Behind the Rise of Antisemitism in China: A Convergence of Events

Around 2021, the Chinese government chose to harden its attitude towards Israel and its Jewish supporters. Chinese contacts informed some Israeli experts of this policy change. Whether Xi Jinping himself made the relevant decisions is not known. No single reason, but a convergence of events caused this change. In May 2020, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Israel to argue against China’s critical infrastructure investments, particularly in a major desalination project. The Chinese resented this, as well as additional interventions that followed.¹¹ Already in 2019 Israel had to set up an Advisory Committee to Assess the National Security Implications of Foreign Investments, which began operating in 2020. China was not mentioned but everybody knew that it was the main target.¹² These warnings compelled Israel to restrict its economic relations with China. Then, Israel’s eleven-day conflict with Gaza in May 2021 became an opportunity for China to assault America, Israel’s only effective diplomatic defender, by hitting out at its Israeli ally. Hence, China attacked Israel at the United Nations for alleged war crimes, which led Israel in June 2021 to pay the Chinese back by supporting for the first time a Western resolution condemning China’s Uyghur policy. The Chinese were upset at Israel’s vote. This was a prelude to China’s accelerated support for the Arab side, starting with the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. In China, the attack triggered a strident anti-Israeli and antisemitic media wave.

During the same years but hidden from the public noise at the United Nations, Beijing was preparing a major geopolitical initiative, its grand entry into the Arab Middle East to challenge the United States. On January 14, 2022, the Communist Party’s Global Times, a propaganda tool to convey China’s views to the wider world announced that a “generous” China would enter this region to replace a “selfish” America. At about the same time China announced officially its New Security Architecture for the Middle East.¹³ This document made clear that China’s interest in the Middle East went far beyond energy security and economic links. It revealed a comprehensive strategy of heavily investing in local infrastructure and future technologies to coordinate the development of Middle Eastern nations with China’s own. For China, distancing itself further from Israel was an inexpensive way of boosting its friendship with the Arab world. Finally, in December 2022, President Xi Jinping arrived in Saudi Arabia to meet 21 leaders of the Arab world, carrying in his briefcase dozens of agreements ready for discussion and signature. The official pretext for his visit was to attend the first Head of State Summit of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

In the background of these well-known public events, Chinese decision-makers were discreetly re-assessing Israel’s power and influence. During a couple of decades until about 2020, many Chinese regarded Israel as a solid, strong, unified country, well positioned to resist its noisy, ill-prepared enemies. But Israel’s judicial reform crisis, its unending mass demonstrations against the government and its five elections in four years, ruined Israel’s “strongman” image. Israeli government sources denied that the crisis was damaging the country’s international standing. But the Chinese media’s extensive reporting of the crisis said something else. Chinese journalists writing from Israel described the country’s deep political and social polarization,¹⁴ asked why Israel’s reform efforts were always getting “more chaotic”¹⁵ and quoted President Herzog’s warning that the nation was on the “brink of constitutional and societal collapse.”¹⁶ In China, the publication of such reports often indicates what the leaders are thinking. The October 7 military failure finally confirmed to the Chinese that Israel was no longer what they once thought it was. Israel’s domestic and defense crises do not explain China’s embrace of the Arab Middle East but did likely sharpen Chinese criticism of Israel. Israel’s military successes since those difficult days and America’s ongoing support have certainly told China that Israel’s strength was rising again, but China’s fundamental positions have not greatly changed.

China’s message to the Arabs is that it would always stand resolutely with them, as it had in the past. It was clear to both the Chinese and the Arabs that Israel and the Jews were firmly in the Western camp. What is not clear is why China’s permanent and well-known political support for Arab interests was allowed, if not encouraged to degenerate into a media and university campaign of vile Jew-hatred (details below). This was not necessary. How would parroting the anti-Jewish abuse widespread in the Arab world enhance China’s national interest in the world, or turn the antisemites of the world into useful political supporters of China?

The following pages will provide details and elucidate more specific motives for China’s social and public media antisemitism. Future historians might find other, deeper answers in political, societal, and intellectual changes currently underway in China, rather than the wish to participate in the turmoil of the Middle East or in a reaction to perceived American antagonism.