Israel’s Election, the U.S. Midterm Elections, U.S. Support for Israel, Israel and the Future of the Jewish People, and Countries’ Attitudes Toward Israel
Main Finding
In the days leading up to Israel’s election, connected U.S. Jews continued to show a clear preference for an opposition victory, and a large majority viewed the election as either especially important or the most important in the country’s history. Nearly one-quarter chose the latter. “Unity” is the decisive election issue for panel participants, in contrast to “security” among Israeli Jews.
Additional Findings
- The United States does not support Israel enough: The share of connected Jews who hold this view rose over the past year from just over one-quarter to more than four in ten. The increase is especially sharp among centrists and conservatives.
- A majority also believe that U.S. Jews themselves do not support Israel enough – much as they did a year ago.
- Israel’s election: Preference for the opposition remains steady – nearly six in ten respondents prefer an opposition victory, while about one in seven prefer the coalition.
- A large majority view Israel’s election as either especially important or the most important in the country’s history – a combined share similar to that among Israeli Jews, although Israelis are nearly twice as likely to choose the latter.
- The issue that should decide Israel’s election, according to U.S. Jews: greater unity and fewer divisions. For Israeli Jews: security.
- Ahead of the U.S. congressional midterms: A majority of respondents say they intend to vote for a Democratic candidate, and about one-third for a Republican. The Democratic advantage among respondents has grown since April.
- Israel-related issues are a “very important” factor in the congressional voting decision for more than half of respondents, while issues involving the “Jewish interest” are very important for six in ten.
- Nearly nine in ten say Israel’s existence is essential to the future of the Jewish people, unchanged from last year.
- Western countries are less likely to be seen as friendly toward Israel: Large majorities view France and the UK as unfriendly, while only half view Germany as friendly, down from six in ten a year ago.
- Canada is viewed as a less comfortable place for Jews than it was a year ago. Majorities of Canadian and UK Jews participating in the survey also say their own country is not a comfortable place for the Jewish community.
This month’s data was collected October 15–19, 2026, and summarized about one week before Israel’s Knesset election and about three weeks before the U.S. congressional midterm elections, against the backdrop of continued public debate in the United States over the extent of American support for Israel. The survey also examined views on U.S. support for Israel, voting intentions in the U.S. congressional midterm elections, the weight of Israel-related and Jewish-interest issues in voting decisions, the belief that Israel’s existence is essential to the future of the Jewish people, and perceptions of how friendly various countries are toward Israel. Methodological note: In addition to the sample of connected U.S. Jews, 101 Canadian respondents and 54 UK respondents participated this month. Findings for these groups should be interpreted with caution given their small sample sizes. All breakdowns by ideology, denomination, or vote refer to U.S. Jews only. Throughout the report, the terms “Jews” and “U.S. Jews” do not refer to all U.S. Jews, but to connected Jews represented by JPPI’s standing respondent panel.
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Israel’s Election
Two weeks before Israel’s Knesset election, a large majority of U.S. Jews (78%) view the 2026 election as either “especially important” (55%) or “the most important election in the country’s history” (23%). Israeli Jews, asked the same question in JPPI’s October Israeli Society Index, reach a similar combined share (82%), but with a different distribution across the response options: four in ten Israeli Jews (41%) call this the most important election in the country’s history – nearly twice the share among U.S. Jews. Canadian respondents (37%) and UK respondents (31%) are also more likely than U.S. respondents to choose “the most important election in the country’s history.” Among U.S. Jews, the sense that the election is consequential is stronger on the liberal side: three in ten strong liberals (30%) and three in ten Harris voters in the 2024 presidential election (30%) view Israel’s election as the most important in the country’s history, compared with fewer than one in five strong conservatives (18%) and one in ten Trump voters (10%).
When participants were asked to choose the issue that should be most decisive in Israel’s election, a striking gap emerged between U.S. Jews and Israeli Jews. For U.S. respondents, the leading issue is “who will best bring about greater unity and fewer divisions” – chosen by 36% – followed by security (23%) and moving Israel toward becoming “a more liberal country” (17%). For Israeli Jews, by contrast, security is the decisive issue (34%), followed by “relations between the government and the judicial system” (17%) – an issue chosen by only 6% of connected U.S. Jews – and making Israel a more liberal country (14%). Unity, the leading issue among U.S. respondents, was selected by only 13% of Israeli Jews. The economy, in both groups, is rarely seen as decisive. Among U.S. respondents, preferences are closely tied to political identity: Among strong liberals, “a more liberal country” is the leading choice (41%); among lean liberals and centrists, unity leads (55% and 45%, respectively); and among strong conservatives, security is dominant (65%), followed by “a more Jewish country” (12%), an option chosen by almost no liberals.
Preferences regarding who should win the election have remained stable in recent months: nearly six in ten connected U.S. Jews (57%) say they prefer a victory for the current opposition (also 57% in September and 54% in August), while 15% prefer the current coalition and 21% say it is not their place to say. These preferences continue to mirror the U.S. political map: 81% of strong liberals and 80% of Harris voters prefer the opposition in Israel, while 65% of strong conservatives prefer the coalition. Among Trump voters, nearly half (46%) prefer the coalition and one-third (33%) decline to choose. By denomination, about two-thirds of Reform (68%) and Conservative (63%) respondents prefer the opposition; Orthodox respondents are divided (31% coalition, 42% opposition), while Haredi respondents prefer the coalition (65%). The depth of respondents’ ties to Israel also matters: among those who have lived in Israel, nearly two-thirds (65%) prefer the opposition, compared with just under half (47%) of those who have never visited Israel, among whom the share declining to choose is also higher.
Attention to the election remains high and stable: 35% of connected Jews say they are following election news “very closely,” and nearly half (44%) “somewhat closely” – similar to August and September. The share following “very closely” is even higher among Canadian (41%) and UK (46%) respondents. As in previous months, attention generally rises with the strength of respondents’ ties to Israel: just over half (52%) of those who have lived in Israel follow the election very closely, compared with one in five (19%) of those who have never visited, 36% of whom say they do not follow it very closely. Political differences in attention are more modest: 47% of strong conservatives follow the election very closely, compared with 34% of strong liberals.
U.S. Midterm Elections
When respondents completed the survey, about three weeks before the U.S. congressional midterm elections, more than half (55%) said they intended to vote for a Democratic candidate, about one-third (31%) for a Republican, 10% were undecided, and 4% did not intend to vote. Compared with April 2026, when the question was asked in the same wording, the Democratic share increased (from 50% to 55%) and the share of undecided respondents declined (from 16% to 10%), while the Republican share remained nearly unchanged (32% and 31%). The movement toward the Democrats comes from the center: among respondents who identify ideologically as centrist, the share intending to vote for a Democratic candidate rose and the share of undecided respondents fell; the Democratic share also increased among lean conservatives. There is no change at the ideological poles: 90% of strong liberals intend to vote for a Democratic candidate, and 96% of strong conservatives for a Republican. By denomination, Reform (79%) and Conservative (53%) respondents lean Democratic, Orthodox (49%) and Haredi (88%) respondents lean Republican, while those with no denomination are evenly split. It is also notable that women in the connected-Jewish panel are more likely to vote Democratic (62%) than men (47%).
How much do Israel and Jewish issues influence voting in the upcoming midterms? More than half of respondents (55%) say Israel-related issues will be a “very important factor” in deciding how to vote for Congress, while three in ten (30%) say they will be a somewhat important factor. Only 14% say Israel-related issues will have little or no influence on their vote. Issues involving the “Jewish interest” (as respondents themselves understand it) are considered even more important: six in ten (61%) say they will be a very important factor. In both cases, the weight of these issues rises as one moves to the right on the political spectrum. Israel-related issues are a very important factor for 29% of strong liberals and 81% of strong conservatives; by 2024 vote, for 85% of Trump voters compared with 38% of Harris voters. Jewish-interest issues are a very important factor for 39% of strong liberals and 84% of strong conservatives. Among Canadian respondents, looking ahead to their country’s next election, Israel-related issues (61%) and Jewish-interest issues (72%) carry even greater weight; among UK respondents, the corresponding shares are lower (44% and 52%, respectively).
U.S. Support for Israel
One year after we last examined the question using identical wording, we returned this month to the issue of U.S. support for Israel. In October 2025, a majority of Jews in JPPI’s panel (56%) said the level of U.S. support for Israel was “about right,” while just over one-quarter (28%) said the United States did not support Israel enough. This month, the largest group – more than four in ten (43%) – say the United States does not support Israel enough, while the share saying the level of support is about right has fallen to just over one-third (36%). The share saying the United States supports Israel too much rose slightly, from 10% to 14%. A February 2026 measure, using slightly different wording (“How would you describe U.S. policy toward Israel?”), had already indicated the beginning of this trend, with 31% saying the United States was “not supportive enough.”
The increase in the share saying the United States does not support Israel enough appears across all ideological groups, but is especially sharp in the center and on the right: among centrists, it rose from 31% to 55%; among lean conservatives, from 40% to 61%; and among strong conservatives, from 41% to 68%. Among strong liberals, the increase is more modest (from 12% to 20%), and the largest group among them (39%) still says the United States supports Israel too much. By 2024 vote, two-thirds of Trump voters (68%) say the United States does not support Israel enough, compared with fewer than one-third of Harris voters (31%), among whom the largest group (39%) says the current level of support is about right.
In Canada and the UK, where respondents were asked about their own country, the pattern is much clearer: large majorities in Canada (86%) and the UK (76%) say their country does not support Israel enough – a slight increase from February 2026 (79% and 69%, respectively) – while only small minorities say the level of support is about right. As noted at the beginning of the report, these findings should be interpreted with greater caution than the U.S. findings because the Canadian and UK samples are substantially smaller.
Support for Israel Among U.S. Jews
Alongside the question about U.S. policy, we also asked respondents how they assess the support U.S. Jews themselves provide to Israel. Here, the picture is stable compared with last year: more than half of connected Jews (56%) say U.S. Jews do not support Israel enough (61% in October 2025), one-quarter (25%) say the level of support is about right, and 11% say U.S. Jews support Israel too much. The ideological gradient is sharp: nine in ten strong conservatives (90%) and Trump voters (90%) say U.S. Jews do not support Israel enough, while strong liberals are divided almost evenly among the three substantive responses (30% “too much,” 27% “not enough,” and 29% “about right”). By denomination, four in five Orthodox respondents (79%) and roughly three-quarters of Haredi respondents (76%) say U.S. Jews do not support Israel enough, compared with fewer than half of Reform respondents (44%), one-third of whom (33%) say the level of support is about right. A comparison with Canadian and UK Jews, who were asked about their own communities, suggests that this self-criticism may be more pronounced among U.S. respondents: in Canada, a majority (56%) say the level of support for Israel among Canadian Jews is about right and only one-quarter (25%) say it is insufficient. In the UK, the largest group (41%) says support among UK Jews is about right, while about one-third (31%) say it is insufficient.
Israel and the Future of the Jewish People
One year after the question was first asked, we returned to whether respondents believe Israel’s existence is “essential to the long-term future of the Jewish people.” The answer remains stable: nearly nine in ten connected Jews (88%) say “yes,” exactly as in October 2025, while 8% say “no.” The share is even higher among Canadian (95%) and UK (91%) respondents. For comparison, in a representative survey of all U.S. Jews conducted by The Washington Post in September 2025, three-quarters (76%) answered yes and 16% no – a gap that reflects the difference between the connected-Jewish panel and a survey representative of the entire community. Even in the connected-Jewish survey, the consensus is weaker among strong liberals: 22% say Israel’s existence is not essential to the future of the Jewish people and 9% do not know, compared with single-digit shares in every other ideological group. By 2024 vote, nearly all Trump voters (98%) say “yes,” compared with more than eight in ten Harris voters (82%). By denomination, the highest share is among Conservative respondents (93%), and the lowest shares are among those with no denomination (82%) and those identifying as “Other” (78%). An age gap is also evident: among respondents ages 25–45, the share answering “yes” is lower (71%–75%) than among those ages 55 and older (90% or more).
Countries’ Attitudes Toward Israel
As in October 2025, we asked participants whether they see four countries – the UK, Canada, France, and Germany – as friendly or unfriendly toward Israel. Over the past year, perceptions of friendliness declined for all four. France is seen as the least friendly: seven in ten U.S. Jews (71%) view it as unfriendly toward Israel (65% a year ago). It is followed by the UK (61%, up from 55%) and Canada, which half (50%) view as unfriendly (48% a year ago). Germany is the only one of the four that half of respondents (50%) still view as friendly, but this too is down from six in ten (60%) a year ago.
The farther right respondents are on the political spectrum, the more likely they are to view these countries as unfriendly toward Israel: a large majority of strong conservatives (87%) see the UK as unfriendly, compared with one-third of strong liberals (34%). The gap is similar for Canada (88% versus 20%). Germany is an exception in the opposite direction: strong conservatives are actually the group least convinced of its friendliness – 38% see Germany as friendly and 29% as unfriendly – while half or more of liberals and centrists see it as friendly. The ideological gap is also large regarding France: 90% of strong conservatives view it as unfriendly, compared with 42% of strong liberals, 21% of whom even describe France as friendly toward Israel. Canadian and UK respondents are even more critical in their assessments, including of their own countries. Nearly three-quarters of Canadian respondents (74%) view the UK as unfriendly toward Israel, while 57% say the same of Canada. Among UK respondents, 54% view their own country as unfriendly toward Israel and 57% say the same of Canada. Germany is seen as the friendliest of the four in all three communities (65% among UK respondents and 56% among Canadian respondents).
A Comfortable Place for the Jewish Community
A complementary question examined whether each of the same four countries is a “comfortable place” for its Jewish community. Here, too, France ranks lowest: four in five U.S. respondents (79%) say it is not a comfortable place for Jews, followed by the UK (69%). The most notable change concerns Canada: the share saying it is not a comfortable place for the Jewish community rose from 45% to 57%. Views of Germany also worsened: just over one-quarter (27%) say it is not a comfortable place for Jews (compared with one in five a year ago), while the largest group (35%) still chooses the middle response. Germany is also the country for which a relatively high share of respondents (18%) say they do not know – an indication that the situation of its Jewish community is less familiar to U.S. Jews than that of the Jewish communities in the UK, Canada, and France.
Canadian and UK Jews themselves broadly share the assessment of U.S. Jews: a majority (54%) of Canadian respondents say Canada is not a comfortable place for the Jewish community, while only 16% say it is comfortable. Similarly, a majority (61%) of UK respondents say the UK is not a comfortable place for the Jewish community, while only 9% view it as comfortable. Canadian respondents judge the UK even more harshly than UK respondents themselves: roughly three-quarters (76%) say it is not a comfortable place. The ideological pattern among U.S. respondents closely resembles that found in the friendliness question. Strong conservatives view the UK (91%), Canada (87%), and France (94%) as uncomfortable places for Jews at much higher rates than strong liberals (46%, 31%, and 57%, respectively).
Survey Data and Implications
This report is based on a survey conducted October 15–19, 2026, among participants in JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People respondent panel. In general, the survey reflects the views of “connected” Jews – those with relatively strong ties to the Jewish community, Israel, and/or Jewish identity – and is not representative of all U.S. Jews. The survey included 591 U.S. respondents, 101 Canadian respondents, and 54 UK respondents. Unless otherwise noted, the results apply to U.S. respondents only; Canadian and UK findings should be interpreted with caution given their small sample sizes, particularly the UK findings. JPPI’s Voice of the Jewish People Index survey was conducted by JPPI fellows Shmuel Rosner, Noah Slepkov, and Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provided statistical oversight.
This table presents data on U.S. respondents for October 2026
