Between Values and Interests: Israel and the European Union

Since the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, relations between Israel and the project of European integration – later the European Union (EU) – have been marked by a persistent duality of proximity and estrangement. This duality intensified after the outbreak of the Gaza War on October 7, 2023, and again as the military confrontation expanded to Lebanon and Iran. This tension is inherent on both sides of the relationship. In Israel, Europe is deeply valued as a center of culture, tourism, science, economic activity, and sport, even as EU policy is criticized and at times met with hostility. Conversely, Europe displays a historical and cultural affinity with Israel and an appreciation of its achievements in innovation, cybersecurity, security, and science, alongside consistent criticism of the wars and military operations in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s policy in the occupied territories, and the consequences of Israeli actions, which are perceived as threatening stability in the Middle East, Europe, and the international system.

The key to understanding this relationship of love and antagonism lies in the intertwined history of Europe and its Jews, shaped over millennia. Although the past is essential for understanding relations between the parties, it must not be allowed to dictate the future of Israel-EU relations. Over roughly seventy years, these relations have developed into a multidimensional partnership with strategic, economic, scientific, academic, cultural, and sporting significance that serves vital interests on both sides. The Gaza War and the military confrontations with Lebanon and Iran sharpened tensions between Israel and the European Union and deepened their disagreements. Paradoxically, however, the deterioration in relations during this period illustrates precisely the depth of the ties and the resilience of the cooperation mechanisms built by the parties over many decades. With the end of the principal phase of fighting in the Gaza Strip and the entry into force of fragile ceasefires with Lebanon and Iran, the need to redesign the discourse between Israel and the EU has become more urgent if the parties are to establish a stable, sustainable, and mutually beneficial relationship.

Such a discourse requires a renewed examination of Israel’s position vis-à-vis the EU and of how Israel seeks to situate itself within the political and legal architecture of European integration. Should it aspire to deeper integration into EU institutions, content itself with the status of a “Special Privileged Partnership,” expand its participation in the Union’s various programs, or continue with the existing model of cooperation under the European Neighborhood Policy? This chapter presents an up-to-date account of Israel-EU relations and examines the challenges and opportunities that recent geopolitical developments pose for this relationship.

Between the Desire for Integration and the Reality of Interdependence

In 1958, Israel became the third country in the world to request the opening of a diplomatic mission to the institutions of the European Communities in Brussels but, in practice, the fourth to open one. Economic relations between the parties were first institutionalized in 1964, with the signing of a three-year trade agreement that granted tariff reductions on imports of a small number of Israeli products into the European Community. In 1970, after protracted negotiations, a five-year preferential agreement was signed. Under that agreement, the Community granted tariff reductions of 50% on imports of Israeli industrial products into the member states and 40% on imports of citrus fruit. In return, Israel undertook to grant an average tariff reduction of 18% on a limited volume of imports from Community member states.

In early 1973, the Council of Ministers of the European Community approved a plan to establish a free-trade area with the countries of the Mediterranean Basin, and in May 1975, the free-trade agreement between the European Community and Israel was signed in Brussels. The agreement was intended to promote the development of economic relations by expanding mutual trade, to contribute to the development of the Israeli economy, to improve living and employment conditions, to increase productivity, and to strengthen monetary stability. Since then, relations between Israel and the European Communities have continued to deepen across a broad range of fields, a process that accelerated after the signing of the Association Agreement in 1995. This agreement, which remains the legal and institutional foundation of Israel’s relations with the European Union, regulates political and economic cooperation between the parties and provides a framework for expanding cooperation in culture, sport, tourism, science and research, higher education, and numerous other areas. Even in periods of political crisis and tension, these cooperation frameworks have continued to function and have demonstrated considerable resilience, as discussed below.

Today, the European Union is Israel’s largest trading partner. In 2025, the EU accounted for 31.7% of Israel’s goods trade with the world: 29.4% of Israeli goods exports, excluding diamonds, were destined for EU member states, while 33.1% of Israeli goods imports, excluding diamonds, originated in EU member states. That year, total trade in goods between the parties amounted to €43.3 billion. Israeli exports to the EU stood at €15.3 billion, led by machinery and transport equipment (€6.5 billion, 42.8%) and chemicals (€2.9 billion, 18.7%). Israeli imports from the EU totaled €28 billion, also led by machinery and transport equipment (€12 billion, 42.7%) and chemicals (€4.9 billion, 17.4%). In 2025, Israel was the EU’s twenty-seventh largest trading partner, accounting for only about 0.8% of the EU’s total goods trade with the world. Within the Mediterranean Basin, however, Israel ranked as the EU’s third-largest trading partner, after Morocco and Egypt.²

One of the clearest expressions of the depth of relations between Israel and the European Union is cooperation in science, research, and development. In 1995, the parties signed an agreement on cooperation in research and development (R&D), under which Israel became the first non-European state to attain full-partner status in the EU’s Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development. Since then, Israel has been among the most active and successful participants in European calls for research proposals, and it has become a central source of innovation within the European Research Area, both in basic research and in applied, commercially oriented research. The European Union is today the most important source of research funding in Israel, and this cooperation has contributed significantly to establishing Israel’s status as the “Start-Up Nation.” For example, during 2015-2024, Israel ranked fifth in securing European Research Council (ERC) grants in the fields of life sciences and medicine, after Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.

Israelis are drawn to Europe’s historical and cultural richness, to its traditions, ways of life, and heritage, and they attach great importance to cultural, educational, and sporting ties with Europe. Although many are concerned about the rise of antisemitism on the continent, especially since the October 7 massacre, and are at times also uncomfortable with the European Union’s positions on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Europe’s cities and landscapes remain the preferred destinations for Israeli tourists.⁴ Moreover, in recent decades, a growing number of Israelis have applied for citizenship in EU member states. The eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013 and, even more so, legislative amendments in Spain and Portugal that allowed descendants of Jews expelled from the Iberian Peninsula to obtain citizenship, although those provisions have since been narrowed or repealed significantly expanded the circle of those eligible for citizenship of an EU member state. Today, more than 55% of the Jewish population in Israel is eligible, at least in principle, for citizenship of one of the EU member states by virtue of family origin. Relative to its population, Israel now has the world’s highest concentration of potential citizens of EU member states.⁵

Deep Partnership, Politics of Suspicion

The close ties between Israel and Europe in the fields of security, science, culture, sport, the economy, and other areas stand in contrast to the suspicion, and sometimes even hostility, that characterizes relations at the political level. Since the late 1950s, Israel has sought to deepen its relations with Europe, to draw as close as possible to the project of European integration, and to take part in its various institutions and programs. Yet despite the depth of cooperation in many areas, broad segments of the Israeli public and the Israeli political system do not trust the intentions of the European Union and its member states when it comes to political and security issues first and foremost, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian threat. In addition, since the early 2010s, and especially during Benjamin Netanyahu’s terms in office, the perception has gained ground in Europe that Israel is taking on features of a populist, “soft Eurosceptic” state. This perception took shape alongside the growing prominence of conservative and anti-liberal elements in the policies of Netanyahu governments and in Israeli political discourse. In this context, some Netanyahu governments cultivated ties with radical right-wing parties in Europe, including the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats (SD), Vox in Spain, and the National Rally (RN) in France. Many of these parties have antisemitic and Islamophobic legacies; they are also critical of the EU, and some seek to reduce its powers or undermine the foundations of the European integration project.⁶

The European Union, too, displays ambivalence in its approach toward Israel. On the one hand, it seeks to draw Israel closer to the European integration project, to encourage the adoption of the EU’s values, and to deepen Israel’s integration into European cooperation frameworks. In this spirit, over the years the EU has even offered Israel the prospect of developing a “Special Privileged Partnership,” which would grant it a unique status in relation to the other states of the Middle East.⁷ At the same time, many in Europe do not regard Israel as an integral part of the continent, but rather as a state whose geopolitical and strategic place lies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin. In accordance with this view, and despite Israel’s reservations, Israel is often included in EU regional frameworks intended for the states of the Middle East and North Africa, rather than in dedicated European frameworks. For example, Israel was included in the European Neighborhood Policy and is now also a partner in its successor initiative, the Pact for the Mediterranean.⁸ In addition, despite repeated declarations concerning the establishment of a “Special Privileged Partnership,” the EU has not yet defined the practical meaning of this status or given it substantive institutional and political expression. The result is a persistent gap between the depth of cooperation in the economic, scientific, cultural, and social spheres and the character of political relations, which continue to be marked by disappointment, suspicion, bitterness, and mutual anger.

Between Nationalism and Supranational Integration

Israel and the European Union are fundamentally different political and identity-based entities, located at different stages of their historical development. The EU is by nature a supranational entity whose member states agree to transfer some of their sovereign competences to shared institutions in the fields of policymaking, economic affairs, law, and, to some extent, security. Nationalism does, of course, remain a significant political force in Europe, as demonstrated by the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU in 2020 and by the strengthening of Eurosceptic parties and governments in various countries. Nevertheless, most of the political, economic, and administrative elites on the continent continue to view supranational cooperation as a necessary condition for coping with the challenges of the twenty-first century, even at the cost of limiting certain components of national sovereignty. This view also rests on an ideational foundation. The European project seeks to present itself as an alternative to the rival nationalisms that characterized Europe for centuries and led, among other things, to the two world wars. In this sense, European integration is not merely an institutional arrangement but also an identity project that seeks to shape a new understanding of sovereignty, belonging, and cooperation.

Israel, for its part, pursues a goal different from that of the European integration project, one that resembles the past of the European continent more than the future to which the EU aspires: the establishment and consolidation of the nation-state of the Jewish people. Seventy-eight years after its independence, the process of building Israel and consolidating its self-understanding is not yet complete. Significant segments of the political system and the Israeli public express unqualified support for a national agenda, and few Israelis would be prepared to relinquish central aspects of Israeli sovereignty, especially if doing so were to impair the Jewish character of the state.

The Palestinian Issue

Over the past two decades, Israel has attached growing importance to multilateral cooperation in recognition of the increasing significance of multilateral diplomacy and of its advantages. Such frameworks confer international legitimacy, enable burden-sharing, expand access to knowledge and resources, and strengthen states’ capacity to address shared challenges. This view was evident, among other things, in the deepening of Israel’s relations with NATO during the previous decade, including the opening of an Israeli mission at NATO headquarters in Brussels. At the same time, Israel expanded its participation in international frameworks, acceded to multilateral conventions, and adapted its legislation to international standards, particularly to European Union regulation. This process has been visible in diverse fields, including privacy protection and data security, commercial standardization including the 2024 reform commonly summarized as “what is good for Europe is good for Israel” and environmental quality, among other areas.

Yet despite the rapprochement described above, one issue continues to cloud the prospects for deepening relations between Israel and the European Union: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, since the Six-Day War of 1967, relations between the parties have largely become hostage to developments in the Middle East, and in particular to the ups and downs of the peace process. For decades, the dialogue between Israel and the European Union on this issue has been characterized more by mutual accusations, mistrust, and inattention than by attempts to forge a partnership that would advance the political process. From Israel’s perspective, the central difficulty lies in the fact that political disagreements have a direct bearing on its ability to deepen relations with the EU in areas of strategic importance. Although successive Israeli governments have sought over the years to promote the expansion of cooperation in these fields, they have generally refrained from specifying their objectives out of concern that the European Union would use Israel’s interest in these fields as leverage on the Palestinian issue.

The reason lies in the institutional structure of Israel-EU relations. The scope and depth of the relationship are regulated by the Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 2000. The agreement serves as the central legal framework for relations between the parties and regulates a broad range of areas, including trade and economic cooperation, research cooperation, and political cooperation. At the same time, it anchors the political dialogue and commits the parties to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, which constitute a central foundation of the relationship. Implementation of the Association Agreement is entrusted to the Association Council, in which Israel, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission are represented, usually at the level of foreign ministers. However, substantive decisions concerning the expansion or deepening of relations require the consent of the member states in the Council of the European Union. In light of the EU’s ongoing aspiration to play an active role in advancing a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a close linkage has developed over the years between progress on the political track and the EU’s willingness to deepen its relations with Israel. Accordingly, the state of the political process has long served as a central factor in determining the degree of proximity or distance between Israel and the European Union.

Between Security and Human Rights: Jerusalem, Brussels, and Washington

It is difficult to overstate the importance that the European Union attaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is perceived in Europe as an ongoing focus of tension and instability with regional and international implications. In view of the demographic changes that have taken place in European countries in recent decades, particularly the growth of populations of Arab and Muslim origin and their increasing integration into the political systems of many member states, the conflict has also become an intra-European issue of growing political weight. Against this background, Israeli strategies directed solely at managing and containing the conflict, postponing efforts to resolve it, or preventing the establishment of a viable Palestinian state are perceived in European capitals and EU institutions as contrary to European interests. Accordingly, many European leaders and civil society organizations express dissatisfaction with the stagnation of the political process and, in most cases, sharply criticize Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians.

In addition, there is a widespread feeling in Europe that Israel has worked over the years to reduce the EU’s involvement in the peace process and has preferred the United States as the central – and even exclusive – mediator between the parties. From the perspective of many European decision-makers, this approach is inconsistent with the EU’s international standing and with its aspiration to play a central role in advancing a political settlement in the Middle East. From Israel’s perspective, many European states are perceived as adopting a pro-Palestinian position that does not give sufficient weight to Israel’s security considerations. There is a widespread sense in Israel that EU member states and the Union’s leadership do not adequately understand either the short- and long-term security threats Israel faces or the constraints arising from them. At the same time, the European Union’s focus on human rights is perceived by many Israelis as disproportionate – even an “obsession” – and hollow.⁹ In their view, the EU applies stringent standards to Israel in areas such as human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, but does not apply them to the same extent to other countries, particularly Arab states and China. This perception reinforces the impression that the Union applies double standards to Israel.¹⁰

In addition, Israel sharply criticizes the rise in antisemitic incidents on the European continent, especially after the terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and the wars that followed it. It also criticizes what Israel and European Jewish communities perceive as the weak and inadequate response of EU institutions and some member states to the phenomenon. In the eyes of many Israelis and Jews, Europe’s response to antisemitism is inconsistent with its declared commitments to protecting human rights, combating racism, and safeguarding minorities.¹¹ Moreover, Israel-EU relations are strongly influenced by the character of transatlantic relations. When gaps emerge between the United States and the European Union on issues relating to the Middle East, they often affect Israel-EU relations. This dynamic has been particularly prominent during Donald Trump’s presidency, against the backdrop of disagreements over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American peace plan, the nuclear agreement with Iran, the war in Gaza following the October 7 massacre, the operations in Lebanon, Operation Rising Lion, and the negotiations for ceasefires with Iran. Another salient example is Operation Roaring Lion, in which the United States fought alongside Israel against Iran, while most EU member states intensified their criticism of the United States and of the way it conducted the campaign. This gap deepened tensions between Israel and the European Union.

As a rule, Israel regards the United States as the central external guarantor of its security and as its most important strategic partner. Over the years, its foreign and security policy has rested largely on the alliance with Washington, both because of the close strategic affinity between the two countries and because of the alignment of their views on central international issues. Against this background, Israel tends to prefer American involvement in political processes and to be wary of the EU’s attempts to play a central role in them.¹² Hence, the quality of relations between Washington and Brussels also has a major effect on Israel’s position toward the European Union and on Israel’s diplomatic room for maneuver between Washington and Brussels.

From European Solidarity to Sanctions

In the weeks following the massacre of October 7, 2023, the leadership of the European Union, led by the president of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stood unequivocally alongside Israel. EU leaders repeatedly emphasized their commitment to Israel’s security and to its right to defend itself following the terrorist attack. Yet as the war continued, the casualty toll in the Gaza Strip rose, the fighting expanded to Lebanon and later into direct confrontation with Iran, and a gradual shift occurred in the positions of most member states. The initial support for Israel was replaced by sharp criticism, diplomatic condemnations, and calls to increase pressure on it. The shift was felt not only in the policies of European governments but also in parliaments, the media, and public opinion, where pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel voices grew stronger. Spain, Ireland, and Malta, as well as Slovenia until its change of government in mid-2026, pursued an especially hard line and called for increased political and economic pressure on Israel; additional states later joined them. Their motives varied: domestic political constraints, including the dependence of the Spanish government on radical-left parties; ideological considerations, especially in the case of Ireland; economic interests linked to relations with Arab states; and, at times, a desire to divert public attention from internal crises.

In the summer of 2025, proposals emerged within the European Commission to suspend parts of the Association Agreement and to re-examine Israel’s participation in the Horizon Europe research program. At the same time, in September that year, many European states, including some of Israel’s close friends, broke a decades-long taboo and announced their decision to recognize a Palestinian state, despite Israel’s firm opposition. Although the initiator of the move, French President Emmanuel Macron, acted largely out of domestic considerations, he succeeded in rallying additional states. From the standpoint of the European Union, the move symbolized an attempt to restore its political influence and to return the two-state idea to the center of the international agenda. Developments on the ground, however, pointed in the opposite direction. Despite the recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries and the intensification of pressure on Israel, the EU was pushed to the margins of efforts to end the Gaza War. The arrangement formulated under U.S. leadership in the summer of 2025, which culminated in an October ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and the return of the Israeli hostages, was achieved without meaningful European involvement. At the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, held that same month, the EU was confined to observer status, while the negotiations were led by Washington with the participation of Arab and Muslim states. The mechanisms established to implement the understandings and to shape regional security and policy arrangements also operated outside the European framework and concerned both the future of the Gaza Strip and the expansion of the Abraham Accords and the entry of additional Arab states into the normalization process with Israel.

The EU was thus left with only a secondary role. It proposed reactivating the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing (EUBAM Rafah), which had operated for a limited period in the mid-2000s, and expanding the role of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) in training the security forces of the Palestinian Authority. Yet even with respect to these initiatives, it was not clear whether there was demand for them among the actors involved or whether they were feasible in the new Middle Eastern reality. In May 2026, following the change of government in Hungary and the formation of Péter Magyar’s government, EU foreign ministers approved, for the first time, personal sanctions against settlers deemed to have been involved in acts of violence in the West Bank. The sanctions targeted three individuals and four organizations, as well as ten senior Hamas officials. About a month later, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand increased the pressure by imposing personal sanctions on ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich over their statements concerning the war in the Gaza Strip. France subsequently joined them, imposing sanctions on Minister Smotrich. In the Lebanese and Iranian arenas as well, the European Union found it difficult to play a meaningful role. In Lebanon, France played a limited diplomatic role in efforts to secure a ceasefire, but it was the United States that led the move and brought Israel and Lebanon to the negotiating table. On the Iranian front, the EU and its member states found themselves in an even more marginal position. They opposed the military operations against Iran and bore a significant share of the economic costs resulting from disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the accompanying energy crisis, yet had almost no influence on decision-making.

At the same time, tensions between the European Union and NATO, on the one hand, and the White House – above all President Trump – on the other, deepened as Trump sharply criticized the absence of European assistance to American forces during Operation Roaring Lion. In the subsequent negotiations between the United States and Iran, the EU was almost entirely absent, while Pakistan played a central role in mediation efforts. Thus, paradoxically, precisely when the European Union sharpened its criticism of Israel and sought to position itself as a central actor in shaping the future of the Middle East, its influence over regional developments declined. Brussels continued to exercise its normative power through statements, criticism, sanctions, and regulatory pressure, but the decisive diplomatic and security moves were, in practice, led by the United States, by regional states, and even by extra-regional actors such as Pakistan. The Gaza War, the military operations, and the regional crises that followed demonstrated, more than anything else, the gap between the EU’s ability to exert influence through norms and regulation and its ability actually to shape the strategic agenda in the Middle East. This gap is likely to continue shaping the EU’s foreign policy in the region in the years ahead.

Between Criticism and Strategic Partnership

The Gaza War and the operations in Lebanon and Iran pushed Israel’s standing in Europe to its lowest point in recent decades. Senior Israeli officials, headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have avoided visits to most European countries out of concern about legal proceedings; academic boycotts of Israeli researchers and institutions have expanded; and several EU and other European states have announced freezes on defense procurement from Israel, although some of them continued to pursue such deals nonetheless. Yet as of the time of writing, EU institutions have refrained from imposing comprehensive sanctions on Israel or suspending the main cooperation mechanisms with it. The main reason for this lies in the depth of the ties forged between the parties over decades and in shared strategic interests, foremost among them Europe’s security needs. Against the background of the war in Ukraine, concern over Russia’s military buildup, uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to the defense of the continent, the acceleration of rearmament processes, and the Strait of Hormuz crisis, European states continued to purchase Israeli weapons and defense systems on an unprecedented scale. In many respects, the war and the military operations demonstrated that Israel still has partners and allies in Europe and that its battlefield experience in the Middle East – including the development of air-defense systems, responses to drone threats, cyber technologies, military medicine, and defense innovation continues to be a sought-after strategic asset, even among countries that criticize Israel sharply.

The same is true in the fields of technology and innovation, in which Israel remains a major partner. This was reflected in public statements by senior European officials in favor of continued cooperation and in the success of various actors in blocking initiatives aimed at reducing Israel’s participation in EU research programs. In the public and cultural spheres as well, there are signs that attitudes toward Israel are more complex than the official political discourse suggests. For example, EuroLeague games in Israel resumed in December 2025; several key European states opposed Israel’s removal from the Eurovision Song Contest; and in both 2025 and 2026, Israel won strong public support and finished second, despite calls to boycott it.

Looking Ahead

European Union policy toward Israel has for decades been characterized by a shifting combination of incentives, conditionality, threats, and pressure. On the one hand, the EU has sought to deepen cooperation with Israel in the fields of the economy, security, science, technology, and culture; on the other, it has largely tied the deepening of relations to progress in the political process with the Palestinians. Over the years, this has produced a gap between the depth of Israel’s practical integration into European frameworks and its political status: a close and significant partner, but not part of the European political space. Israel’s attitude toward Europe has likewise remained ambivalent. Israelis see themselves as part of the European cultural and political sphere, yet at the same time reject attempts by the European Union to influence their political and security decisions. This mutual ambiguity regarding the desired character and limits of the relationship remains one of the central sources of tension between the parties.

The Gaza War and the military operations in Lebanon and Iran sharpened the gap between two central dimensions of Israel-EU relations. On the strategic plane, cooperation in the fields of security, the economy, and technology was not only preserved but strengthened, mainly against the background of the war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament, and concern that the American commitment to the security of the continent might weaken. On the value-based plane, by contrast, the war deepened disagreements between the parties. While in Israel the campaign was perceived as a security necessity forced upon it by the October 7 massacre, in Europe there was a growing focus on the humanitarian and legal consequences of the fighting, alongside sharper criticism of Israel’s policy. These developments demonstrate that the disagreement between Israel and the European Union no longer revolves solely around borders, settlements, or the political process. It also reflects deeper differences in their conceptions of sovereignty, security, human rights, nationalism, religion, and collective identity. Israel and the European Union are fundamentally different political entities. Whereas the EU is based on the transfer of elements of national sovereignty to a supranational framework and on a conception that seeks to restrain nationalism through deeper European integration, Israel remains engaged in consolidating itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people and sees itself as committed to the prosperity and security of the Jewish people in the Diaspora as well. This conception does not fully align with the political and normative conception underpinning the European Union and its institutions. Repeated declarations about “shared values” can therefore no longer substitute for a sober examination of what those values mean and of the limits of agreement surrounding them.

Precisely from this point, a new conception of the relationship may emerge. Israel and the European Union need a kind of new diplomatic contract, one that is not based on the assumption that deeper relations necessarily require Israel’s gradual convergence with the EU’s political and normative positions. Instead, the new contract should be based on partnership across differences: a sober recognition that the parties share many values and interests, but interpret some of those values differently and at times hold different conceptions of the state, society, security, and the international order. Such differences need not disappear as a condition for partnership; they should become a reality that the Israeli-European partnership is capable of accommodating and managing. In practical terms, such a contract would mean moving from a relationship with a transformative aspiration to a more strategic one. The European Union need not abandon its positions on human rights, international law, settlements, or the Palestinian issue, and Israel need not adopt those positions as a condition for cooperation. The automatic linkage between these disagreements and the relationship as a whole should, however, be reduced. The Palestinian issue will remain a central component of the political dialogue, but there is no reason every disagreement over it must delay cooperation in research, security, cyber, energy, health, water, desertification, or efforts to address climate change.

Such an approach requires a greater capacity to compartmentalize and manage disagreements. European criticism of Israeli policy need not automatically result in damage to cooperative frameworks that serve clear interests on both sides; at the same time, deep strategic cooperation should not prevent the European Union from voicing strong criticism when it believes Israel is violating norms and principles to which it is committed. The purpose of the new partnership is not to eliminate disagreement, but to prevent it from taking over the relationship as a whole. To this end, the parties should also consider institutionalizing a regular strategic dialogue between Israel and the European Union that examines not only immediate crises but their shared interests for the coming decade. Such a dialogue could include permanent tracks on security and defense, cyber and artificial intelligence, energy, research and innovation, health, water, desertification and climate, supply chains, and civil resilience. Its purpose would be to shift the center of gravity of the relationship from reactive crisis management to the joint shaping of a strategic agenda.

A new contract of this kind also requires change on Israel’s part. For years, Israel has sought to deepen its integration into European programs and frameworks, but it has never defined the long-term political objective of its relationship with the European Union. As this chapter asked at the outset, does Israel seek deeper integration, status as a preferred strategic partner, expanded participation in EU programs and institutions, or continuation of the existing model under the European Neighborhood Policy? An updated Israeli policy toward the European Union must answer this question and explicitly define what Israel seeks to achieve in its relations with the EU over the coming decade. The fight against antisemitism on the European continent must also occupy a central place in the new contract. The sharp rise in antisemitic incidents since the October 7 massacre demonstrates that this is not an Israeli problem but, first and foremost, an internal European challenge concerning the ability of the European Union and its member states to ensure the security, rights, and freedom of their Jewish citizens. This chapter has already pointed to the perceived gap between the stated commitment of the European Union and its member states to human rights and the protection of minorities, on the one hand, and the sense among many Israelis and Jews that Europe’s response to rising antisemitism has been inadequate, on the other.

The security of European Jews should therefore be understood as part of Europe’s commitment to its own values, not as a gesture to Israel or to Jewish communities. This requires consistent policies of prevention, education, enforcement, intelligence, and security, alongside determined action against violence, hate crimes, and incitement to terrorism. Ultimately, the new diplomatic contract proposed here calls not for fewer values but for fewer illusions about a shared normative identity; not for less criticism but for a greater ability to keep it within bounds; and not for the blurring of disagreements but for mechanisms that allow them to be managed without turning the entire Israel-EU relationship into their hostage. The new contract seeks to move Israel-EU relations from a model in which proximity is measured chiefly by the degree of normative convergence to one in which a deep strategic partnership can be sustained even between two entities that do not see the world in precisely the same way.

The central question for the future, therefore, is no longer whether Israel belongs to Europe or to the Middle East. It is whether Israel and the European Union are capable of building a partnership across differences: a relationship that recognizes their shared history and heritage, and their economic, scientific, and strategic proximity, while also acknowledging the deep differences in their outlooks and interests. The success of the relationship will not be measured by the disappearance of disagreements, but by the parties’ ability to manage them while at the same time expanding and deepening the spheres of cooperation. If they succeed, Jerusalem and Brussels will be able to transform a relationship long marked by the duality of proximity and estrangement into a more sober, stable, and resilient partnership suited to the emerging European and Middle Eastern reality of the twenty-first century.

To read the endnotes, click here.