left with no possible 61-seat coalition. Everyone else has at least one possible coalition – but almost never the same one. We examined ten theoretically possible coalitions and calculated the share of respondents who did not rule out any of their parties. Only one reaches half the public: Likud, Yashar, Beyachad, and Yisrael Beytenu (67 seats). It is not ruled out by 51% of Israelis, including 57% of Jewish Israelis and one-quarter of Arab Israelis.
The first three parties alone total 60 seats – one short of a majority – and are not ruled out by 54%. A Likud–Yashar government with the Haredi parties (exactly 61 seats) is not ruled out by four in ten Israelis (41%), but by only 17% of change-bloc voters. The outgoing coalition plus Yashar (74 seats) is not ruled out by 31% – seven in ten outgoing-coalition voters, almost no change-bloc voters (4%), and 6% of Arab Israelis. A change-bloc government with the Arab parties (67 seats) – the option four in ten say they want – is not ruled out by one-third (32%): seven in ten Arab Israelis, one-fifth of Jewish Israelis, four in ten change-bloc voters, and virtually no outgoing-coalition voters. A change-bloc government with the Haredi parties (61 seats) is not ruled out by one-quarter (26%).
The conclusion: the only coalition not ruled out by a majority of respondents is a center-right coalition without the Haredi parties, Otzma Yehudit, or the Arab parties – in other words, one in which Likud sits with parties that pledged not to sit with it. This does not address who would serve as prime minister, a question not tested in the survey but one that would presumably affect support. Every other coalition currently under discussion is ruled out in advance by at least half of Israelis. It is also important to distinguish between “want” and “do not rule out”: a change-bloc government with the Arab parties is the most desired option (36%) but is ruled out by two-thirds; a Likud–Yashar–Beyachad–Yisrael Beytenu government is the least often ruled out, yet fewer than one-fifth explicitly say they want a government containing all four parties.
“Do not rule out” – the share of respondents who did not mark any party in the coalition as one they “under no circumstances” want in the coalition. “Haredi parties” – Shas and United Torah Judaism; “change bloc” – Yashar, Beyachad, the Democrats, and Yisrael Beytenu; “outgoing coalition” – Likud, Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, Shas, and United Torah Judaism.
Principles Respondents Set as Conditions
Alongside party exclusions, we presented respondents with nine principles and asked them to identify those they considered prerequisites for coalition membership – principles that, in their view, any party joining the coalition must accept. The average Jewish respondent selected three; the average Arab respondent, one. The most widely accepted principle is that “Israel is a Jewish and democratic state” – six in ten Israelis (62%) and nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (74%). Substantial shares in every ideological camp make coalition participation conditional on this principle: 60% on the left and 85% in the center-right; among Arab Israelis, 13%. Next come two principles strongly supported by change-bloc voters: broad or full Haredi military service, with sanctions for those who do not serve (38% of Israelis, 43% of Jewish Israelis, 71% in the center-left, 68% in the center, and 19% on the right); and a state commission of inquiry into October 7 (36% of Israelis, 38% of Jewish Israelis, 81% on the left, 66% in the center, and 8% on the right).
Right-wing coalition supporters emphasize a narrower set of conditions: no reconstruction in Gaza while Hamas remains in power (43% of Israelis, 69% on the right, 17% on the left); support for settlement in Judea and Samaria (30% of Israelis, 68% on the right, 1% in the center-left); and reform reducing some Supreme Court powers (28% of Israelis, 61% on the right, 0% in the center-left). The opposite condition – opposition to such reform – is selected by 19% (52% on the left); opposition to settlement by 8% (28% of Arab Israelis); and a broad or full exemption for Haredi Torah students by 12%. Among Haredim, nearly half (45%) require such an exemption, alongside support for settlement (61%) and judicial reform (60%), conditions similar to those set by right-wing voters. Here too, the conditions add up to a coalition that does not exist. One-quarter of Israelis (26%) require both a state commission of inquiry and Haredi military service – two conditions that no party in the outgoing coalition supports. Another quarter (23%) require both support for settlement and judicial reform – conditions not accepted by every change-bloc party.
“I do not agree with any of these conditions” (6%) and “Don’t know” (6%) are not shown in the table.
Victory in the War
Four in ten Israelis (43%) feel Israel is winning or has won the war overall (ratings 4 or 5 on a five-point scale) – a slight increase from October (41%) and September (39%), and the highest level since April. Among Jewish Israelis, half (49%; 46% in October) feel this way; among Arab Israelis, one-fifth do (20%; 24% in October). As in previous months, the sense of victory varies sharply by political identification: three-quarters on the right (77%), half in the center-right (52%), one-fifth in the center (20%), and still fewer in the center-left and on the left. This month’s increase is concentrated on the right and center-right; the center and left show no change.
In addition to the general victory question, this month we asked separately about two fronts. The sense of victory against Hamas (42% of Israelis; 47% of Jewish Israelis) is close to the overall figure. The sense of victory against Iran is lower – 38% of Israelis and 43% of Jewish Israelis – and has fallen sharply since July 2025, immediately after the latest campaign, when nearly three-quarters of Jewish Israelis (72%) felt Israel had defeated Iran, far more than felt Israel was winning the war overall (53%). By November 2026, the order had reversed: the campaign against Iran is now seen as a weaker component of Israel’s overall wartime achievements. The decline cuts across ideological camps: on the right, two-thirds (68%) feel Israel achieved victory against Iran, compared with 77% in the war overall. Among Arab Israelis, the three measures are similar – about one-fifth perceive victory in each.
Consistent and Split Assessments
Do Israelis distinguish between the fronts, or is the sense of victory a single judgment applied to every question about the war? Half of Israelis (53%; Jewish Israelis 48%, Arab Israelis 73%) gave Israel’s achievements against Iran and Hamas the same rating, and only one in ten (10%) gave ratings that differed by two points or more. The two ratings are highly correlated, and the “overall” sense of victory is slightly closer to the Hamas rating than to the Iran rating. Grouped into four types, one-third of Jewish Israelis (34%) feel Israel achieved victory on both fronts, one-fifth (21%) on neither, and only about one-fifth are “split”: 13% feel victory against Hamas but not Iran, and 9% against Iran but not Hamas. Among Arab Israelis, four in ten (44%) feel victory on neither front, and the share with split assessments is even lower (9%). Those who do distinguish between the fronts tend to rate Israel’s achievement against Hamas more highly. Among Israelis overall, 28% rate the outcome against Hamas higher than the outcome against Iran, while 19% do the reverse; in the center, the gap is especially wide (41% versus 15%). Religious Jews are the only group in which Iran is still seen as the greater victory (32% versus 23%).
The two groups with consistent assessments align closely with ideological camps. Those who feel Israel achieved victory on both fronts are overwhelmingly outgoing-coalition voters (87%); two-thirds identify with the right, and six in ten are “very optimistic” about the country’s future. Those who feel victory on neither front are overwhelmingly change-bloc voters (79%); three-quarters are secular, and two-thirds (64%) want a change-bloc government with the Arab parties. The “split” groups, by contrast, do not clearly belong to either camp: among those who feel victory only against Hamas, 43% voted for the outgoing coalition and 45% for the change bloc; among those who feel victory only against Iran, the figures are 44% and 36%. They are also the only groups in which a unity government is the preferred option (39% and 42%, compared with 24% among those who feel victory on both fronts and 17% among those who feel victory on neither). Those who feel victory only against Iran lean further right and are more religious (56% right-wing; one-third religious), while those who feel victory only against Hamas are concentrated in the center and center-right, are secular or traditionalist, and are dissatisfied with the election results (81%). In other words, a split sense of victory is characteristic of Israelis who do not clearly belong to either bloc.
“Victory” – ratings 4–5; “no victory” – ratings 1–2.
Respondents who gave a rating of 3 on one or both fronts are not included in the four victory/no-victory categories.
Respondents who gave a rating of 3 on one or both fronts are not included in the four victory/no-victory categories.
Optimism and Emigration
Ideological breakdowns refer to Jewish respondents.
More than half of Israelis (55%) are optimistic about the country’s future – 26% “very” and 29% “somewhat” – up from October 2025 (50%) and just below November 2024 (57%). Among Jewish Israelis, optimism is stable at six in ten (60%), similar to a year ago (58%) and two years ago (60%). The main change is among Arab Israelis: after falling from 40% optimistic in November 2024 to 20% in October 2025, the figure has rebounded to 42%. Half (50%) were “very pessimistic” a year ago, compared with one-quarter (23%) today. Among Jewish Israelis, the intensity of sentiment has also shifted: the share who are “very optimistic” fell from 36% to 31%, while the “very pessimistic” share fell from 19% to 13%. As in the past, optimism is closely associated with ideology and religiosity. On the right, eight in ten (79%) are optimistic, compared with one-third (35%) on the left; among Haredim, 84% are optimistic, compared with 42% of secular Jews. Optimism is also closely linked to the sense of victory: among Jewish Israelis who feel Israel is winning or has won, eight in ten (79%) are optimistic; among those who do not, one-third (36%) are optimistic and one-quarter are “very pessimistic.”
Excludes “Don’t know.”
The desire to emigrate has also changed little. One-quarter of Israelis (25%) agree that “if I had a practical opportunity to move abroad, I would do so” – 11% “strongly” and 14% “somewhat” – the same as in October 2025 (25%) and close to November 2024 (27%). More than half (54%) “strongly disagree.” Among Jewish Israelis, one-fifth (22%) would emigrate; among Arab Israelis, four in ten (39%) would, including one-quarter (24%) who “strongly agree” – three times the Jewish share (8%). Among Jewish Israelis, the ideological gap is large: 9% on the right would emigrate, compared with one-fifth in the center-right, one-third (35%) in the center, and four in ten in both the center-left and left. Among secular Jews, four in ten (38%) would emigrate, compared with 5% of religious Jews. As with optimism, interest in emigration tracks the sense of victory: among Jewish Israelis who do not feel that Israel is winning or has won, half (51%) would emigrate; among those who do, 7% would.
Excludes “Don’t know.”
Nearly half of Israelis (46%) know Israelis who, “because of the situation, are considering moving abroad” – 18% “know many such people” and 28% “know some” – similar to 51% in October 2025. Among Jewish Israelis, four in ten (40%; 44% a year ago and 47% two years ago) know such people, while the share who “do not know any” has risen steadily, from 23% in November 2024 to 29% in October 2025 and 37% today. Among Arab Israelis, seven in ten (69%; 79% a year ago) know such people. On the left, three-quarters know Israelis considering moving abroad; on the right, one in seven do.
Friendly and Unfriendly Countries
This is the third year in which we have asked whether six countries are friendly or unfriendly toward Israel. India and Germany are perceived as friendly; the other four are not. Three-quarters of Israelis (76%) see India as friendly, a marked increase from October 2025 (61%); among Jewish Israelis, eight in ten do (83%; 65% a year ago). Nearly two-thirds (62%) see Germany as friendly – similar to a year ago (64%) and well below November 2024 (80%). Ratings of the United Kingdom and France continue to fall: one-fifth see the United Kingdom as friendly (21%; 45% in November 2024 and 27% in October 2025), and 15% see France as friendly (27% and 19%, respectively). Among Jewish Israelis, only 8% see France as friendly, while two-thirds (67%) see it as unfriendly; the figures for the United Kingdom are 13% and 52%. China and Russia are seen as unfriendly by 43% and 61%, respectively, and as friendly by just 6% each.
Arab Israeli assessments differ sharply from those of Jewish Israelis. Four in ten see France as friendly (42%), and half see the United Kingdom as friendly (55%), compared with 8% and 13%, respectively, of Jewish Israelis. One-fifth see China and Russia as friendly (20% and 17%), compared with 3% of Jewish Israelis. Only India and Germany are viewed as less friendly by Arab Israelis than by Jewish Israelis (50% and 56%, respectively). Among Arab Israelis, ratings have declined from a year ago: France from 48% to 42%, the United Kingdom from 60% to 55%, China from 29% to 20%, and Russia from 32% to 17%. Among Jewish Israelis, ideological differences are concentrated mainly on Europe: on the left, one-third (32%) see France as friendly, compared with 2% on the right; nearly everyone on the left (94%) sees Germany as friendly, compared with fewer than half on the right (45%). Differences over China and Russia are minimal; the gap over India, though smaller than the gaps over the European countries, is still 23 percentage points.
Data for the JPPI Israeli Society Index survey was collected November 1–3, 2026, immediately after publication of the election results, through the Madad.com online panel (1,787 Jewish panelists, from whom 600 were randomly selected within quotas based on voting in the 2026 election) and Afkar Research (205 Arab respondents, approximately two-thirds online and one-third by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting patterns and religiosity to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepokov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index with research, production, and writing assistance by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.