Academic Boycotts Targeting Israel: A Status Report and Policy Recommendations

Introduction

Israeli academia is one of the State of Israel’s principal engines of growth, innovation, and resilience. Israel’s achievements in science, medicine, the high-tech sector, and technological innovation depend to a considerable extent on a strong higher education system and deep integration into international research networks. Since October 7, 2023, and the war that followed, initiatives to boycott, exclude, and delegitimize Israeli institutions, researchers, and students have intensified markedly. Incidents that once appeared isolated have become a persistent pattern: canceled lectures and conferences, suspended institutional agreements, withdrawals from collaborative ventures, difficulties in forming research consortia, and damage to professional and personal relationships.

The harm is not confined to a small academic community. Over time, it may erode Israel’s scientific standing, reduce access to research grants and international infrastructure, impede the recruitment of outstanding researchers and students, accelerate brain drain, and weaken the innovation mechanisms on which the Israeli economy depends. Academic boycotts should therefore be regarded as a strategic threat requiring a sustained, coordinated national response.

This chapter presents the principal characteristics of the phenomenon, key data collected in recent years, the tension between government involvement and academic autonomy, the particular importance of Horizon Europe, and the measures already taken in Israel. It concludes with operational recommendations at the national, institutional, and international levels.

Academic Boycotts as a Strategic Threat

An academic boycott is not limited to an individual researcher’s refusal to cooperate with an Israeli colleague. It can damage foundational mechanisms essential to national resilience: cross-border collaboration, participation in research and development programs, access to equipment and databases, student and researcher mobility, and Israel’s standing in the scientific community. As these harms accumulate, they also affect the economy, industry, diplomacy, and civil society. Defining the phenomenon as a strategic threat also requires examining the relationship between Israeli policy and the response of the international community. The international response is neither immutable nor disconnected from Israel’s actions and messages. Military and political measures – especially extreme statements and dehumanizing rhetoric by public officials – are repeatedly cited in campaigns against Israel and lend legitimacy to boycott initiatives.

At the same time, statements by government officials accusing academia itself of having “brought the boycott upon itself” weaken Israel’s capacity to address the threat. Israeli academia is not a domestic adversary but a national asset. It has a responsibility to warn of long-term risks, and the government should incorporate academic consequences into its foreign policy and security calculus, just as it considers economic and diplomatic repercussions.

Academic Autonomy and Tensions with the State

The need for a national response does not diminish the importance of university autonomy. Academic institutions are not arms of government and should not be expected to justify government policy. Their role is to sustain free inquiry, criticism, public debate, and a plurality of voices. This very autonomy is one of the strongest arguments against institutional boycotts: such boycotts damage the spaces in which internal criticism is voiced, different groups encounter one another, and freedom of thought and expression is upheld. A clear distinction must therefore be drawn between government support and political control. The state can and should provide funding, legal assistance, diplomatic tools, and an infrastructure for gathering information, but it must not dictate universities’ positions, messages, or intellectual agendas. Identifying academia too closely with the government could reinforce the claim that research institutions are extensions of the state and weaken the case for their defense in the international arena.

It must be acknowledged that some boycott initiatives contain anti-Zionist and even antisemitic elements. Yet not all boycott supporters are motivated by hatred of Jews or by denial of Israel’s very existence; many regard boycotts as a form of protest against policies they consider immoral. The appropriate response is therefore to make a substantive argument: boycotting academia weakens precisely the liberal, critical, and collaborative forces within Israel. Jews and Arabs, including civilians and military reservists, study and work side by side at universities, where strong criticism of the government is also voiced. Harming these institutions does not promote dialogue or change; it constricts the space for both.

Current Situation: The Academic Sphere and Antisemitism on Campus

International reports indicate that the treatment of Israeli researchers and institutions has become part of the broader European debate over academic freedom. A European Parliament report on academic freedom included, among other cases, the cancellation of historian Benny Morris’s lecture at Leipzig University, disputes at universities in Belgium and Poland, and calls by faculty members to sever ties with institutions in Israel. The inclusion of these cases in a non-Israeli report not devoted exclusively to Israel indicates that the phenomenon has moved beyond the political margins and penetrated academic institutions themselves.

Data published in Nature and in bibliographic databases points to a reconfiguration of global research networks along geopolitical fault lines. In the Israeli context, collaboration with researchers in countries whose governments were sharply critical of Israel, including Spain and South Africa, declined in 2025. This does not mean that Israel’s scientific system has collapsed, but it is an early sign that ties are eroding – a trend that could intensify if it becomes normalized. At the same time, there has been an exceptional rise in antisemitic incidents worldwide since October 7. In the United States, more than 6,200 incidents were documented in 2025 – an average of approximately 17 per day. Europe likewise reported increases in assaults, threats, harassment, vandalism, and incitement. The data is incomplete because of differences in reporting methods and underreporting; the actual scale of the phenomenon may therefore be larger.

On American campuses, the number of incidents declined in 2025 from its 2024 peak but remained far higher than in the years preceding the war. A distinction must be drawn between forceful political protest, which falls within the scope of freedom of expression, and incitement to violence, the use of antisemitic tropes, the exclusion of Jews and Israelis, or the denial of their right to participate in academic life. The distinction is not always clear, but ambiguity does not relieve universities of their duty to protect members of their communities. In the United States, political and legal pressure prompted federal investigations and procedural changes at many institutions. Some measures were intended to protect Jewish students, but aggressive government intervention and threats to research funding also raise concerns about damage to university autonomy and freedom of expression. The challenge is to establish clear rules against harassment and incitement without turning legitimate political criticism into a disciplinary offense.

At the same time, it is important to avoid treating every criticism of Israel or every expression of support for a boycott as a direct manifestation of hatred of Jews. A significant proportion of activists in this arena regard their actions as grounded in a commitment to universal human rights and in a desire to influence Israeli policies they perceive as immoral or unjust. The relationship between academic boycotts and antisemitism is therefore neither straightforward nor uniform across contexts and cases. The central challenge is to distinguish legitimate political criticism – even when it is harsh and difficult – from discourse that moves beyond political bounds and becomes a vehicle for exclusion or hostility toward Jews as Jews.

The Israeli Response: From Case-by-Case Measures to a Systemic Approach

As early as 2013, following the American Studies Association’s decision to boycott Israel, the Knesset Science and Technology Committee held a special session. Participants warned of a widening trend and called for the establishment of a coordinating government body. The committee identified two parallel dangers: the absence of national coordination, on the one hand, and excessively direct government involvement that would portray academia as part of the political system, on the other. Despite these warnings, no permanent mechanism was established. Following October 7, universities had to contend with hundreds of incidents: canceled conferences and lectures, suspended agreements, refusals to participate in joint projects, and demonstrations on campuses abroad. At first, each university handled the cases affecting it independently, generally through the office of its vice president for international affairs. The Association of University Heads, Israel (VERA) issued statements condemning violence, antisemitism, and calls for Israel’s destruction and offered Jewish and Israeli researchers and students who felt threatened abroad the opportunity to be hosted in Israel.

The protests and encampments on campuses in the United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia made the limits of freedom of expression a central issue. On some campuses, protests were peaceful; on others, there were building occupations, blockades, confrontations, and arrests. The U.S. congressional hearing involving the presidents of Harvard, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania illustrated the difficulty of determining when extremist calls violate campus rules. Their cautious responses drew fierce criticism and came to symbolize the institutional crisis. Within months, it became clear that a case-by-case response was insufficient. The same patterns appeared at different institutions; in some cases, a single foreign institution adversely affected several Israeli universities. A coordinated response required pooled resources: a shared database, legal and diplomatic tools, standardized response language, information-sharing mechanisms, and a process for designating priority cases.

Recognition that this was a shared challenge led to the establishment of a dedicated forum under VERA. The task force’s purpose is to coordinate a systematic, unified effort to address the phenomenon and to create shared infrastructure for knowledge management, monitoring, information collection, and coordinated responses across all Israeli universities. It works to identify emerging trends, initiatives, and risks in the international arena; formulate common strategies for engagement with institutions and organizations worldwide; and strengthen Israel’s academic and scientific collaborations in the face of current challenges. The task force includes the vice presidents for international affairs of all Israeli research universities, together with designated representatives appointed by the universities specifically for this issue. Emmanuel Nahshon, a former Israeli diplomat, was appointed to lead the task force. His previous positions include deputy director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for public diplomacy, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Israel’s ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg.

The forum also retains the services of Johan Benizri of KESHER LAW, a European law firm based in Belgium. Subsequently, in recognition of the European arena’s heightened sensitivity and significance for Israeli academia, a special representative for European Union affairs was appointed: former ambassador and EU affairs adviser Roni Leshno-Yaar. His role is to assist in managing contacts, monitoring developments, and responding to them in this arena. These activities are funded by the universities. The task force was established in recognition that academic boycotts were no longer confined to broad political declarations but had begun to take the form of concrete actions affecting research, teaching, international collaboration, and the personal and professional standing of Israeli researchers. At an early stage, the team identified a significant gap between the on-the-ground experiences of researchers and institutions and the team’s capacity to map the phenomenon systematically and comparatively on the basis of data. A dedicated database was therefore developed to collect and analyze reports of academic boycott incidents from all universities and classify them by type of boycott, degree of formalization, and institutional, professional, and geographic context. Reports based on these submissions are published regularly.

Horizon Europe and the European Arena

Horizon Europe is the European Union’s principal research and innovation program for 2021–2027, with a budget of approximately EUR 95.5 billion. Israel participates as an associated country on terms similar to those of EU member states and has historically achieved high success rates. The program’s importance is not solely financial: it integrates Israeli researchers and companies into international consortia, creates long-term relationships, and strengthens Israel’s position in science and technology. Calls to suspend Israel from the program arise from a combination of criticism of the war in Gaza, political and economic interests, and competition for research resources. Some hostility toward cooperation with Israel predates October 7. These factors are compounded by internal European disputes over the allocation of funding to non-EU countries, as well as concerns about dual-use technologies.

In July 2025, the European Commission proposed a partial and targeted suspension of Israeli entities from the EIC Accelerator, which supports start-ups and near-market technologies. The proposal was not intended to exclude universities and researchers from Horizon Europe as a whole, and it was presented as reversible. Nevertheless, the proposal itself created a precedent and demonstrated the possibility of using scientific cooperation as an instrument of political pressure. In parallel with the official proposal, human rights organizations, university associations, and civil society groups have campaigned for broader measures, including the suspension of the EU–Israel Association Agreement and Israel’s participation in research programs. The central struggle concerns not only the current program but also the next framework, FP10, planned for 2028–2034. The participation rules, budget, and status of associated countries are now being determined. The coming years therefore constitute a critical window for diplomatic and academic action to secure Israel’s place in the future European research framework.

Data Collected in Israel

The forum established under VERA began systematically collecting reports from the institutions. The findings show that most boycott incidents occur in Europe, especially Western Europe, across a range of settings: conferences, journals, professional associations, institutional collaborations, and research consortia. Reported cases included refusals to invite or host Israelis, demands to remove institutional affiliations, the cancellation of agreements, and pressure on foreign partners to withdraw from joint projects.

The second report, covering the period through February 2025, recorded more than 500 incidents. It identified a shift from symbolic gestures of protest to actions with professional consequences: blocked access to funding, canceled conference participation, interference with publications, and the suspension of institutional ties. Organizations associated with the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement sometimes provided the ideological and organizational infrastructure, but not every case resulted from a coordinated campaign; some reflected local decisions or a “silent boycott” that is difficult to substantiate.

The third report, covering the summer and autumn of 2025, described a further escalation: the cumulative number of reports exceeded 1,000, and approximately one-quarter of the reports concerned boycotts targeting individuals. Several European universities had, in practice, imposed full institutional boycotts, while others had not renewed ties that had been suspended. The report also highlighted professional associations that imposed political conditions on participation, as well as disruptions affecting approximately 20 Israeli partnerships within Horizon Europe, primarily involving partners in Spain, Belgium, and Italy.

Alongside VERA’s reports, the Samuel Neaman Institute has monitored the phenomenon since 2024 and compared external pressures with performance indicators for Israeli academia. The situation as of May 2026 points to an escalation and partial normalization of boycott initiatives but also to relative stability in key indicators: publication output, European Research Council (ERC) grants, and international collaboration do not, at this stage, indicate systemic collapse. The conclusion is not that the danger is absent, but that a window for action remains before these pressures translate into deep and lasting harm.

Patterns of Boycott and Their Practical Consequences

The data indicates that an “academic boycott” is not a single phenomenon but rather a continuum of patterns that vary in severity. At the most visible end are formal institutional decisions: suspending an agreement, terminating student exchanges, prohibiting cooperation, or refusing to participate in a consortium that includes an Israeli partner. Such decisions are relatively easy to identify and document, and there is a clearly identifiable institutional authority to which academic, legal, or diplomatic representations can be made. These are accompanied by actions taken by professional associations and journals: withdrawing conference invitations, requiring researchers to conceal or remove an Israeli institutional affiliation, refusing to appoint Israelis to professional positions, or adopting procedures that restrict contact with institutions in Israel. In some cases, the decision is explicitly framed as a political measure; in others, it is presented as an organizational or security consideration, even though its practical effect is discriminatory against Israeli researchers.

The greatest difficulty is the “silent boycott.” A researcher receives no response to an invitation to collaborate; a manuscript is rejected on general grounds; a prospective partner explains in a private conversation that an Israeli institution cannot be included; or a research consortium is reconfigured without the Israeli partner to avoid internal pressure. In such cases, it is difficult to establish a causal link between the decision and the researcher’s national identity, but the accumulating evidence points to a significant change in the academic climate. The effects vary by career stage and field. Senior researchers with established networks can sometimes find alternative partners, whereas early-career researchers depend more heavily on invitations, mentors, conferences, and recommendations. Fields that rely on major infrastructure and international consortia are particularly vulnerable, because partners, equipment, or experimental sites cannot readily be replaced. The humanities and social sciences are also affected, particularly through professional associations, journals, and mobility programs.

Boycotts also affect students. The cancellation of exchanges and fears of harassment on campus reduce educational opportunities, impede mobility, and create a sense of insecurity. Israeli and Jewish students abroad may avoid disclosing their identity, attending public events, or expressing their views. Conversely, Palestinian students and supporters of protest may feel that sweeping restrictions silence legitimate criticism. Sound institutional policy must protect security and equal participation while also safeguarding freedom of expression and nonviolent protest. At the institutional level, each incident may appear minor, but the cumulative cost is high: senior management time, legal advice, the search for alternative partners, reputational damage, and loss of trust. A strategy must therefore encompass not only crisis management but also prevention: sustained engagement with partners, agreements containing dispute-resolution mechanisms, Israeli representation in governing bodies, and early identification of areas of risk.

Policy Recommendations

A. Recommendations at the National and Governmental Levels

1. Establish a national coordinating body to address academic boycotts: Rather than relying on the current arrangement, under which the forum addressing boycotts operates within VERA and is effectively run solely by the universities, Israel should establish a permanent interministerial body comprising representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council for Higher Education, the Planning and Budgeting Committee, the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, and VERA. This body should coordinate the response to academic boycotts targeting Israeli researchers and institutions. Its remit should include information collection, policy formulation, rapid response to exceptional incidents, legal and communications support, and coordination among all relevant stakeholders.

2. Create assistance mechanisms for researchers affected by boycotts: A dedicated fund should be established to support researchers who, because of their national identity or institutional affiliation, face conference cancellations, denial of collaborative opportunities, exclusion from international projects, or other losses of research opportunities. Assistance could include alternative research funding, travel support, legal counsel, and communications support.

3. Expand academic ties with additional regions of the world: Israel should deepen academic cooperation with institutions and countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Gulf states, while continuing to strengthen ties with Europe and North America. Broader collaborative networks would reduce dependence on a small number of academic power centers and create new opportunities for research, teaching, innovation, and student and researcher mobility. This effort, however, cannot rest on institutional initiatives alone; it requires substantial, dedicated government investment. Dedicated funding tracks and international research programs should be established in partnership with institutions in these countries and regions, including joint research grants, support for researcher and student exchanges, conference funding, joint research centers, and incentives for academic institutions to develop new partnerships.

Such investment is needed, among other reasons, to offset at least some of the academic, research, and institutional opportunities lost in parts of Europe and North America, where Israeli researchers and institutions have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. A proactive policy of expanding global cooperation could not only mitigate the effects of boycotts and exclusion but also reinforce Israel’s standing as an international academic actor operating across diverse regions.

4. Make a national investment in the international visibility of Israeli research and science: A large-scale national program should be developed to increase the international visibility of Israeli research among scholars and institutions worldwide, on the understanding that personal relationships and direct familiarity with Israeli academia are among the most effective tools for countering trends toward boycotts, delegitimization, and exclusion. Dedicated funding should support visits to Israel by international scholars for conferences, short-term academic stays, research workshops, meetings with researchers and doctoral candidates, summer sabbatical programs, and full sabbaticals. At present, demand from Israeli institutions and faculty members for such programs far exceeds the resources available to facilitate these visits and collaborations. Investment in this area is expected to make a long-term strategic contribution to Israeli academia’s international standing.

Experience indicates a significant difference between researchers who have visited Israel and its universities – meeting local researchers and students and gaining close familiarity with the country’s social, cultural, and academic complexity – and those who have not. Direct familiarity with Israeli research institutions often contributes to stable professional partnerships and reduces the likelihood of future support for boycott and exclusion initiatives. In this context, it is particularly important to address disparities between institutions in central Israel and those in the geographic periphery. In practice, international scholars visiting Israel tend to go primarily to institutions in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, while universities in peripheral areas, including Beersheba and Haifa, benefit less from such exposure. Dedicated support tracks should therefore encourage academic visits, conferences, and sabbaticals at these universities in particular. Such investment could significantly help develop international research networks, strengthen academic opportunities for researchers and students in the periphery, and narrow disparities in the extent to which different Israeli institutions have access to global academic networks.

B. Recommendations on International Academic Relations

5. Strengthen each university’s strategic partnerships with leading institutions worldwide: Universities should invest in developing deep partnerships with major universities and research institutes around the world by establishing joint research centers, developing joint doctoral programs, creating bilateral research funds, and expanding student and faculty exchange programs. Broad and deep institutional networks make academic ties more resilient even during periods of political crisis.

6. Support Israeli researchers’ participation in international academic leadership: Israeli researchers should be encouraged and supported in seeking leadership positions in professional associations, academic journals, scientific committees, and international research networks. An active presence at decision-making centers in global academia helps counter exclusion and enhances the legitimacy of Israeli academia.

C. Recommendations on Education, Values, and the Public Sphere

7. Strengthen discourse on academic freedom and distinguish political criticism from discrimination: Proactive and sustained engagement is needed in public, academic, and international arenas to clarify the distinction between legitimate political criticism of Israeli government policy and boycotts, exclusion, or denial of academic cooperation on the basis of national identity or institutional affiliation. It should be emphasized that harming researchers and academic institutions simply because they are Israeli violates the foundational principles of academic freedom, freedom of research, and freedom of expression on which a democratic academic system rests. In this context, a broad campaign of public and diplomatic engagement is required, at both the university and national levels, to convey to international partners and audiences the complexity of Israeli academia and its role as a liberal, critical, and pluralistic space.

It should be made clear that Israeli universities are among the country’s principal venues for freedom of expression, critical debate, independent research, and everyday coexistence among different groups in Israeli society, including Jewish and Arab students and researchers who study and work side by side. Accordingly, boycotting Israeli academia is not only morally and normatively problematic; it also harms precisely the most liberal, critical, and open spaces in Israeli society. Rather than strengthening moderate forces, advancing dialogue, or encouraging change, academic boycotts may weaken institutions and communities that promote pluralism, open discourse, and intercommunal cooperation. In this sense, boycotting Israeli academia does not advance solutions or promote political change; it may instead constrict the spaces in which engagement, criticism, and dialogue take place.

8. Support educational initiatives on pluralism and academic freedom: Investment should be made in educational and international programs addressing freedom of research, tolerance, pluralism, and opposition to exclusion on the basis of nationality, religion, or origin. Such activity can help position Israel as an active participant in global debates about the future of academia and democratic society. Joint projects among researchers and diverse communities should also be encouraged, including academic projects involving Jews, Arabs, Israelis, and Palestinians, as well as multinational and interdisciplinary research initiatives. Such projects demonstrate the complexity and diversity of Israeli academia and strengthen its standing as a sphere of cooperation, research, and dialogue.

Conclusion

Addressing academic boycotts requires a broad approach that extends beyond case-by-case responses to individual incidents. This is a long-term strategic challenge requiring a combination of diplomatic engagement, institutional strengthening, investment in international relationships, and protection of the foundational principles of academic freedom. The struggle against academic boycotts is not only a struggle over Israel’s standing in the international arena; it is also a struggle over the character of academia as a domain in which knowledge, research, and dialogue transcend political boundaries.