The War Three Years After October 7; The Importance of the Upcoming Elections and the Issues Likely to Decide Them; Satisfaction with the Political Choices on Offer; Measures Israelis Want the Next Government to Take; and Changes in Religious Practice, Faith, and Self-Identification Since the War Began.
Additional Findings
- Three years after the war began, four in ten Israelis feel Israel has won – slightly fewer than a year ago.
- “The October 7 War” remains the most commonly used name for the war. On the right, “War of Revival” has become the leading choice.
- Eight in ten Israelis regard the elections at month’s end as either especially important or the most important in the country’s history.
- Security is gaining ground as the decisive election issue, while unity and relations between the government and judiciary are losing ground.
- After the elections, majorities want prime ministerial term limits, an attempt to adopt a constitution, and a state commission of inquiry into October 7.
- A majority of Israelis oppose a government bringing together Likud and the largest party in the change bloc.
- About half of Jewish Israelis favor broad judicial reform; nearly two-thirds of Israelis oppose restoring military-service exemptions for Haredi Torah students.
- About half of Israelis are satisfied with the parties and prospective candidates for prime minister.
- Respondents on the right prioritize reform of the Ministry of Justice, while those in the center and on the left prioritize reform of the Ministry of Education.
- More than half favor abolishing both the Ministry of Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition and the Ministry of Heritage; nearly half favor abolishing the Ministry of Settlements and National Missions.
- Seven in ten Israelis say Trump is “the friendliest president Israel has ever had.”
- Fewer Israelis than last year report increased religious observance since the war began.
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Three Years Since October 7
Three years after the war began, four in ten Israelis (41%) rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5 on a five-point scale – almost unchanged from October 2025 (43%), when the fighting in Gaza ended. By contrast, roughly one-third (36%) choose the two lowest ratings, 1 or 2. Among Jewish Israelis, 46% give one of the two highest ratings, compared with 24% of Arab Israelis. Nearly half of Arab Israelis (46%) give one of the two lowest ratings. The ideological pattern is clear and consistent: 76% of those who identify with the right rate their sense of victory at 4 or 5, compared with 53% in the center-right, 16% in the center, 7% in the center-left, and 3% on the left.
Comparisons across the three years of war require some caution. During the first two years, respondents were asked about the future – “How confident are you that Israel will win the war?” Since October 2025, we have asked whether Israel “is winning and/or has won.” Although the wording has changed, the overall trend is clear. Among Jewish Israelis, the share choosing the two highest ratings has fallen from 74% in the war’s opening weeks to 63% one year later, 49% after two years, and 46% today. Over the same period, the share of Jewish respondents choosing the lowest rating has risen from 6% to 20%.
Has the War Ended?
One year after the fighting stopped, we repeated the November 2025 question about whether the war had ended for an extended period. In November 2025, nearly four in ten Israelis (37%) expected the calm to last at least a year: 18% said “several years” and 19% said “one or two years.” Today, only one in five (21%) expect the calm to last that long – 10% for several years and 11% for one or two years. Instead, one-third (32%) expect it to last “another few months,” up from 20% in November 2025, and another 30% say “no more than another few weeks,” compared with 32% a year ago. In other words, six in ten Israelis expect the calm to last no longer than a few months, compared with about half of Israelis a year ago. The pattern is similar among Jewish and Arab Israelis.
This change has not been evenly distributed across the political spectrum. In November 2025, the right was the most pessimistic camp: 44% of respondents identifying with the right expected the calm to last only a few weeks, compared with about one-quarter in the center and center-left. Today, those differences have all but disappeared. In every ideological camp, roughly one-third expect only a few weeks of calm, and between one-quarter and one-third expect a few months. The shift has come mainly from the center and left. The share anticipating at least a year of calm has fallen from 44% to 15% in the center-left, from 43% to 15% on the left, from 38% to 18% in the center, and from 38% to 19% in the center-right. The decline on the right is much smaller, from 32% to 25%. Put differently, a year ago the center and left hoped the agreement would mark the end of the war, while the right was skeptical. Today, respondents across the ideological spectrum are less confident that the agreement marked the end of the war. In July 2026, when asked what Israel should do in Gaza, 35% of Israelis and 41% of Jewish Israelis chose “resume the fighting until the objectives are achieved.” For some Israelis, then, the expectation that the calm is temporary is not merely a forecast – it also reflects a preference.
What Should the War Be Called?
After the fighting ended, the government changed the war’s official name from “Swords of Iron” to “War of Revival.” In November 2025, we asked what the war should be called; this month, using slightly different wording, we asked what respondents actually call it. The overall picture is stable. “The October 7 War” remains the most widely used name, chosen by 43% of Israelis, compared with 42% a year ago. The government’s preferred name, “War of Revival,” is still used by about one in six respondents (18%, up from 16%), while 16% use the original military name, “Swords of Iron” (13% last year). The only substantial shift is the declining use of “Simchat Torah War”: 12% chose it in November 2025, compared with just 6% today. Another 11% say none of the proposed names is suitable.
Among Jewish Israelis, what people call the war depends heavily on their political orientation. Majorities of those identifying with the left, center-left, and center (72%, 77%, and 68%, respectively) use “The October 7 War.” It is also the most popular name in the center-right. On the right, by contrast, “War of Revival” has become the leading choice over the past year: 43% use it, compared with 32% in November 2025, while only 17% call it “The October 7 War.” “Simchat Torah War,” chosen a year ago by 23% on the right and 45% of religious Jews, has fallen to 8% and 12%, respectively. Only among secular Jews does a single name command majority support: 66% use “The October 7 War.” Among religious and Haredi Jews, preferences are divided among “War of Revival” (30% and 32%), “Swords of Iron” (31% and 17%), and “Simchat Torah War” (12% and 20%). Among Arab Israelis, 32% say none of the names is suitable, while 37% use “The October 7 War.”
The Importance of the Elections and the Decisive Issue
With the elections imminent, the sense that the vote is fateful remains as strong as last month. Four in ten Israelis (39%) believe these will be “the most important elections in the country’s history,” compared with 40% in September and 33% in February. Another 40% consider them “especially important.” Only 17% consider them no more important than other elections. This sense of importance grows stronger moving leftward along the political spectrum: 69% on the left and 59% in the center-left call them the most important elections in Israel’s history, compared with 45% in the center, 32% in the center-right, and 33% on the right.
One-third of Israelis (34%) say their decisive consideration in the elections will be “who will contribute most effectively to maintaining security,” slightly more than in September and August (31%) or July (28%). Meanwhile, the two issues previously ranked second and third – relations between the government and the judiciary, and “more unity and fewer disputes” – have lost ground. The share choosing “a more liberal state” remains at 13%, and the economy at 9%. Among Arab Israelis, security (37%) and the economy (20%) are the leading considerations. Security’s growing importance spans ideological camps, though it has displaced different priorities in each. On the right, its share rose from 40% to 46%, primarily at the expense of relations between the government and the judiciary. In the center, security increased from 24% to 25%, and in the center-right from 30% to 36%, largely at the expense of unity. On the left and center-left, “a more liberal state” remains the leading issue (46% and 30%, respectively).
After the Elections
This month, we presented respondents with six possible initiatives for the post-election period, all of which have figured in political debate over the past year, and asked whether they wanted each one to be implemented. Three enjoy majority support: a law limiting the prime minister’s tenure (63%); an attempt to adopt a constitution for Israel (59%); and the establishment, by the Supreme Court, of a state commission of inquiry into October 7 (58%). A broad judicial reform that would reduce some of the Supreme Court’s powers divides the public almost evenly, with 46% in favor and 42% opposed, although a majority of Jewish Israelis (52%) support it. Two initiatives face majority opposition: reinstating the military-service exemption for Haredi men studying Torah (64% opposed) and forming a government that includes both Likud and the largest party in the change bloc, with the prime minister chosen by mutual agreement (60% opposed).
Several of these proposals have been tested in earlier JPPI surveys, using different wording, and this month’s results are broadly consistent with previous findings. In May 2026, nearly two-thirds of Israelis (63%) said some form of inquiry should be established “as soon as possible.” But when asked to choose between types of commissions, only 46% preferred a state commission headed by a Supreme Court justice, while 40% preferred a “national” commission without Supreme Court involvement. In November 2025, the respective figures were 46% and 42%. When the question simply asks whether respondents want a state commission of inquiry, without offering an alternative, support rises to 58%. One reason is that some center-right supporters of a national commission had also supported the state-commission option in earlier surveys. As for a constitution, only 46% believed in February 2026 that “agreements can be reached that would make a constitution possible.” Today, 59% want an attempt to be made. In other words, more Israelis may want a constitution than believe one is attainable.
The ideological divisions on most of these questions are sharp. Support for a state commission of inquiry stands at 97% on the left, 87% in the center, and 18% on the right. Support for term limits is 95%, 90%, and 27%, respectively. Support for judicial reform runs in the opposite direction: 90% on the right, 17% in the center, and 0% on the left. The gap over a constitution is narrower, partly because opinions on the right are divided: 39% want an attempt, 30% do not, and 30% are undecided. The outlier is a proposed government bringing together Likud and the largest party in the change bloc – the only initiative opposed in every ideological camp. Opposition is overwhelming on the left (87%) and center-left (80%), and stands at 74% in the center. But even on the right a majority (54%) do not want such a government; only the center-right is relatively evenly divided (41% in favor, 48% opposed).
Opposition to a joint government of Likud and the change bloc is neither new nor evidence that Israelis do not value unity. In June 2026, respondents gave the importance of unity in Israeli society an average rating of 7.9 on a scale of 0 to 10. Yet the same survey also found declining willingness to compromise on policy for the sake of social cohesion. The following month, in July 2026, when we asked what coalition Israelis wanted after the elections, only 28% selected one of three versions of a “broad coalition with parties from both blocs”: 16% without Haredi and Arab parties, 8% without Haredi parties, and 5% without Arab parties. Another 30% wanted a coalition led by the right-wing bloc and 35% one led by the change bloc. Israelis want unity, but they want their own political camp to form the next coalition even more.
All Israelis, weighted. The six items were presented as separate questions, each beginning: “Do you want or not want the following to happen after the elections…?”
Satisfaction with the Political Choices
How satisfied are Israelis with their choices in the elections? The picture is mixed. A slim majority (53%) say they are “generally satisfied” with the parties competing, while 37% are dissatisfied. When asked about the prospective candidates for prime minister, about half (49%) are satisfied and 42% dissatisfied. Satisfaction is higher among Jewish Israelis (57% for the parties and 54% for the candidates) and much lower among Arab Israelis, of whom only 38% are satisfied with the parties and 31% with the candidates. Among Jewish Israelis, satisfaction with the parties is similar across ideological camps, apart from the relatively small left-wing camp, where it is lower. The divide is more apparent when it comes to prime-ministerial candidates: majorities are satisfied in all camps from the right through the center-left, while a majority on the left are dissatisfied. In February 2026, we asked a related question, worded differently and with three response options. At that time, 24% said they were “satisfied with the available choices,” 34% said “there are enough reasonable options,” and 34% were dissatisfied. The questions cannot be compared directly, but the share of dissatisfied voters was similar earlier in the election year and on the eve of the vote.
Government Ministries
Ahead of the elections, we asked respondents which of six ministries most urgently needs a minister who will undertake substantial reform. Two ministries are virtually tied: the Ministry of Justice (31%) and the Ministry of Education (30%). Some distance behind were the Ministry of Public Security (18%) and the Ministry of Finance (9%). The Ministry of Defense (4%) and the Ministry of Health (2%) were seldom selected. The near tie between Justice and Education reflects sharply different priorities among ideological camps. On the right, 62% choose the Ministry of Justice and 17% Education. In the center, 50% choose Education, 23% Public Security, and just 9% Justice. About half of respondents in both the center and center-left prioritize Education. The pattern is equally clear by religiosity: 58% of Haredi Jews and 50% of religious Jews choose Justice, while 42% of secular Jews choose Education. Among Arab Israelis, the Ministry of Public Security ranks first, at 37%.
*Respondents could select more than one ministry. The six ministries chosen most often are shown.
In a separate question, respondents were asked which ministries, from a list of 14, should be abolished after the elections. The number of ministries has grown substantially under recent governments, reaching 31. This expansion has prompted public debate and criticism, with critics arguing that additional ministries waste public funds to reward coalition partners. Three ministries top the list of those Israelis would abolish: Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (55%), Heritage (54%), and Settlements and National Missions (49%). Next come Social Equality (41%), Intelligence (41%), and the Negev, Galilee, and National Resilience (34%). Only one in eight Israelis (12%) say none of the ministries should be abolished. Support for closures is greater among Jewish Israelis: nearly two-thirds would abolish Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (64%) and Heritage (63%). Support is much lower among Arab Israelis, 22% of whom would abolish none of the ministries. Here too, priorities differ substantially across ideological camps. On the left, center-left, and center, respondents most often favor abolishing the current coalition’s “identity ministries”: Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition (97%, 91%, and 78%, respectively), Settlements and National Missions (87%, 86%, and 73%), and Heritage (87%, 82%, and 80%). On the right, by contrast, the most frequently chosen ministry for abolition is Social Equality (54%). Only about 40% would abolish Jerusalem and Jewish Tradition or Heritage, and about one-third would abolish Settlements and National Missions.
Trump and the United States
*“Very true” and “fairly true” combined, October 2026.
In November 2025, after President Trump visited Israel and addressed the Knesset, we asked whether Israelis agreed with the claim, made by the prime minister and others, that Trump is “the friendliest president Israel has ever had.” We repeated the question this month. Agreement remains widespread: seven in ten Israelis (69%) consider the statement “very true” (34%) or “fairly true” (35%), compared with 72% in November 2025. Agreement among Jewish Israelis has slipped from 76% to 72%; among Arab Israelis, it remains at about six in ten (58%). It is worth noting that, in a separate question asked every few months, the share of Israelis expressing “a great deal of trust” in Trump fell during 2026 from 34% in March to 10% in August. In February 2026, nearly half (49%) called Trump “one of the best presidents in U.S. history.” In July 2026, when asked whether the United States is a “true friend” of Israel, 27% said it was a true friend “more than in recent years” and 26% said “less than in recent years.” Israelis still see Trump as a great friend of Israel, but their trust in him has eroded. The modest erosion in Trump’s standing has not occurred on the right, where agreement that he is Israel’s friendliest president remains almost universal (94%), or on the left, where it remains low (18%). Rather, it is concentrated in the center-left, where agreement has fallen from 52% to 32%, and, to a lesser degree, the center-right (from 85% to 80%).
The War, Religious Tradition, and Faith
In November 2025, when the fighting in Gaza ended, we published a special report on how the war had affected Israelis’ religious observance, faith, and self-identification. Nearly a year later, we repeated the same battery of questions, using identical wording. The broad picture is similar: most report no change in religious practice, and among those reporting a change, increases in observance outnumber declines. But the shift toward greater observance is less pronounced than a year ago. One in five Jewish Israelis (20%) say they observe more Jewish traditions than before the war, down from 27% in November 2025. One in ten (10%) say they observe fewer traditions (8% last year), and nearly seven in ten (69%) report no change (62% last year). The pattern is similar for belief in God: 22% of Jewish Israelis say they believe more strongly than before, 12% less strongly, and 65% about the same. Among Arab Israelis, too, the share reporting a strengthening has declined slightly – from 23% to 20% for religious practice and from 37% to 32% for faith – although the share reporting weaker faith remains very low (3%).
The central finding of the previous report still holds: increases in religious observance are concentrated among those who were already traditionalist or religious, while secular Jews – the largest group among Jewish Israelis – show the opposite tendency. Among secular respondents, 9% say they observe more traditions than before the war, compared with 17% who observe fewer; 6% say their faith has strengthened, compared with 21% who say it has weakened. In all other religiosity groups, the balance tilts toward stronger observance, increasingly so as religiosity rises. Among traditionalist (Masorti), nonreligious Jews, 25% observe more traditions and 22% report stronger faith; among religious (Dati) Jews, the figures are 26% and 41%; among Haredim, 38% and 52%. Not a single Haredi respondent reports a decline in religious observance. The ideological breakdown follows a similar pattern: on the right, 35% observe more traditions and 40% report stronger faith, while in the center-left, 21% observe fewer traditions and 26% report weaker faith.
Among Jewish Israelis, fewer respondents reported an increase in every religious practice listed than in November 2025. Prayer remains the most common, but the share of Jewish Israelis who say they pray more often since the war began has fallen from nearly one-third to about one-fifth. The share reading more of the Bible or Psalms has fallen from one-fifth to roughly one-eighth. Fewer respondents also report attending synagogue more often, lighting Shabbat candles, putting on tefillin, wearing tzitzit, or dressing more modestly. Correspondingly, the share of Jewish Israelis who have not increased any of these practices has risen from 55% to 65%. Among Arab Israelis, 24% say they pray more, down from 32% a year ago. Nearly half of Haredim (48%), about one-third of religious Jews (35%), and 28% of traditionalist, nonreligious Jews report praying more often.
In another question, we asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale, with the midpoint representing the strength of their faith before the war. Here too, the reported change is more modest than a year ago: a majority of Jewish Israelis (53%) say their faith remains at its prewar level, up from 43% in November 2025; 32% place themselves higher on the scale, down from 43%; and 15% place themselves lower, up from 12%. Among Arab Israelis, 44% report no change, 46% stronger faith, and 4% weaker faith. Once again, secular Jews stand apart from the other religiosity groups: 25% report a downward shift and 11% an upward shift, compared with 56% of religious Jews and 57% of Haredim who report stronger faith.
Asked about the faith of their “relatives and friends,” respondents perceived more widespread strengthening than they reported for themselves. This echoes a pattern found in earlier JPPI studies of religious strengthening among young adults and adolescents. Among Jewish Israelis, 41% believe people around them have grown stronger in faith, down from 49% last year, while only 10% believe they have grown weaker. The gap between perceptions of oneself and of one’s social circle is especially striking among secular Jews: 11% report stronger faith themselves, while 20% believe faith has strengthened among people around them. As we noted in the previous report, this perception may reflect public discussion of growing religiosity – or simply the fact that increasing observance is more visible than declining observance.
Religiosity and Political Orientation
As in November 2025, we asked Jewish respondents to place themselves on a detailed nine-category religiosity scale, first as they recall their religious identity on the eve of the war and then as they identify today. The overall distribution has barely changed: roughly one-third (32%) describe themselves as “completely secular” both before and after the war, one-fifth as “secular with some traditional practices,” and 15% as “traditionalist.” About one in ten Jewish Israelis (10%) now place themselves in a more religious category than before the war, while half as many (5%) place themselves in a less religious one. The principal shifts are among those formerly “secular with some traditional practices” who now identify as “traditionalist” (12% of that group), and among “liberal religious” and “religious” respondents who have moved one category toward greater religiosity (16% of each group). Among the completely secular, 92% remain in the same category.
On the political scale, respondents report much greater movement – toward the right, particularly its outer edge, as we also found a year ago. The share of Jewish Israelis who now identify as “strong right” is 24%, nearly double the 13% who recall identifying that way before the war. The share placing themselves in one of the four right-wing categories is nearly unchanged between respondents’ recalled prewar positions and their positions today. What has changed is the distribution within the bloc. Looking at individual movements, 33% of Jewish respondents who placed themselves on the scale say they have shifted rightward since the war began, 14% say they have shifted leftward, and 54% report no change. Among Arab Israelis, as a year ago, there is little movement: about one-quarter place themselves “exactly in the center,” three in ten on the left, and one-quarter do not know how to respond. One qualification is important: every July, we measure political orientation directly on this nine-point scale, without reference to the war. In July 2025, 13% of Jewish Israelis placed themselves on the strong right; in July 2026, 14% did so. Thus, the figure respondents give for “before the war” (13%) is consistent with the direct measurement, whereas their figure for “today” (24%) is substantially higher. The discrepancy may stem from wording that invites respondents to report a change. If so, some Israelis may feel they have moved further to the right than they actually have.
Totals may not equal 100% because “None of these” and “Don’t know” responses are omitted and percentages have been rounded.
Data for the JPPI Israeli Society Index survey was collected in October 2026 through Madad.com (618 Jewish respondents) and Afkar Research (203 Arab respondents, approximately half online and half by telephone). The data was analyzed and weighted by voting patterns and religiosity to represent Israel’s adult population. Shmuel Rosner and Noah Slepokov compile the JPPI Israeli Society Index with research, production, and writing assistance by Yael Levinovsky. Prof. David Steinberg provides statistical supervision.