Jewish Communities Worldwide

The Ukraine War – A Jewish and Israeli Perspective

As the war marks its third anniversary, this new JPPI study examines its impact on Jewish communities in Europe and how Israel should address the geopolitical changes that have occurred as a result.

By: Dr. Dov Maimon

The Ukraine War – A Jewish and Israeli Perspective

Strategic Transformations in Israel-Europe Relations

The Russia-Ukraine War has catalyzed fundamental changes in Israel-Europe relations, spanning military cooperation, energy security, and diplomatic dynamics. These transformations, while significant in their own right, took on additional complexity in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack and subsequent Gaza conflict. The detailed effects of the Ukraine war, followed by the slowdown during the Gaza conflict, on both economic and non-economic relations between Israel and the EU are summarized in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.

1. Military and Security Cooperation

The war has driven unprecedented military cooperation between Israel and European nations, nurtured by renewed fears of potential Russian aggression. The comprehensive trend began with the Czech Republic purchasing Iron Dome radars from Israel Aerospace Industries in 2019, followed by Hungary in 2020 and Slovakia in 2021. Multiple bilateral security agreements have since emerged, including Germany’s €3.5 billion Arrow-3 acquisition and Finland’s agreement to purchase the David’s Sling system. French-Israeli cybersecurity cooperation has doubled, while Polish-Israeli drone defense initiatives have been established. The Baltic States have adopted Israeli counter-terrorism protocols, marking a significant shift in security relationships.³⁸ These developments reflect a growing European recognition of Israeli military and technological capabilities in an increasingly unstable global environment dominated by Russian threats.

2. Energy Security Dynamics

Israel’s position in European energy security calculations has strengthened significantly. The EastMed pipeline project, previously considered economically marginal, has gained new strategic importance. The 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline connecting Israeli gas to Europe via Cyprus and Greece was once dismissed as economically unfeasible at €6 billion. With a planned capacity of 10 billion cubic meters annually, the pipeline could replace approximately 10 percent of Europe’s pre-war Russian gas imports.³⁹ European investment in Israeli gas infrastructure has similarly increased by 145 percent since 2022, reflecting a broader recalibration of energy security priorities.⁴⁰ This energy dimension has added a new layer to Israel-Europe relations, moving beyond traditional security cooperation to encompass strategic resource management and energy independence from Russia.⁴¹

3. Impact of the Hamas Attack on Israel-Europe Relations

The October 7 Hamas attack and subsequent Gaza conflict have added new complexity to these evolving dynamics. Initial European solidarity with Israel in the wake of the October 7 onslaught has evolved into a more nuanced position, particularly as civilian casualties in Gaza mounted. This evolution mirrors historical patterns identified by writers like Dara Horn, who published People Love Dead Jews in 2021. The book exposes the tendency to express sympathy for Jewish victims while criticizing Jewish self-defense.⁴² However, the foundation of military and energy cooperation established in response to the Ukraine war has provided a more robust framework for maintaining strategic relationships despite political tensions.

The dual pressures of the Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict have tested the resilience of these emerging partnerships, while also making clear their strategic importance to both sides. This period has fundamentally reshaped the relationship between Israel and Europe, creating a more pragmatic and focused partnership that maintains essential cooperation while adapting to evolving geopolitical challenges.

The ability to sustain critical collaborations during these crises, particularly in areas like security, energy, and research, shows both the durability and strategic necessity of these bilateral ties, even as they navigate through periods of significant international tension.

4. Israel’s Image: Partnership Growth Does Not Equal Public Support

Despite growing professional and military partnerships with Israel across Europe, their impact on public opinion reveals a sharp East-West divide. In Ukraine, where the Russian invasion has heightened security concerns, Israel serves as an inspiring model of a nation successfully balancing security with prosperity. Ukraine particularly admires Israel’s ability to maintain a thriving democracy and high-tech economy while managing constant conflict – a path that resonates with Ukraine’s current challenges. This alignment has led to Ukraine being labeled “the most pro-Israel country in the world,” with 69 percent supporting Israel during the Hamas conflict versus one percent backing Palestinians, a pattern reflected across other Eastern European nations, such as the Baltic States, Poland, and Moldova.

However, as data shows, increased professional collaboration with Israel has not improved public attitudes in Western Europe. The data shows that Western European public support for Israel has not increased but decreased since the Ukraine war began. While October 7, 2023 triggered a temporary shift in sentiment, support levels quickly recalibrated to their previous trajectory or even beyond, suggesting that enhanced partnerships do not necessarily translate into public opinion upgrades.

5. European Responses to Ukraine and Gaza: A Comparative Analysis

Understanding Europe’s responses to both the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts provides crucial insights into the evolving dynamics of European foreign policy and its implications for Jewish and Israeli interests. While both conflicts engage core European values and security concerns, national responses reveal distinct patterns shaped by historical legacies, geopolitical interests, and domestic factors. The following tables offer a systematic analysis of these complex positions, highlighting the often-contradictory nature of European positions.

Tables 1 and 2 map individual European countries’ positions on the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts respectively, categorizing their stances and examining the underlying rationales and priority focuses. This comparative approach reveals how factors such as geographic proximity to Russia, historical experiences, energy dependencies, and domestic political considerations shape national responses. Table 3 then provides a comprehensive country-by-country comparison of postures on both conflicts, exposing interesting patterns where nations that strongly support Ukraine may take markedly different positions on the Israel-Gaza conflict, or vice versa.

This detailed mapping helps identify both reliable partners and areas of concern for Jewish communities and Israeli interests, while illuminating the complex interplay between historical obligations, strategic interests, and domestic political pressures in shaping European foreign policy responses. The analysis is particularly useful for understanding potential future trends in European-Israeli relations and their implications for Jewish security across the continent.

6. The Rise of Radical Parties: A Complex Web of Attitudes Toward Ukraine and Israel

While our previous analysis treated European countries as monolithic entities, a more nuanced understanding requires examining the growing influence of radical political parties across the continent. Their increasing electoral success and potential for gaining power demands careful attention to their positions on both the Ukraine war and Israel-Palestinian conflict, as summarized in Table 4.

The Ukraine war has notably weakened the liberal ethos in Europe, empowering both far-right and far-left parties with anti-liberal agendas. For European Jews, this trend raises particular concerns as these movements often harbor xenophobic elements and show little sympathy for Jewish particularity. However, the far-right and far-left manifest markedly different attitudes toward Israel and Ukraine.

Far-right parties, particularly in Germany, France, and Italy, have emerged as strong supporters of Israel, driven by a shared opposition to Islamism and an admiration for Israeli nationalism, military prowess, anti-terrorism activities, and conservative values (family, high birth rates, religious identity). Many have tactically moderated their historical antisemitic rhetoric. Regarding Ukraine, their position is more ambivalent – while some express admiration for Putin’s authoritarian leadership and conservative values, others fear Russian expansion. They generally oppose financial aid to Ukraine, prioritizing national interests over international commitments.

The far-left presents a more complex picture. These parties have overwhelmingly adopted pro-Palestinian positions, with many literally replacing the red flag with the Palestinian flag as their symbol. They advocate for multiculturalism and pro-immigration policies (with Germany’s Die Linke as a notable exception). Jewish communities generally view them with greater apprehension than far-right parties (except for cases like Germany’s AfD). On Ukraine, their self-proclaimed anti-NATO, anti-militarist, and pacifist stances effectively translate into support for Putin’s invasion and territorial annexations, reflecting lingering sympathies for communism and anti-Western narratives.

Far-left support for Putin varies significantly by country. In France, La France Insoumise (LFI) under Jean-Luc Mélenchon frames the conflict as the result of NATO aggression, driven more by anti-Americanism than pro-Putin sentiment. Germany’s Die Linke shows internal divisions, officially condemning Russian belligerence while significant factions oppose NATO and arms supplies to Ukraine, reflecting both East German communist heritage and modern leftist pacifism. Southern European parties like Spain’s Podemos and Greece’s SYRIZA view Russia as a counterweight to American hegemony, though their support has become more muted since the invasion. Most extreme are parties in Cyprus and Bulgaria, where historical, religious, and cultural ties to Russia combine with communist nostalgia to produce more explicit pro-Putin positions. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) particularly stands out in consistently defending Russian interests.

This support stems from traditional anti-Western sentiment, opposition to NATO, lingering communist sympathies, and viewing Russia as a bulwark against American “imperialism.” However, this position has created internal tensions, as Putin’s Russia embraces nationalist and conservative values that clash with leftist ideologies.

PreviousNext