The Strategic Balance: Power and Legitimacy

The State of Israel is rapidly approaching the third anniversary of the October 7 attack, which profoundly transformed the country both domestically and internationally. The initial trauma of a surprise terrorist attack with such tragic consequences gradually gave way to a protracted and difficult war that is reshaping Israel, the Middle East, and, to some extent, the international system as a whole. Alongside the war in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East is one of the defining conflicts of recent decades. How these wars are conducted – and, certainly, how they end – will help define the parameters of warfare and international relations for years to come.

Any assessment at this stage is necessarily provisional. The campaigns remain unfinished in every theater, and the regional landscape continues to change, both because of Israeli actions and because of the profound transformation underway across the Middle East. Nevertheless, even amid this uncertainty, Israel’s strategic balance sheet can and should be assessed. The result is mixed.

From a broad perspective, Israel has demonstrated its capacity to act as a regional power – a political and military actor capable of shaping and disrupting the Middle Eastern landscape. Operational cooperation with the U.S. military and significant achievements in many theaters have projected Israeli power and underscored the country’s strategic value to regional and global partners. The combination of military capabilities and the resolve to employ them against adversaries creates an opportunity to deepen those partnerships.

At the same time, Israel faces an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy in the West, calling into question a foundation of support that has been essential to its security, development, and prosperity. This erosion has many ramifications, particularly for Israel’s ability to sustain a thriving economy and a strong military capable of addressing the threats it faces. These seemingly contradictory trends – the demonstration of Israel’s strategic value and the weakening of its legitimacy – will largely shape its ability to achieve its objectives. Israel can diversify its sources of support to some extent, but it cannot relinquish the backing of the West, and of the United States in particular. Preserving that support is likely to become considerably more difficult in the coming years.

Lebanon and Gaza

The most significant improvement in Israel’s strategic position is the substantial weakening of the threats along its borders, above all in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. Before October 7, both Hamas and Hezbollah possessed formidable military capabilities, including extensive high-trajectory firepower and thousands of commando fighters trained and positioned to raid Israeli territory with only hours’ notice – as tragically occurred from Gaza on October 7. Given their growing military strength and their perception that Israel was being weakened by internal conflict, both organizations came to believe that they could defeat Israel militarily in the near term. For years, Israelis lived under a conventional military threat from two separate theaters – an exposure whose severity was not adequately appreciated.

Nearly three years later, both organizations are considerably weaker, although they remain far from dismantled. Hezbollah has lost its long-serving leader and most of its senior leadership; thousands of its fighters have been killed; its firepower has been substantially reduced; and its capacity to mount large-scale raids into Israel has been almost entirely destroyed. The organization has abandoned its near-term vision of defeating Israel militarily and is focused primarily on survival and asymmetric warfare.

The military balance between Israel and Hezbollah has shifted markedly in Israel’s favor, while Israel’s freedom of action in Lebanon has expanded. The establishment of a new security zone in southern Lebanon also strengthens the IDF’s forward defense and its ability to protect communities along the northern border – even in a worst-case scenario in which Hezbollah rapidly rebuilds its capabilities.

Hamas has likewise been substantially weakened, and its capacity to inflict harm on Israel’s home front has been greatly diminished. The organization still exists, of course, but it is very different from the force that invaded Israel on October 7 and fired thousands of rockets at the country. The IDF’s military presence inside Gaza has compelled Hamas to make far-reaching operational adjustments and, like Hezbollah, to emphasize survival and asymmetric warfare. Hamas started from a weaker position than Hezbollah, yet today it operates largely through separate terrorist cells rather than within a unified, Gaza-wide framework – a reality that significantly impairs its functioning as a military system.

These achievements have broader implications for both theaters. Hezbollah is at its lowest strategic point since it was established by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the early 1980s. Most importantly, it has lost Syria as a strategic ally and supply conduit – the lifeline through which Iranian funds and weapons flowed largely unobstructed for years. Hezbollah sacrificed thousands of fighters during the Syrian civil war – more than the total number of operatives it lost in the Second Lebanon War – to preserve the Assad regime, which ultimately collapsed in less than two weeks. Syria was thus transformed almost overnight from a strategic ally into a strategic problem for Hezbollah.

The organization’s legitimacy has also been severely damaged. Recent surveys in Lebanon indicate that clear majorities among non-Shiite communities support Hezbollah’s disarmament. Its political power has declined, as demonstrated by the election of a president and prime minister whom Hezbollah once strongly opposed. For years, as Lebanon’s kingmaker, the organization had prevented the election of a president. Hezbollah is also finding it increasingly difficult to convince the Lebanese public that it protects Lebanese interests after twice dragging the country into war in recent years in the service of foreign interests.

With Iran experiencing a worsening economic crisis and its supply routes to Lebanon more constrained than ever, Hezbollah’s ability to continue serving as the protector of Lebanon’s Shiite community is increasingly in doubt. These circumstances have opened an important window of opportunity for Israel to pursue, over a period of years, the disarmament of Hezbollah’s heavy weapons and, ultimately, a peace agreement with Lebanon. The Lebanese state could become a central partner in efforts to disarm Hezbollah, notwithstanding its well-known limitations, while its immense dependence on the United States provides unprecedented leverage for positive change. The path will be difficult, uncertain, and fraught with crises. Yet prudent Israeli and American policy could, for the first time, create the prospect of a different future for Lebanon.

In Gaza, by contrast, the picture is more mixed. Hamas has been severely damaged, but there is still no coherent alternative to its rule in the Strip, and, as of this writing, it is unclear how sincere its commitment to disarmament is. Israel will consequently need to continue employing force in Gaza for the foreseeable future, while the question of the “day after” remains deeply unsettled. Hamas’s selection of Khalil al-Hayya – one of the movement’s most radical leaders – to head the organization further indicates that the prospects for fundamental change within it are poor.

The Gaza Strip will likely remain a devastated and politically fragmented territory in the coming years, and the terrorist threat emanating from it is unlikely to disappear. Nevertheless, there are sound reasons to assess that this threat will more closely resemble the threat emanating from the West Bank rather than the strategic threat that existed along the Gaza border before October 7.

Israel’s paramount test in Gaza will be to combine the military defeat of Hamas with participation in efforts to build a different Gaza – one undergoing a gradual process of deradicalization and institutional reconstruction. The postwar transformations of Germany and Japan may offer broad lessons, although the historical circumstances are markedly different. Such a process would need to be pursued together with moderate Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Morocco, as well as moderate Palestinian actors. Without it, Israel will be forced to continue grappling with the Gaza problem for decades. This objective will, almost by definition, intersect with the broader Palestinian question.

Iran: Nuclear Capabilities, Regional Power, and Regime Stability

Israel stands at one of the most consequential strategic crossroads it has ever faced in relation to Iran. Any sober assessment must begin with the premise that Iran is a central source of Israel’s geostrategic problems – from the nuclear issue, terrorism, and regional activity to missiles and the campaign to destroy Israel. Accordingly, an assessment must consider every dimension of the Iranian challenge. Here too, much remains unknown, as it is unclear how the campaign between the United States and Iran will end.

On the nuclear front, Iran has lost large parts of the robust, fortified, and advanced program it built over many years – especially since President Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement. Its enrichment sites have been severely damaged, though apparently not destroyed; many of its scientists have been killed; and key components of the program have been dismantled by intensive air strikes. This is a significant achievement that directly disrupted – and largely at the last moment – a program that was on the verge of becoming irreversible.

A serious residual risk nevertheless remains. Iran still possesses approximately half a ton of uranium enriched to 60%, which could theoretically be used to assemble a rudimentary nuclear device with a small number of centrifuges and a relatively modest clandestine facility. This would not constitute the same advanced and highly developed program, but it would still provide Iran with a potential pathway to a nuclear weapon. The assumption that Israel and the United States can maintain continuous and comprehensive surveillance of the enriched uranium – which cannot be destroyed from the air and must instead be removed from Iran or diluted – is questionable, particularly after the intelligence failure preceding the October 7 attack. Nuclear programs make deliberate use of deception and concealment; detection therefore cannot be guaranteed. Iran’s motivation to acquire nuclear weapons as its principal insurance policy against future attempts at regime change must also be considered. That motivation has probably increased amid the radicalization of the regime and deepening mutual suspicion between Iran and the West.

Regionally, Iran has suffered a severe strategic blow. The process began to a significant extent with the killing of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 but accelerated markedly after October 7. In Lebanon, Hezbollah – Iran’s most important proxy – has been weakened both militarily and politically. The organization, established to defend Iran and the Islamic Revolution, did not fire at Israel during Operation Rising Lion (June 13–24, 2025), illustrating the scale of the change. Syria has shifted from an ally of the Shiite axis to an adversary, while Palestinian terrorist organizations have been weakened by successive Israeli operations in multiple theaters. Even in Iraq – a country of strategic importance to Iran – Iranian influence is gradually declining, though it has not disappeared. Yemen is the exception: Iran’s strategic partnership with the Houthis endures, even though the Houthis pursue a vision that is largely independent of Tehran’s. In broad terms, Iran’s regional proxy network has been substantially weakened, calling into question a national security doctrine in which proxies were regarded as a central layer of defense.

The campaign to destroy Israel has likewise suffered a severe setback. In recent years, the Shiite axis and Palestinian terrorist organizations developed a conviction that they could defeat the State of Israel. Despite the formidable challenges it has faced, Israel demonstrated its resilience in confronting Hamas’s attempt to implement that plan and adopted a more proactive approach across the theaters, reshaping the axis’s perceptions. The aspiration to destroy Israel remains deeply embedded – as illustrated by the countdown clock in Tehran’s Palestine Square – but the operational concept according to which this was a realistic objective achievable by military means in the coming years has collapsed. The deaths of Yahya Sinwar, Hassan Nasrallah, and Ali Khamenei, together with Bashar al-Assad’s removal from power, underscore the magnitude of the change.

The past year has brought the Iranian missile threat into sharper focus. Israel previously regarded it as a secondary threat, connected primarily to the nuclear issue, because the country was surrounded by hundreds of thousands of rockets and missiles. Now that this surrounding threat has been significantly reduced, the direct threat from Iran is more pronounced, especially following the direct exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran. Iranian missiles cause far greater damage than rockets fired from Gaza or Lebanon and are considerably more difficult to intercept. Israel and the United States have damaged part of Iran’s missile order of battle and elements of the industrial base that produces those missiles, but Iran retains substantial residual capabilities. Moreover, history shows that it is extremely difficult to disrupt an adversary’s force buildup over time, especially when that adversary is located thousands of kilometers from Israel. The Iranian missile challenge is therefore likely to endure and intensify – particularly if Iran realizes its long-standing vision of a 10,000-missile arsenal.

Finally, the Iranian question ultimately comes down to the regime’s stability, and here too the assessment is mixed. On the one hand, the regime has remained standing despite the unprecedented and sustained military attacks directed against it in recent months and the killing of the supreme leader at the outset of Operation Roaring Lion (launched February 28, 2026). Months of warfare have not generated public unrest sufficient to pose a significant challenge to the regime, and Iran continues to project confidence in its confrontation with the United States. The current regime – without Ali Khamenei as its unifying force – also appears more extreme and messianic than before, creating an escalating challenge for Israel.

At the same time, signs of serious instability are multiplying. Disputes within the Iranian leadership are surfacing. The current supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not appeared in public for months and does not command the respect enjoyed by his father – against the backdrop of the Iranian public’s deep aversion to dynastic rule. Iran’s underlying problems – which brought hundreds of thousands into the streets in unprecedented protests last January – have not been resolved and have, in many respects, worsened. The economy, the water crisis, and recurring fires are problems the regime can address only with stopgap measures, and it will likely struggle to govern in its present form for many more years. Even a partial U.S.–Iranian agreement, however, would likely inject tens of billions of dollars into the regime, providing a vital infusion of oxygen for its survival, though not a genuine solution to its fundamental problems.

Two clocks are now racing, and it is difficult to predict which will run out first. On the one hand stands a regime more radical and vengeful than before, one that is likely to intensify the threat to Israel in the short term, especially on the nuclear front. On the other stands a militarily weakened and unstable regime that lacks the foundations required to govern securely for years. Israel, the United States, and their regional partners should therefore focus on slowing Iran’s nuclear progress while supporting conditions for political change, alongside a broad effort to minimize the damage Iran can inflict on the global and regional economies.

The Iranian regime’s open aggression – including deliberate attacks on civilians and national infrastructure – presents Israel with an opportunity to deepen its partnerships. Israel is a regional actor that regards Iran as its principal threat, and its attention is unlikely to shift away from this challenge. This opportunity should be translated into a clear strategic objective: expanding the Abraham Accords, with normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a priority. Naturally, this objective also intersects with the Palestinian question.

Syria

In Syria, President Ahmed al-Sharaa continues to pursue, with considerable success, a strategy aimed at securing international acceptance for his regime, and the West and the region’s states appear to have decided to embrace him. Syria’s reconstruction will take years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars, increasing the Syrian president’s incentive to maintain his current strategy. A cautious equilibrium prevails vis-à-vis Israel: both sides are maintaining low-level contacts without deepening cooperation. At the same time, the prospect of a peace agreement remains remote, given al-Sharaa’s commitment not to accept an agreement without an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Israel’s continued military presence in the Syrian Golan, which Israel views as a necessary lesson from the failure of October 7.

The principal challenge Israel faces in the Syrian theater is the potential for a growing terrorist threat in the Syrian Golan Heights amid the IDF’s presence in the security zone. This area has always been part of Syria’s periphery and previously hosted significant global jihadist activity, particularly in the southern Golan. By contrast, al-Sharaa appears determined to keep the Syrian border as quiet as possible, given his focus on other issues, although his regime is not yet entirely stable.

Israel also has a significant opportunity to deepen cooperation with the Syrian regime on shared interests, primarily Hezbollah and global jihad, under a U.S. umbrella. Israel can and should pursue a security agreement with Syria that ensures the demilitarization of southern Syria and the safety of the Druze community there. In parallel, it should seek to establish a mechanism along the Syrian-Lebanese border capable of preventing most transfers of weapons and funds to Hezbollah through Syria. Unlike Lebanon, Syria offers no genuine path to a peace agreement, but sound management could both calm the theater and advance shared interests that require Syrian cooperation. Israel must nevertheless continue to regard the Syrian regime with caution in light of al-Sharaa’s al-Qaeda past and keep both possibilities in mind: that he is a jihadist who has changed course or that he has merely adopted a more pragmatic public posture. This uncertainty requires caution in dealing with him and a military presence that reduces the risk of surprises.

The Houthis and the Red Sea

To the south, the Houthis continue to establish themselves as the “surprise of the war.” A movement rooted in a ruling family and presiding over an impoverished population has managed to disrupt the regional and global economies and become an increasingly serious problem for both Israel and the region’s states. Over the past year, the Houthis have operated against Israel on a relatively limited scale, partly because of successive military operations directed against them. Nevertheless, the challenge they pose is likely to grow, particularly given their expansionist, Islamist, jihadist, and antisemitic ideology. After October 7, their repeated declarations about the need to destroy Israel and send thousands of fighters to Jerusalem must be taken seriously, especially in view of their considerable military power and the possibility that they will seek a leadership role in the Shiite axis if Iran is weakened.

The Houthis are by no means solely Israel’s problem, as the escalating direct confrontation between them and Saudi Arabia demonstrates. This challenge is also an opportunity for Israel to deepen partnerships with other states and advance a coherent strategy for weakening the Houthis through military, economic, and other means – including the development of alternative shipping routes that reduce dependence on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which the Houthis can effectively hold hostage. In the meantime, Israel should concentrate on its other principal objectives, seek to contain the Houthi threat to the extent possible, and deter the organization from aggressive action against it.

The Palestinian Arena

In Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Israel has registered significant operational achievements against Palestinian terrorism, largely because of sustained operations in refugee camps in northern Samaria – among the largest terrorist strongholds in the area. The IDF has substantially reduced the scale of terrorism in Judea and Samaria, particularly coordinated and sophisticated attacks. This achievement has had a positive effect both within the territory and on Israel’s home front.

Nevertheless, the underlying problems remain. Increased friction between Jews and Palestinians, the rise in nationalistically motivated violence, and the growing difficulty of enforcing law and order increase the likelihood of a violent eruption in the near term. The economic situation is also deteriorating, while the post–Mahmoud Abbas era approaches; Abbas is now over 90. In this fragile environment, and with the IDF deployed across so many theaters, the challenge in this arena will become especially significant in the coming year.

Egypt and Jordan

Concerns about the stability of neighboring governments are not confined to the Palestinian Authority; they also apply to Egypt and Jordan. Egypt continues to confront severe structural challenges that impede its ability to meet the needs of its enormous population. The peace treaty and the clear convergence of interests remain intact, but the possibility of rapid political upheaval – as occurred with the fall of the Mubarak government in 2011 – is ever present. A further concern is the gradual expansion of Egyptian military activity in the Sinai Peninsula, which raises serious questions about compliance with the Camp David Accords. The result is a fragile reality in which an authoritarian government whose long-term stability is not assured is taking steps that could diminish Israel’s security safeguards in the event of its collapse. Israel must find the delicate balance between strengthening the peace treaty and Egypt’s stability, on the one hand, and insisting more firmly on Egypt’s adherence to the Camp David Accords, on the other.

In Jordan, the cold peace and close security coordination have endured and have even deepened as the direct Iranian threat to both countries has become clearer. King Abdullah is stepping up efforts to place his son, the crown prince, at center stage, highlighting the kingdom’s relative vulnerability as it approaches a future succession. Jordan faces intensifying challenges – from Syrian refugees and Iran, which regards the kingdom as a weak link in the U.S. regional posture, to the possibility of upheaval in the Palestinian arena. Here too, Israel will need to bring its influence to bear to safeguard the kingdom’s stability and the peace treaty.

The Turkish Challenge

Over the past year, Turkey has emerged as a growing challenge to Israel, both because of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s provocative rhetoric and because of Ankara’s actions on the ground. Turkey continues to tolerate overt Hamas terrorist activity on its soil and leads a substantial share of the delegitimization campaign against Israel. The two countries also have conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria. This reinforces a growing perception in Israel that Turkey could become Israel’s “next threat,” particularly as the Iranian regime weakens.

Ankara is not Abu Dhabi, but neither is it Tehran. Israel and Turkey still maintain a bilateral framework that allows them to manage disagreements, and the United States remains a major source of leverage over Turkey. Erdoğan has repeatedly chosen not to rupture relations with Israel entirely, despite conflicting interests and his sustained hostility toward it. Israel must recognize the growing Turkish challenge while avoiding misleading comparisons with Iran. Turkey requires a different set of tools – ones that allow disputes to be managed while channels of communication around shared interests remain open.

Converting Military Gains into Strategic Outcomes

The overall strategic picture is mixed. Israel emerges from this period stronger relative to many of its enemies, having demonstrated exceptional military capabilities, weakened the ring of threats surrounding it, and expanded its freedom of action. Yet major threats remain: the possible revival of Iran’s nuclear program; the missile threat; instability in the Palestinian arena and neighboring states; the growing Turkish challenge; and the deepening damage to Israel’s standing in the West. Israel has improved its military position but has not yet secured its long-term strategic standing.

The principal test now is Israel’s ability to convert battlefield achievements into durable political and diplomatic outcomes. Hezbollah’s weakening could lead to a new arrangement in Lebanon; the erosion of the Iranian axis could accelerate the expansion of the Abraham Accords; and shared interests in confronting Iran, the Houthis, and terrorism could deepen cooperation with the United States and regional partners. But windows of opportunity do not remain open indefinitely. Without diplomatic initiative, close coordination with Washington, responsible handling of the Palestinian question, and the rebuilding of international legitimacy, military gains may erode and weakened enemies may recover.

Israel therefore faces a strategic choice. It can regard its military power as an end in itself, or it can use that power as the basis for shaping a new regional order, strengthening alliances, and reducing threats for decades to come. Doing so requires a sober policy that neither ignores dangers nor misses opportunities – one capable of combining force with diplomacy, vigilance with cooperation, and operational resolve with a long-term perspective. Israel’s success in the coming years will be measured not only by the enemies it has weakened, but also by the political, security, and economic reality it succeeds in building on the foundation of those achievements.