JPPI Jewish World Dialogue 2025: Global Jewry’s Attitudes on Jewish Hard Power

Introduction

The question of Jewish military power sits at the center of one of the most important transformations in modern Jewish history. For nearly two millennia, most Jews lived without sovereignty, armies, or meaningful control over their collective security. The establishment of the State of Israel changed that condition fundamentally. Jews became responsible not only for their own defense but also for the exercise of political and military power. This transition has profoundly shaped Israeli identity and continues to influence the relationship between Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world. For Israelis, military power is a concrete reality. Military service is woven into the fabric of citizenship and national life. Most Jewish Israelis either serve in the military or live in close proximity to those who do. The military is not an abstraction; it is a lived institution that protects families, communities, and the state itself. For most Diaspora Jews, the experience is very different. Few serve in the armed forces of their home countries, and even fewer encounter military institutions as a central component of daily life. Consequently, Jewish military power is often understood through moral, political, and symbolic lenses rather than through direct experience. While Israelis tend to view military force primarily as a necessary instrument of national survival, many Diaspora Jews also approach it through broader ethical questions concerning justice, responsibility, and the proper use of power.

This distinction reflects a much older historical pattern. During centuries of exile, Jews generally lacked the means of self-defense and depended on non-Jewish rulers for protection. Under such conditions, military prowess was rarely regarded as a Jewish ideal. Jewish culture instead developed alternative models of masculine excellence centered on learning, scholarship, religious devotion, communal responsibility, and ethical conduct. Some scholars have argued that Jewish civilization produced a distinctive conception of virtue that stood in contrast to dominant Western ideals associated with conquest, aggression, and military glory. Whether or not one accepts this interpretation in full, it is clear that the experience of exile left a deep imprint on Jewish attitudes toward power and force.

The Zionist movement sought to alter this condition. One of its central ambitions was the normalization of Jewish life. Jews would once again become a sovereign people capable of defending themselves, cultivating land, governing institutions, and exercising political responsibility. Military self-reliance became a crucial component of this vision, particularly in light of persistent Arab opposition to Zionism and, later, the devastating lessons of the Holocaust. Yet Zionism never viewed military power solely as an instrument of survival. Many Zionist thinkers believed that the return of the Jewish people to history offered an opportunity to express distinctive Jewish values in politics, society, economics, and warfare. The aspiration was not simply to become “like every other nation” but also to demonstrate how Jewish civilization might shape public life in exemplary ways. This was expressed in David Ben-Gurion’s idea that Israel should be “a light unto the nations” (Isaiah 42:6).

This aspiration found expression in the ideal of Tohar HaNeshek, or “purity of arms.” First articulated by Labor Zionist leader Berl Katznelson and later incorporated into the ethical ethos of the Israel Defense Forces, the principle held that military force should be used only when necessary and should avoid harm to innocents whenever possible. In this understanding, the Jewish state was expected not merely to wield power but to wield it ethically. In recent decades, however, alternative conceptions have emerged within Israeli society. Religious Zionist and conservative voices have argued that Western military ethics, which reflect Christian influence, do not adequately address contemporary threats, particularly asymmetric conflicts against organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that operate from within civilian populations. Jewish military ethics, by contrast, they argue, are based on Jewish law (Halakhah) and prohibit harming civilians in combat, but are more “lenient” regarding civilian and “bystander” casualties. This approach tends to place greater emphasis on military victory and national survival, even while remaining committed to ethical constraints. The resulting debate reflects a larger question: How should Jews understand power now that they possess it? JPPI’s 2025 Jewish World Dialogue was designed to explore this question. More specifically, it sought to understand how Diaspora Jews think about Israeli military power after nearly two years of war following the October 7 attacks and amid widespread international criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Several factors constitute the background to this dialogue.

Diaspora Attitudes Toward the Israeli Military

After World War II, although Diaspora Jews did not adopt a military way of life for themselves, they applauded the creation of an Israeli military capable of fending off the Arab armies in 1948 and winning a spectacular military victory in the Six-Day War. This appreciation was enhanced by the official Israeli presentation of its military endeavor. Israel stressed that its military was primarily defensive in nature, as the name of its armed forces, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), indicates. Israel also presents its military as operating under the ideals and strictures of “purity of arms”: limiting violence to combatants and trying to minimize civilian casualties. Nevertheless, over the decades, as unease within the liberal American Jewish community over Israeli government policy has grown, some of that unease has spilled over into questions about Israel’s use of military force. This is especially the case as some of the central visual symbols of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been images of dead Palestinian children, an iconography that has become especially prevalent in the current war.

Developments in Western liberalism and progressivism, especially among the younger generation, have also sharpened differences between Israelis and most Diaspora Jews in how they view military might and the use of force more generally. Israelis tend to see force as a necessity for protecting the sovereignty of their nation and its citizens, especially in the last decade, when wars have felt increasingly asymmetrical and have often involved non-state actors. Many young American Jews, more removed from regular, direct existential conflict, prefer to rely on a liberal international order in which problems are resolved through negotiation. The Israel-Gaza War of 2023-2025 greatly sharpened these issues. Israel sustained a significant number of civilian and military casualties on October 7, 2023, and in the ensuing war (around 2,000 dead and many thousands wounded), while the IDF killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, including women, children, and infants. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes, including ethnic cleansing and genocide. In many settings, these charges have gained currency and are accepted as fact or, at least, the consensus view.

The 2025 Dialogue

Thus, the Gaza war raised new thoughts, doubts, and feelings regarding Israel, the IDF, and military power among most Diaspora Jews, and amplified existing ones. These thoughts and feelings were not of one piece; they moved in many directions and contained many nuances. In the 2025 Jewish World Dialogue, we wanted to understand these thoughts and feelings in all their complexity. The 2025 Jewish World Dialogue asked whether attitudes toward military power were becoming a new fault line between Israel and the Diaspora. Were Diaspora Jews developing a different understanding of power, sovereignty, and force than Israelis? Were traditional forms of attachment to Israel changing? Moreover, we wanted to understand the impact of the Gaza war: How did Jews of various ages and backgrounds react to it and to the widespread charges that Israel was committing war crimes and even genocide? We know that the vast majority of the Jewish community has strongly identified with Israel. Yet this war, and the scale of Palestinian casualties, also lent greater voice and legitimacy to Jewish criticism of Israel and even to anti-Israel and anti-Zionist sentiment.

The 2025 Jewish World Dialogue was an exercise in qualitative research. Unlike public opinion surveys, the Dialogue aimed to uncover how Diaspora Jews think, deliberate, and debate these issues rather than to measure levels of support. Through extended conversations, participants were encouraged to explore their uncertainties, contradictions, and evolving perspectives. Its purpose was not to determine how many Jews hold a particular opinion but rather to understand how thoughtful and engaged Jews reason through difficult issues.

Methodology and Participants

The Dialogue consisted of ten moderated sessions conducted via Zoom with 108 participants from the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Seventy participants also completed a questionnaire. Participants were unusually connected to Israel. Many had visited numerous times, maintained personal relationships with Israelis, or occupied leadership positions within Jewish organizations. The sample also included a substantial number of Orthodox Jews, though a majority identified politically as “strong liberal” or “leaning liberal.” The research team encountered unexpected challenges in organizing the sessions. Although organizations initially expressed strong interest, recruiting participants proved more difficult than in previous years. This difficulty itself became a finding. Many Jews appeared exhausted by constant discussion of Israel and the need to defend it. Others seemed reluctant to engage publicly with issues they regarded as painful, divisive, or morally complicated.

The Dominance of Ambivalence

The most striking finding of the Dialogue was the prevalence of ambivalence. Participants repeatedly resisted simple categories such as “supportive,” “critical,” “pro-Israel,” or “anti-Israel.” Many expressed pride and discomfort simultaneously. They admired Israel’s resilience, military capabilities, and achievements while also worrying about the human consequences of military action and the moral direction of Israeli politics. A statement by a participant from the American Jewish Committee (AJC) is emblematic in this regard: “I believe Jews have a great deal of pride for the strength of the Israeli military, the ingenuity of its intelligence services, what it’s able to accomplish in Lebanon, in Iran, and in Syria, and at the same time, today, that overwhelming ability to exert force on its enemies at times elicits discomfort, insofar as it is viewed here at times as an unequal fight not so much against enemies such as Hamas – but against the collateral damage for the civilians within Gaza. Those issues, those areas of Israeli military strength give many American Jews pause now.” Responses such as this were common. Participants were not abandoning Israel; rather, they were struggling to reconcile competing commitments. This same complexity emerged in participants’ criticism of the questionnaire we administered, which permitted only one answer per question. They often felt that multiple answers described them at the same time. This complexity appeared across ideological, denominational, and generational lines.

The Right to Defend and the Obligation to Restrain

Discussion frequently began with broad agreement on one fundamental principle: Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself. “As a country, [Israel] should and does have the right to defend itself, regardless of any further reason – full stop,” as one participant put it. Despite this common-sense approach, there was a hint of the moral complexity of the topic. In almost all sessions, participants placed great stress on defense and deterrence. Most participants took it for granted that Israel’s military power could be used legitimately only for defensive purposes. This moral aspect of participants’ approach to the topic, and their expectations of Israel, found fuller expression in the questionnaire, which asked directly: “What level of moral conduct in armed conflict should Israel strive to maintain?” Thirty-six of the 70 respondents (51%) answered, “Israel should attempt to exercise its highest moral values regardless of the enemy it is facing.”

It should be noted that these thirty-six respondents included seven Orthodox participants, one specifically a Chabad adherent. Nineteen of the 70 (27%) answered, “Israel should balance between morality and the fact that it is facing ruthless enemies who wish to destroy it.” Importantly, participants rarely viewed these positions as mutually exclusive. Most attempted to hold both ideas simultaneously: military force is necessary, but ethical conduct remains indispensable. When asked what should guide Israeli military behavior, many participants pointed to international law. Yet they often regarded Jewish values as imposing even more demanding obligations. In effect, they expected Israel to comply with international norms while also embodying a distinctive moral vision rooted in Jewish tradition.

Changing Attitudes Toward Israeli Military Power

Participants overwhelmingly acknowledged the pride that earlier generations felt in Israeli military achievements, particularly after the Six-Day War. Israel’s victories were widely understood as evidence that Jews could defend themselves successfully after centuries of vulnerability. Today, however, attitudes are more complicated. We asked participants how they and other Jews in their social circles feel about Israeli military power, both in the past, around the time of the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, and today. Participants were practically unanimous in saying that the Six-Day War had engendered pride. Regarding the Israeli military today, they were not at all condemnatory, but they did largely express themselves in careful and reserved terms.

This was reflected first in the questionnaire responses. The questionnaire asked: “Given the fact that Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxies deliberately situate themselves among a civilian population, has Israel’s prosecution of its recent armed conflicts made you feel more …” 43% answered “proud”; an equal percentage answered, “more worried about Israel’s character.” Similarly, 18 of the 70 respondents answered that other Jews in their community became more detached from Israel, 23 answered that their fellow community members seemed to be prouder, and 22 answered that Jews in their community became more worried about Israel’s character. The correlation with background factors was not very strong. Twelve Haredi and Modern Orthodox participants expressed pride in Israel’s military, but a substantial minority (six) of that same group stated that they were worried about Israel’s moral character, while one said that she felt embarrassed by Israel and its military.

In the breakout sessions, participants also expressed themselves in reserved and nuanced terms. One Chicago participant said that there used to be unanimous pride, but that attitudes now “are more complicated and careful.” Another participant spoke about giving the Israeli military the “benefit of the doubt.” Some also mentioned that people they know felt shame in connection with the Gaza war, especially after mid-2024. Furthermore, some noted that since this war had been by far the longest war in which Israel had been involved, they found it increasingly difficult to identify with and defend it as time went on. Most telling were statements that Israel and the IDF had lost their special status, were “just like any other country and every other army,” and were misbehaving in the participants’ eyes. Several spoke of discomfort regarding civilian casualties and concern about what they perceived as a weakening commitment to the principle of “purity of arms.” Others emphasized the unprecedented challenges of fighting adversaries embedded within civilian populations and expressed admiration for Israeli soldiers operating under difficult circumstances. Yet, even as participants acknowledged the problematic behavior of the IDF and the Israeli government, they also acknowledged that they felt a degree of pride. A participant from the Toronto Federation put it this way: “They [members of my community] may not agree with the decisions of the [Israeli] government, how [the war] went on or how long, and all of those things. And those heated conversations I’ve heard many, many times, but when it comes to the military itself, they really feel it is quite remarkable.”

The Personal Impact of the War

One of the clearest findings was the extent to which Israeli military actions affect the lives of Diaspora Jews. In the focus group sessions, some responses to this topic were very direct. One Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA) participant stated that he felt he was being looked at as a genocidal killer just because he was a Jew. Another participant echoed that experience: “I spend all of my work with people looking at me like I’m a baby-killing monster because I’m Jewish and a Zionist.” Other participants, such as those in the J Street group, described how the conflict with the Palestinians has become part of their day-to-day interactions and has strained relationships and friendships. The conflict therefore operates not only as a geopolitical issue but also as a personal and communal reality. Because Israel’s actions have consequences for Jews worldwide, many participants argued that Diaspora perspectives deserve greater consideration. While they did not challenge Israel’s sovereignty, they believed that decisions affecting world Jewry should not be made without some awareness of Diaspora concerns. A recurring complaint was that Diaspora Jews often feel responsible for defending Israel while simultaneously feeling ignored by Israeli political leaders. Many participants drew a sharp distinction between the Israeli government and the Israeli people. They expressed affection for Israelis and commitment to Israel’s future while criticizing government policies and political leadership.

Diplomacy and the Use of Force

What could be termed a Diasporan perspective, even if not a full-blown progressive one, also surfaced regarding another important issue: diplomacy versus military deployment and war. One of the questions in the questionnaire asked: “Should Israel use more political or diplomatic approaches in pursuit of its goals?” Sixty-one of the 70 respondents answered “yes.” This unequivocal answer contrasts with the distrust of diplomacy and negotiations vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue that has characterized Israeli political culture since the Second Intifada.

The Absence of Familiar Talking Points

An important observation concerned what participants did not say. Traditional Israeli public diplomacy arguments appeared relatively infrequently. Few participants insisted that outsiders cannot understand Israel’s security challenges. Most believed they understood those challenges reasonably well. Similarly, participants rarely relied on simple slogans or categorical defenses of Israeli policy. Instead, they attempted to grapple with competing realities simultaneously: the brutality of October 7, the legitimacy of Israeli self-defense, the suffering of Palestinian civilians, the failures of political leadership, and the challenges of asymmetric warfare. The discussions therefore reflected a search for moral and political frameworks capable of accommodating complexity.

The Diversity of Diaspora Experience

The South African sessions highlighted the diversity of Diaspora experience. Participants described living under a government that is strongly anti-Israel while simultaneously encountering significant grassroots support for Israel among segments of the broader population. They felt able to advocate publicly for their views and push back against official narratives. Their experience served as a reminder that Jewish communities do not confront identical political environments and that local contexts shape attitudes toward Israel in important ways.

A Shift in the Basis of Attachment

The Dialogue’s most consequential finding may concern the changing nature of Diaspora attachment to Israel. Historically, attachment rested on several foundations: shared peoplehood, religious identity, concern for Jewish security, and pride in Israel as a civilizational project. For many Jews, Israel represented more than a refuge or a nation-state. It embodied the possibility that Jewish values could shape society in distinctive and exemplary ways. The state was seen not only as a political achievement but also as a moral and cultural one. Many of the most prominent pioneers of Zionism exhibited this drive: Ahad Ha’Am, Ben-Gurion, and Berl Katznelson. The Dialogue suggests that this civilizational dimension may be weakening. Many participants no longer view Israel as uniquely moral or as a model society. They continue to support Israel and care deeply about its future, but they increasingly regard it as a normal country rather than as an exceptional realization of Jewish ethical ideals. This shift appeared not only among progressive participants but also among many centrists and some Orthodox respondents.

The conversations we held with these engaged Jews from communities around the world suggest that many participants no longer think the IDF is “the most moral army in the world” or that it acts in accordance with superior military ethics. Unlike participants in the 2014 Jewish World Dialogue, who said they believed the IDF was more moral than other armies, some participants in the 2025 Dialogue mocked this very notion. It can be inferred that they do not think Israel is in any way “a model society” or “a light unto the nations” in the sense Ben-Gurion envisioned. This attitude was expressed most strongly by the liberal J Street and JCPA participants, but it seems to have been shared by other participants, including Orthodox participants, who said that they were worried about Israel’s moral character. In the wake of this development, the nature of attachment may be changing from admiration to kinship. One is attached to Israel because Israel is viewed as family. One remains committed not because Israel is perfect or exemplary but because Israelis are part of one’s extended collective. The bond endures, but its foundation shifts.

Jewish Identity and Competing Moral Languages

The Dialogue also illuminates important differences between Israeli and Diaspora understandings of Jewish identity. Many Diaspora Jews emphasize universal ethical commitments and regard them as central expressions of Jewish values. Concepts such as justice, human dignity, equality, and moral responsibility occupy a prominent place in their self-understanding. By contrast, many Israeli Jews particularly on the political right – place greater emphasis on collective survival, national solidarity, and the obligations associated with sovereignty, defining their Jewishness primarily through national-ethnic affiliation or ritual practice. To the extent that Religious Zionists emphasize the sacred dimension, they tend to do so in a particularist mode. Thus, in Israel, the sacred dimension is associated with particularism, while in the liberal Jewish Diaspora it is associated with universal values. Any attempt to bridge the gap between the two communities must take these differences into account. The difference concerning Jewish identity has become increasingly visible in debates over Israel’s conduct in war.

A Liminal Moment

The Dialogue sessions suggested that many Diaspora Jews are currently experiencing what social scientists call a liminal condition. They are no longer fully comfortable with older narratives about Israel, yet they have not developed stable alternatives. They occupy an intermediate space characterized by uncertainty, experimentation, and reevaluation. Participants frequently described themselves as holding contradictory emotions at the same time. They felt pride and shame, solidarity and criticism, admiration and disappointment. Rather than choosing one side, they were attempting to live within the tension. A participant from Australia fully acknowledged these self-contradictory feelings: “There is no one clear-cut answer to the question, ‘Am I proud or am I ashamed?’ It’s incredibly complex, and being able to hold that complexity is probably the most truthful answer a young person in the Diaspora can obtain… You can hold both pride and shame. There doesn’t need to be an ‘or.’ Two truths can exist at the same time.” This condition may prove temporary, or it may signal a deeper transformation in Israel-Diaspora relations.

Policy Recommendations

• Consider repurposing the IDF officer delegations as a central instrument. JPPI brings hundreds of IDF officers to Diaspora communities each year, currently framed as exposure and goodwill. They are the most valuable asset available for addressing what this Dialogue uncovered, and they are underused. Diaspora Jews will not accept moral reassurance from spokespeople or advocacy organizations, all understood to be making a case. They will listen to a major who can describe an actual targeting decision – who was in the room, what the legal advisor said, which strike was aborted, what the doubt felt like, what he believes in retrospect was wrong. That is testimony, not hasbara, and it is the only register in which the question participants are asking can be answered.
• Communities should create more opportunities for open and honest conversation about Israel. Participants stated that they lack forums in which complex views can be explored safely.
• Educational institutions and agencies should develop materials that encourage nuanced engagement with Israel while affirming the importance of Israel–Diaspora ties.
• Israeli diplomatic representatives should strengthen engagement with Diaspora communities and communicate Israeli perspectives more effectively.
• Greater effort should be devoted to helping Diaspora Jews understand Israeli realities and helping Israelis understand the experiences of Jews living as minorities in other societies. Programs such as Birthright, gap-year initiatives, study-abroad experiences, and federation missions should emphasize sustained relationships between Israelis and Diaspora Jews. Furthermore, expanded exchange and service opportunities would allow Israelis and Diaspora Jews to spend meaningful periods of time living and working in one another’s communities.

Conclusion

The 2025 Jewish World Dialogue reveals a Jewish world that remains deeply connected to Israel but is rethinking the meaning of that connection. The central story is not estrangement. Nor is it unconditional support. Rather, it is the emergence of a more complex and self-conscious relationship to Jewish power, sovereignty, and responsibility. Participants continue to care deeply about Israel. They continue to see its security and flourishing as matters of profound importance. Yet many no longer view Israel through the idealized framework that shaped earlier generations. They are searching for new ways to reconcile moral aspiration with political reality, universal values with collective obligations, and criticism with commitment.

Whether this search produces a new form of Zionism, a revised understanding of peoplehood, or some other framework remains unclear. What is clear is that many Diaspora Jews are engaged in an ongoing process of reflection and reevaluation. The challenge facing Jewish institutions is not to resolve these tensions prematurely but to provide the intellectual, educational, and communal space necessary for thoughtful engagement. If managed constructively, this period of uncertainty may ultimately strengthen rather than weaken the bonds between Israel and world Jewry. The Dialogue suggests that we may be witnessing an important inflection point in modern Jewish life: a transition from older certainties to a more complex, honest, and mature conversation.

Endnotes

¹ David Manchester and Meg Siritzky, JFNA 2025 Survey of Jewish Life Since October 7.