The U.S.–Israel Partnership: Listing but Not Sinking

Until President Donald Trump’s June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU), this past year in U.S.–Israel relations posed one central question: how does Israel navigate the paradox of ever-closer military, diplomatic, and presidential ties even as many Americans denounce Israel? The immediate panic triggered by President Trump’s seeming capitulation to Iran with his MOU poses a different danger: if the nightmare scenario people have feared comes true, how does Israel handle a hostile White House and a hostile Main Street USA? The situation remains volatile. The MOU ceasefire barely lasted 21 days. As of this writing, anyone ready to declare that the Iranian regime has won or lost is engaging in soothsaying – or is self-delusional. The situation could change if Trump continues pounding Iran, if the Iranian people revolt as the economy collapses, or if Trump loses patience, declares a nonexistent victory, then proclaims a 1975-style “reassessment,” freezing Israel out until it withdraws from Lebanon and supports his cave-in to Iran. These are not predictions. Rather, imagining such scenarios serves as a warning that, no matter the crisis or breakthrough, the Israeli government and the Israeli public must look in two directions. Looking back illuminates the fundamentals that still bind America and Israel. Meanwhile, looking ahead enables Israel to anticipate problems and respond in ways that are preemptive, self-protective, and constructive. The partnership is listing but not sinking.

Looking Back 1: 1975 as the Reverse Mirror Image

When Gerald Ford abruptly succeeded his fellow Republican Richard Nixon as president in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was conducting “shuttle diplomacy.” Kissinger laid the groundwork for what became the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty. As negotiations dragged on, Ford said Israeli “tactics frustrated the Egyptians and made me mad as hell.” In March 1975, Ford declared a “reassessment of United States policy”¹ – suspending aid. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said this “innocent-sounding term … heralded one of the worst periods in American–Israeli relations.”² On September 4, 1975, Israel, under pressure, signed the Sinai Interim Agreement with Egypt. Aid resumed. This short version of a longer tale convinced many pro-Israel Americans and Israelis that the relationship was doomed and once again reflected the Republican Party’s patrician, WASPy disdain for Jews and the Jewish state. Yet a decade later, many would hail Ronald Reagan – a Republican – as one of the most pro-Israel presidents, and Republicans soon became the deeply pro-Israel party. No one needed a crystal ball to look that far ahead. Just weeks after Israel succumbed, the American people united in a pro-Israel fury, as President Ford’s UN ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan spearheaded the fight against General Assembly Resolution 3379, branding Zionism as racism.³

President Ford declared: “This administration is very, very much opposed” to the resolution, which “is contrary to the basic Charter of the United Nations.” Ford chided the Palestinian national movement, which “refused to recognize the State of Israel. And we, of course, strongly back the State of Israel in its attitude that there must be recognition before there can be any contact or any participation by the Palestinians in any negotiations.”⁴ Spurred by Moynihan, a liberal Democrat, the American people mocked the UN resolution, from left to right, black and white, labor unionists and preachers alike. Recognizing this anti-Zionism as antisemitic, most Americans embraced Israel. On the new program “Saturday Night” – not yet “Saturday Night Live” – the mock newscaster Chevy Chase “reported” on the resolution: “Black entertainer Sammy Davis, Jr., a convert to Judaism, was quoted as saying: ‘What a breakthrough! Now, finally, I can hate myself!’”⁵ Two enduring lessons emerged from this moment when Israel was more popular among the American people than among American policymakers – a contrast with this past year: 1. American support for Israel runs deep. 2. As in any long, healthy marriage, spats are inevitable, often fleeting, rarely catastrophic.

Looking Back 2: The Record Low: Double Trouble During the “First Intifada”

When Palestinians rioted and then spread terror in 1988 and 1989 in what they called the “First Intifada,” Israel’s reputation suffered. In January 1988, a frustrated Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin proclaimed: “The first priority is to use force, power and beatings.”⁶ He claimed that he sought police-style containment rather than the use of lethal military force. Especially after Israeli commanders testified in military courts that they had been ordered to break Palestinian stone-throwers’ arms and legs,⁷ and CBS News showed Israeli soldiers doing just that to two young Palestinians,⁸ Rabin’s “break-their-bones” policy became notorious. Support for Israel plummeted. By 1989, Gallup found Israel’s favorability rating at a record low of 45%.⁹ President George H.W. Bush used the State Department Human Rights Report to condemn Israel’s military tactics in the “occupied territories.” In February 1989, the powerful Democratic chair of the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, Wisconsin’s David Obey, insisted that the United States had a responsibility to investigate and press Israel on human-rights reforms during discussions and votes on aid to Israel, seemingly linking the two issues.¹⁰ Even pro-Israel “pragmatists” such as Republican Senator Bob Dole and Brooklyn Congressman Stephen Solarz criticized Israel’s aggression. Nevertheless, by early 1991, Gallup recorded a peak in support for Israel: 79% favorable.¹¹ That February, 64% of American voters acknowledged liking Israel more than the Palestinians.¹²

What happened? … Operation Desert Storm. The First Persian Gulf War boosted Israel’s popularity. First, even when Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles landed, Israel respected President Bush’s request not to retaliate. So, once again, Israelis appeared as vulnerable victims – always a tragic fast-track to popularity, as October 7 confirmed. Second, by fall 1991, politicians and journalists were discussing Israel’s willingness to attend a Madrid Peace Conference, with a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation. By 1995, Yitzhak Rabin, the bone-breaker, had become the Middle East’s prince of peace. These events offer three more lessons about deep and enduring ties amid passing tiffs: 3. The Middle East’s volatility makes Israel’s standing headline-driven and event-focused. The front page giveth popularity – and taketh it away, repeatedly. 4. Most Americans sympathize when Israelis are slaughtered but dislike Israel’s counterattacks, especially when journalists portray the IDF’s response as excessive or vengeful. 5. Glimmers of hope and possibilities for peace, especially with the Palestinians, heighten Israel’s approval ratings. These insights lead to the most important conclusion about relations between Israel and the American people. With the atmosphere dynamic rather than static, the conversation is fluid rather than binary. Most Americans are neither blindly pro-Israel nor zealously anti-Israel. Most don’t feel so strongly. Even most American Jews usually prioritize domestic considerations over foreign policy concerns, including support for Israel, when voting.

The Enduring but Overlooked Phenomenon of Media-Stoked Conditional Zionism

So beware. Especially today, activists on both extremes run the conversation – on social media, through the headlines, and with a newer phenomenon: a rising cadre of young progressives whose first defining political experience was championing anti-Zionism. But not every American criticizing Israel is an anti-Zionist or a lifelong critic of the Jewish state. In fact, while the anti-Zionists are predatory sharks, most Americans are foreign-policy goldfish – inattentive and forgetful. That puts Israel on perpetual probation because it’s so targeted and obsessively discussed in the press. Israel’s popularity at any moment depends on what’s perceived to be “good” behavior or “good” leadership. This state of media-stoked conditional Zionism is not a post–October 7 blip; it’s a historical reality. Too many Israelis – and Israeli leaders – address Americans on the assumption that they’re either pro-Israel or anti-Zionist. Especially now, American Jews, pro-Israel activists, and Israelis must think more strategically. They should narrowcast messages to different groups, ignore anti-Zionists as much as possible, and woo the muddled, swayable middle thoughtfully, respectfully, and strategically. This year offered abundant evidence confirming the need for such a strategy.

The Unhappy Horseshoe: Fanatic Anti-Zionists Bond Through Antisemitic Conspiratorialism

The Jewish world has been traumatized by the mainstreaming and hardening of the anti-Zionist horseshoe on both the left and the right. In JPPI’s monthly Voice of the Jewish People survey, which uses a respondent panel of “connected” U.S. Jews, 85% of respondents agreed that “Israel’s image was damaged in 2025” – and it got worse.¹³ A further 62% worry equally about antisemitism on the left and the right.¹⁴ Zohran Mamdani’s election as New York’s mayor marks a turning point. It normalized obsessive anti-Zionism as an organizing principle for some individuals and institutions and eliminated red lines for Democratic candidates regarding anti-Zionist antisemitism. Mamdani’s denials don’t fool most American Jews – 64% of respondents in JPPI’s monthly Voice of the Jewish People survey called him “anti-Israel and antisemitic.”¹⁵ Equally sobering on the left was the fact that 40 of 47 Senate Democrats opposed major weapons transfers to Israel and supported the Joint Resolutions of Disapproval.¹⁶ Shortly thereafter, 103 House Democrats – more than half the caucus – voted against continued foreign aid to Israel.¹⁷ The Democrats are being Sanderized. Having absorbed Bernie Sanders’ portrayal of socialism as benign, too many now pronounce Israel and Zionism malignant.

On the right, Vice President J.D. Vance’s sneering response to Israeli and Jewish critics of Trump’s memorandum of understanding with Iran in June 2026¹⁸ also reflects worrying ideological and structural shifts. Beyond currying favor with the president, the vice president played to the Republican Party’s increasingly shrill Tucker Carlson–Candace Owens wing. Some isolationists are principled, but many are antisemitic in intent, not just in effect. A JPPI study using artificial intelligence analyzed six months of video transcripts from Carlson and Owens. The study found that the two podcasters increased the volume and intensity of their attacks on Israel. The share of Carlson’s references to Israel that were negative rose from roughly 50% to 70%; the tone became overwhelmingly negative.¹⁹ Alas, in America today, anti-Jewish rhetoric is a booming business. “There is a part of the Right that is extraordinarily conspiratorial and sees Jews as a conspiratorial force…,” Ben Shapiro told the Jerusalem Post.²⁰ Those conspiracy-mongers flourish “because social media rewards it. On X and TikTok, you often get more clicks if you push anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric.” Shapiro noted: “Conspiratorialism is an incredibly seductive storyline, particularly for young people who are being told that the problems in their own lives are not their fault, and they can be solved by externalizing those problems onto a different group…. Virtually every conspiracy theory ends up pointing at the Jews because the narrative needs a villain,” and the Jews are an old favorite.²¹

Still, two distinctions separate left-wing and right-wing anti-Zionism. Most mainstream Republicans, especially Lindsey Graham, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz, repudiate MAGA antisemitism. Their moral clarity contrasts with the muffled response of most Senate Democrats, especially that of their leader, Charles Schumer. Second, most Jewish Republicans denounce anti-Zionism categorically. Alas, a growing number of progressive Jewish Democrats are blue-and-whitewashing anti-Zionism – a practice we could call J-Streeting or Landering (a form of laundering), after Brad Lander, Mamdani’s Jewish ally and a Bash-Israel-First congressional candidate. These activists often claim that all but the harshest, most obsessive anti-Israel critics are not “antisemitic” but merely critical of Israel’s policies and government.

The Happy Horseshoe: Ensuring that the Fundamentals of the U.S.–Israel Partnership Remain Sound

These warning signs should not cloud the parallel narrative – the many structural and popular points of light. Events over the last twelve months produced remarkable milestones of integration, not just cooperation, in the U.S.–Israel partnership, yielding historic achievements. In June 2025, America made history by joining Israel’s “12-Day War” against Iran, delivering the final bunker-busting, nuclear-hunting blows. In October, President Trump’s direct intervention forced Hamas to free the final 20 living hostages and return the bodies of the last 27 Israelis held in Gaza. On October 7, 2025 – let alone on October 8, 2023 – few people believed that 168 of the 251 hostages would be freed alive and that every hostage would be accounted for and returned home, including the remains of two soldiers held since 2014. To put this accomplishment in perspective, as of July 2026, 41 American citizens²² – and up to 250 Western nationals – are being held hostage or unjustly imprisoned. Recent reports suggest that Russia, China, and Iran together hold 78% of them.²³ It’s hard to appreciate the American–Israeli achievement regarding the Gaza hostages because Americans and other Westerners simply ignore these victims of other totalitarian regimes and terrorist organizations.

It is also critical to remember that the U.S.–Israel partnership runs much deeper than political, military, and diplomatic ties. As of 2023, there were 135 Israeli companies listed on America’s Nasdaq stock exchange. More than 250 American high-tech companies have research facilities in Israel,²⁴ and an average of more than 450,000 Israelis visit the U.S. annually, spending approximately $1.4 billion in the American economy.²⁵ Some 400,000 Americans visited Israel this past year²⁶ – down from nearly one million before October 7.²⁷ Before the outbreak of the war, up to 200,000 U.S. citizens were reported to reside permanently in Israel.²⁸ In March 2025, Google announced an agreement to acquire Israel’s cybersecurity powerhouse Wiz for $32 billion.²⁹ This mega-transaction illustrated the strength of the ties. Meanwhile, despite the headlines, in May 2026, Congress proposed a more stable “United States–Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” in Section 219 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2027.³⁰ Israeli technology would become more deeply integrated into American weapons systems through a range of research and development collaborations.

This bill, which fortunately has not attracted much public attention, would create an “Executive Agent” within the Department of Defense. Bureaucratizing support for Israel based on internal criteria would make it less dependent on foreign-aid votes and politicking. Israeli technology would naturally fit into the U.S. military supply chain and would often lock in U.S.–Israeli collaborations through long-term contracts and bureaucratic momentum. Given the current volatility, which will not disappear quickly, Israeli officials should seek more such ways to “lock in” cooperation – bureaucratizing, normalizing, and reinforcing these ties, which are essential to both countries’ militaries, intelligence systems, and economies. Even on the sobering June primary day, when three anti-Israel Democratic congressional candidates were nominated, many moderate pro-Israel Democrats won, from Adrian Boafo in Maryland’s 5th Congressional District to Thomas DiNapoli in New York State. DiNapoli defeated two progressive rivals who insisted that New York divest its holdings in Israel bonds, which the comptroller holds as profitable investments on behalf of New York State. Here, too, subtlety is required. People and institutions live up to high expectations – and down to harsh condemnations.

It’s bad enough that Mamdani and his allies will use Israel-bashing as a get-out-of-jail-free card with constituents, yelling louder about Israel to obscure any governmental failures or political controversies. And they will keep bullying many timid Democrats into complicit silence. Still, dismissing the Democratic Party as “anti-Israel” because of some destructive members of Congress and mayors will obscure the many pro-Israel moderates and risk alienating them. House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries, for example, needs reinforcement from Israeli politicians, not demagogic cold-shouldering. “Israel is an ally and has a right to exist as a Jewish and Democratic state,” Jeffries believes. “Our commitment to Israel’s security is ironclad.”³¹ Even while joining the Democratic pile-on supporting an arms ban to punish Israel, Senator Jeanne Shaheen, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, clarified: “The horrific attack on October 7th underscored the very real threats Israel faces…. No country should ever have to live with a bloodthirsty terrorist organization on its doorstep… The United States [remains] a longstanding partner of Israel.”³²

The Real Battleground: The Conditional or Soft Zionists

The Unhappy Horseshoe risks inducing paralysis through despair, while the Happy Horseshoe risks inducing paralysis through complacency. True, broader antisemitic forces have made modern anti-Zionism the latest mania, casting Israel as a “folk devil” in the words of sociologist Stanley Cohen, the author of Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972).³³ In JPPI’s Diaspora Jewish survey, 45% of respondents believe that more Americans have soured on Israel because of surging antisemitism – only 28% attribute this shift to “changes in Israeli policy.”³⁴ Nevertheless, that doesn’t excuse the utter failure of Israel’s public diplomacy infrastructure. While not as bloody and irreversible as the military and intelligence failures of October 7, it’s as systemic. Consider two challenges: one that emerged in the spring and summer of the past year – the impact on public opinion of the accusation of starvation in Gaza – and one that is ongoing – what critics call “settler violence” in the territories. In February 2025, biased news outlets such as Al Jazeera and anti-Israel human-rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International charged Israel with systematically starving Gazans. In May, when Israel set out to seize 70% of Gaza, the story gained momentum. The World Health Organization condemned Israel. The American media and American establishment warned about “starvation.” The American-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation stepped in and became a target. These concerns peaked in August, when a UN-backed review declared there was “famine” in Gaza. The American media and social media echoed the UN condemnations and highlighted any misfires in delivery.

Future academics will dissect how marginal, tendentious accusations came to be widely believed. Pro-Israel advocates futilely tried to dismiss the accusations as “modern-day blood libels.” Israeli officials should be concerned about the reporting’s impact on Americans who are pro-Israel, who condemned the October 7 attack, and who were inclined to support Israel’s war effort. Such Americans should never be dismissed as “anti-Israel” merely because biased media reports convinced them that a state they respected was starving children. The JPPI study tracked critical terms such as “genocide,” “massacre,” “apartheid,” and “starvation,” along with “Israel” and “Zionism,” in approximately 3,000 local-media articles from January 2024 to June 2026 – noting that many local newspapers initially supported Israel. ChatGPT 5.2 also analyzed the articles’ tone. The conclusion: “August is the month with the highest percentage of negative articles and the only month in which the percentage of negative articles is higher than that of neutral articles.”³⁵ Further proof that the problem is conditional – and thus that many are convincible, wooable Zionists – comes from the observation that “the term ‘starvation’ appears only at specific points in time. It is important to note that it usually fades away after a short time. Here, too, a notable milestone is August 2025, following the start of the ‘starvation’ campaign in late July.”

Regional variations emerge. “Local newspapers in conservative regions such as Florida” present “a relatively positive tone toward Israel. In contrast, as one moves to larger cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, the tone becomes more negative.” The study concludes: “It is evident that as the war continues, there has been a decline in the percentage of articles expressing a positive tone toward Israel. It is also evident that one of the central issues around which criticism of Israel reached a peak is the issue of ‘starvation’ in the Gaza Strip. Admittedly, this term did not persist over time. However, it is reasonable to assume that the issue is fading from the agenda due to actions Israel is taking in response to heavy international pressure, which is dampening the criticism.” Since the October 2025 ceasefire, specific incidents highlighting the starvation accusation have been limited – but the reputational damage has lingered. In fairness, one can argue that Israel had to fight the war aggressively and that, given a choice between winning the war and losing the PR battle, it’s better to win the war first. That’s why the second PR crisis over violent settlers is even more problematic. It’s a self-destructive “own goal.” There is no policy upside or security gain in the most extreme incidents – Israeli citizens harassing, beating, and often injuring Palestinians – that dominate the headlines. The global media’s coverage of these incidents – collectively labeled “settler violence” by critics – harms Israel’s international standing more than its coverage of the “starvation” accusation does.

Some settlers’ actions – combined with government inaction and inflammatory rhetoric – make Israel look deliberately cruel and, to use favored concepts among American progressives, “settler-colonialist and oppressive.” Hard anti-Zionists are delighted. Conditional – or soft – Zionists are appalled, with some abandoning their support of Israel. Even more disturbing, as the number of Disappointed Zionists grows, condemning “settler violence” has become a necessary posture for even ardent Zionists to connect with Jewish audiences and gain a measure of the credibility that too many defensive Zionists are forever seeking. While defending Israel proudly – and fending off fellow progressives’ counterattacks – New York Congressman Ritchie Torres has condemned the “crisis of extremist settler violence.”³⁶ Major Jewish organizations have branded these settler “pogroms” as “an affront to a democratic state.”³⁷ The Union for Reform Judaism blasted the “terrorizing” actions of settlers.³⁸ All this feeds a sense of moral equivalence – and crisis. These dynamics reinforce three important conclusions from last year: 1. Israel’s government must not only speak “Jerusalem language” to “Red America” but must also have representatives who speak “Tel Aviv talk” to “Blue America.” 2. Leading Jewish organizations must be sensitive to the growing red–blue divisions within the Diaspora, especially within American Jewry, and the need to frame Israel in terms that resonate broadly. 3. Even as politicians dismiss “bipartisanship” as cowardly, Americans’ bipartisan support for Israel remains a gift to Americans, too – healthy democracies need some issues on which the left and the right agree.

JPPI’s latest “Essential Guide” to the U.S.–Israel Partnership identifies five gates of friendship – pathways toward supporting Israel. The Guide advises “narrowcasting,” not just broadcasting: reaching out strategically to American Jews and Evangelicals, as well as Americans over 55, Catholics, mainstream Protestants, Cuban Americans, and security-minded voters.³⁹ Each of the five gates – or languages of love – is defined by an all-American symbol and can encourage these core supporters and others to support Israel for what it is, without necessarily endorsing everything it does.

• Biblical Zionism: Many Jews, Evangelicals, devout Protestants, and Catholics cherish Israel as the Promised Land and the Jewish democratic state. Zionism is foundational to what Ronald Reagan called their “shared identity – a deep, spiritual identity,” rooted in the Bible. They appreciate Israel pragmatically, romantically, existentially – and theologically. As the late Charlie Kirk said after visiting the Holy Land: “Israel changed my life. Strengthened my faith, made the Bible pop into reality, and gave me the most precious memories with Erika,” his wife, now his widow.
• Liberal-Democratic Zionism: Many golden agers, in both parties, start with America’s founding documents and the fact that the U.S. and Israel are sister democracies. These supporters combine affection for Israel, appreciation for its security needs, and reverence for its democratic values with pride in the historic ties uniting both countries. In 2008, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush’s secretary of state, celebrated the shared “fellowship of families, of friends, and of faith … deepened by a shared culture of tolerance and a pioneer spirit.” Nancy Pelosi, the longtime Democratic House speaker who believed protecting Israel was “in my DNA,” said in 2018, “If this Capitol crumbled to the ground, the one thing that would remain would be … our cooperation with Israel. That’s fundamental to who we are.” Pelosi, like many others, including Bill and Hillary Clinton, hopes Israel will solve the Palestinian conflict as soon as possible, while acknowledging the complexities, starting with Palestinian rejectionism.
• Progressive Zionism: Many progressives, rallying around the Statue of Liberty as the beacon to immigrants, the oppressed, and the poor, have become leading anti-Zionists. They brand Israel a right-wing bully while slinging accusations of settler colonialism, racism, oppression, and genocide. One day, like many once-disapproving, now-supportive baby boomers, they may realize that liberal-democratic Israelis live by progressive values, unlike the sexist, homophobic, fundamentalist autocrats of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or Hamas. A Palestinian crime or an Israeli peace breakthrough might change the conversation. But the trendy “Palestinianism” dominating the media, academia, and the arts has seduced many into blindly and zealously supporting a dramatically illiberal cause that has become foundational to their identity.
• National Security Zionism: Security-minded voters see Israel as America’s most useful military and diplomatic ally and, in Ambassador Nikki Haley’s words, as “the front line of defense” against “jihad terrorism.” General Alexander Haig went from resenting Israel’s defiance during the 1982 Lebanon War to appreciating how Israeli pilots demolished Soviet-made anti-aircraft batteries. Haig called Israel “America’s largest aircraft carrier in the world that cannot be sunk.”
• Transactional Zionism: Many Trumpians are transactionalists. A vocal minority is anti-Jewish and rigidly isolationist. But most MAGA supporters calculate the dividends America’s investment in Israel yields. Convinced skeptics include Vice President J.D. Vance, who puts Ukraine and Israel “in separate buckets,” while saluting the sacred nature of “that narrow little strip of territory on the Mediterranean.” Vance says Israel “gives us missile-defense parity,” serves as a “regional counterweight to Iran,” and acts as a bulwark against the common enemies of Western civilization. In 2024, he proclaimed: “We want our allies to be like Israel – strong, independent, and capable of defending their own interests so we don’t have to.”

America is changing. Israel and its supporters must be nimble. Even while refining Israel’s “language of love” for these traditional voting groups, Israel should Think Ethnic and Think Digital. Israel and its American supporters have not reached out enough to Latinos, Hindu Americans, Cuban Americans, and Iranian Americans to find common ground, shared values, and, yes, common jihadist and totalitarian enemies. Thinking Digital means understanding that Americans now have different affiliations and affinity groups online. More tailored outreach is necessary to reach America’s Intellectual Guardians, Liberal Guardians, Civic Guardians, Technology Guardians, Freedom Guardians, Defense Guardians, Constitutional Guardians, and Institutional Guardians. All thrive in different online communities and forums, ultimately united in their commitment to defending the civic, constitutional, Enlightenment, liberal, and capitalist values the Woke anti-Zionist world rejects and Israel embodies.

To read the endnotes, click here.