If the government pressure finally pushes Eyal Zamir to quit, it will just be another victory in the October 7 coalition’s campaign to deflect blame.
“The time of the Zamir has come.” That’s the verse from the second chapter of the Song of Songs, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted at the incoming ceremony for IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir back in March. In Hebrew, the word for “singing” in the verse is “zamir” – a convenient play on words for the new chief of staff, whose appointment, Netanyahu said at the time, signified a “new era” for the IDF.
The warm relationship between Zamir and the prime minister was no secret. Zamir had served as Netanyahu’s military adviser from 2012 to 2015, and the two were reportedly close. Even Sara Netanyahu was believed to have taken an interest in his advancement, with media reports suggesting the Prime Minister’s Office was firmly in his corner. When Zamir lost out to Herzi Halevi for the top IDF post in early 2023, he was instead appointed as director-general of the Defense Ministry, working closely with the government, including the prime minister himself, through the early months of the war.
“We have known each other for many years, and twice I recommended you for the position, and on the third time, ‘the time of singing has come,’” Netanyahu said at Zamir’s incoming ceremony. “On my behalf, on behalf of the Government of Israel, and on behalf of all the citizens of the State of Israel, I wish you the greatest success.”
Against this backdrop, it’s hard to understand why Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have, in recent weeks, turned their political firepower against the very man they worked so hard to place in the job. If they wanted Zamir so badly, as they said back in March, then why are they now making his life so difficult?
Two weeks ago, during a cabinet meeting, for example, Zamir reportedly confronted Netanyahu directly, asking why the prime minister’s son, Yair, who lives in Miami, was personally attacking the IDF chief on social media.
The attacks began amid reports that Zamir opposed a full-scale invasion and reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, favoring smaller, targeted operations. His reasoning might not have been what the government wanted to hear, but it was grounded in reality: The reserves are exhausted, the standing army is stretched thin, and Hamas has already been broken.
Tensions peaked last Friday when the cabinet approved a scaled-back version of the original plan to occupy Gaza, postponing the entire operation for two months and putting the focus just on Gaza City. Zamir had advocated for an even less intensive approach. That put him in the crosshairs of the coalition’s right wing, which has now turned him into public enemy number two, second only to Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara.
On pro-Netanyahu outlets such as Channel 14, Zamir is portrayed as an obstacle to victory. He’s vilified for defending the IDF and its soldiers, even when it comes to opposing the haredi draft bill that would exempt ultra-Orthodox men from service.
The situation escalated on Monday when Katz informed Zamir that he would not approve a list of promotions – for colonels and brigadier generals – that the IDF chief had put forward. Technically, promotions above the rank of colonel require the minister’s signature. But in practice, this has long been a formality, with the defense minister simply signing off on the chief’s selections. Only appointments to the General Staff, at the rank of major general, are traditionally coordinated jointly.
Zamir’s office responded that his process was entirely in line with tradition. Katz shot back: “The days when the army made its own decisions are over.”
How did relations deteriorate so badly, so quickly?
This brings us back to the central question: How did relations deteriorate so badly, so quickly? Zamir was appointed only months ago. The answer is both simple and troubling: This is not about policy disagreements or even personal mistrust. It is about a government determined, since October 7, to deflect responsibility, evade accountability, and pin the blame for every failure on someone else.
We saw this pattern with Herzi Halevi, the chief of staff on October 7. There is no denying that Halevi bore responsibility for the operational and intelligence failures that allowed Hamas to execute its attack. But there is equally no denying that Netanyahu, who has been in power for most of the past 20 years, was responsible for the broader strategic framework: the policy of “containment,” the belief that Hamas could be deterred, and the transfer of Qatari cash into Gaza in suitcases.
Once the war began, Halevi focused on fighting Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. The government, meanwhile, focused on fighting Halevi and the rest of the defense establishment’s most senior figures, who have all since been purged: Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Ronen Bar stepped down last month, Halevi left in March, former defense minister Yoav Gallant was pushed out in November, and former military intelligence chief Aharon Haliva resigned last April.
This campaign serves the government’s narrative: The problem isn’t political leadership; it’s the generals. Replace the generals, and you can claim the problems are solved. The fight with Zamir is the latest chapter. It’s about ensuring that blame for policy paralysis, indecision, and the absence of a coherent “day after” plan falls on the army, not Netanyahu or his cabinet.
It is not, for example, the government that is failing to decide between continuing the war or negotiating a political resolution; it’s the chief of staff who isn’t fighting “hard enough.” And it is not the government that is failing to pass a draft law; it’s the chief of staff who is blocking the haredi exemption bill.
This policy of deflection reached an absurd low on Tuesday when Attorney-General Baharav-Miara arrived at her Tel Aviv office to find that the locks had been changed. The culprit? Justice Minister Yariv Levin, who decided to block Baharav-Miara from accessing her office after the cabinet voted to fire her. Not only was his stunt childish, but it was also in violation of a Supreme Court ruling that the government could not fire her without following due process, something it failed to do.
Changing the locks on the Attorney-General’s Office underscores a deeper problem: Key figures in this government behave as if state institutions are personal property, bending or breaking the rules to weaken checks and balances. Levin, for example, was the main driver behind the judicial overhaul and did not care at the time that it was tearing the country apart, weakening Israel internationally, and emboldening its enemies.
The same mindset is at work when it comes to Zamir. This has nothing to do with military policy; it’s about politics. A professional chief of staff who won’t serve as a rubber stamp is a threat and reminder that the IDF is not the personal army of the prime minister or defense minister but an institution meant to defend the state.
If the government pressure finally pushes Zamir to quit, it will just be another victory in the October 7 coalition’s campaign to deflect blame, evade responsibility for its failures, and reshape Israel’s democratic and security institutions into tools of political survival. But it will also leave Israel less prepared, less united, and less able to meet its challenges. And that, far more than any disagreement over tactics in Gaza City, is the real danger.
Originally published in JPost