⁶⁰Policy Considerations

Israel’s China policy is set by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet when they have time for it, which is currently rare. Israel has apparently no coherent long-term China strategy. SIGNAL Group’s Carice Witte regards this as an Israeli handicap in working with a country that bases its policies on long-term perspectives. The mandate conferred to Israeli officials is to avoid alienating China and focus on strengthening economic engagement. Chinese businessmen are said to be well-disposed to Israel, which is an added advantage of economic links.

Of course, Israel’s freedom of action vis-à-vis China is constrained by Israel’s close alliance with the United States and the tensions between the two superpowers. United States concerns have always accompanied the Sino-Israeli relationship. It follows that Israel’s China policy must have an American sub-chapter, which is the need to seek American understanding that uncontroversial economic, cultural, and academic links with China might improve Israel’s acceptance also by the Global South. This would be in America’s interest too.

Israel must take a long-term view like David Ben-Gurion did in the 1950s and early 1960s. He exhorted Israel and the Jewish people to seek contact with China and India, the great powers of the future as he believed, although both were then still hostile to Israel. At this moment, in autumn 2025, Israel’s international relations are under great strain. This is not the best time for new policy initiatives towards China. When the situation improves, Israel should consider a number of policies regarding antisemitism in China, which could have broader effects as well:

• Engage the Jewish People around the World in confronting antisemitism in China, particularly in the media and the university system. China’s prominent global role, and the fact that China is not at war with Israel or the Jews gives this issue a greater global resonance than, say antisemitism in a smaller foreign country. Jews all over the world are worried by the global rise of antisemitism but are generally not aware of China’s role. Israel should make them aware. There are Jewish communities in many countries in addition to the United States that are important to China, such as the BRICS founding members Brazil and South Africa, or the European countries. Jewish communities in all these countries could make their voice heard through China’s embassies. Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism should play a lead role, in cooperation with the appropriate world and national Jewish organizations, particularly the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the American Jewish Committee (ACJ) and others. In Israel, Yad Vashem could be involved as well.
• Engage other, mainly Western countries to join Israel in denouncing antisemitism in China. The United States is already doing it. As this is part of the larger confrontation between the two super-powers, the contribution of other, particularly European, countries could have more effect in China. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and others declare defeating antisemitism as a national priority. When a Chinese blogger quoted Hitler on his website to defame the Jews, he should have triggered a strong diplomatic protestation from the Federal Republic of Germany (apparently, there was one, but no public trace could be found). In Germany, publicly quoting Hitler against the Jews is a crime with serious legal consequences. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with Jewish community organizations in the concerned countries, should play the main role.
• Monitor and record expressions of Chinese antisemitism, particularly in public and social media and in universities. Much of what is known of Chinese antisemitism is anecdotal, not comprehensive and not statistically weighted. Anti-Defamation League (ADL) statistics and data collection processes require revision and improvement. The assiduous research by Chinese-speaking scholars on this subject has been indispensable so far and must continue. Reviewing antisemitism among China’s 1.11 billion internet users is technically possible but expensive and difficult from outside China. If the ADL or Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism cannot take this on, perhaps civil society bodies, if funding is available, or private companies can.
• Explore which sectors of China’s state bureaucracy are responsible for authorizing, directing or preventing antisemitism. China’s state bureaucracy is huge and not well coordinated. For example, China’s ambassador to Israel argued recently for closer links between the two countries and would certainly include university links, but it is the Ministry of Education that is responsible for higher education policy, and this ministry does not take advice from diplomats or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Knowing exactly where to intervene in a bureaucracy can confer a decisive advantage. Israel’s embassy in Beijing, its consulate in Shanghai, and Israel’s China experts can be helpful.
• Make Israel’s concern about public hostility to Jews and Israel part of the country’s diplomatic mandate and discuss it with the Chinese authorities, including China’s ambassador in Israel, as an unwanted obstacle to improved relations. China needs to understand that the issue is serious. If the next Chinese generation grows up with only hostile views of Jews and Israel, building a lasting relationship in the future will be difficult. Raising this concern is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israeli ambassador in Beijing, and the Chinese ambassador in Israel.
• Propose a renewal of cultural Relations. China’s ambassador in Israel referred in his articles and speeches to the more than thousand years of friendship between Chinese and Jews. Israel should take his diplomatic flourish up and suggest building more academic and other relations in the fields of historiography, archeology, literature, arts, and music. Presenting the long history of the Jewish people and the creativity of Israel are more convincing countermeasures against antisemitism than polemics. A great variety of organizations, including museums, could be involved depending on the subject chosen and the budget available.
• Maybe the time has come for Israel to speak a cearer language to the Chinese. So far, Israel’s reaction to China’s one-sided support for its adversaries, and to the continuation of the antisemitic trends in China, has been restrained. Maybe this should change even if Israel still has a weak hand: If China cannot balance its position more equitably and recognize that Israel is facing severe intractable threats, it will play no role in finding solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot decide alone to change Israel’s language. This would require a prime ministerial decision and a cabinet vote.
• Israel’s “One China Policy” should not change. Israel adopted a “One China Policy” in 1950 when it recognized the People’s Republic of China and never changed this policy. Recently, a proposal was informally voiced by non-governmental sources that Israel should support some political gains for Taiwan to demonstrate displeasure with China’s backing for Israel’s enemies. Israel should ignore such proposals. Drawing it into one of the world’s most dangerous tensions, as if the Middle East conflict were not enough, would be reckless. So far, Taiwan has not been infected with the People’s Republic of China’s antisemitic wave, and it should be thanked for this. Israel should strengthen its cultural and academic relations with Taiwan. It should support scholarly Taiwanese research on the long history of relations between China and the Jewish people, particularly also how and why antisemitism emerged on the Chinese mainland. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israel Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei (ISECO) should follow this issue, if necessary, the prime minister and the cabinet must also intervene.
• Influencing China’s views of Israel’s resilience and power. China keeps assessing Israel’s domestic resilience, its military strength and its strategic position in the Middle East and beyond. As said, Israel’s long-lasting domestic crises and the October 7 catastrophe have greatly damaged Israel’s image in Chinese eyes, while the following military and intelligence successes have restored part, although not all of this image. Some, certainly in the Chinese military, are again impressed by Israels’ performance. Others, likely continue to regard Israel and the Jews as geopolitical lightweights provisionally maintained by the United States, compared to the enormous size and importance of the Muslim countries and an increasingly hostile wider world. In the absence of a comprehensive peace, can Israel’s image in Chinese eyes be influenced? Can Israel make itself strategically more attractive to China? An Ad-Hoc Working Group of experts from various Ministries (Defense, Strategic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Diaspora Affairs, Science and Technology) together with China experts, should reflect in this question.